The demand for intensity versus frequency of alcohol consumption: Evidence from rural Australia

This paper develops a theoretical model for the demand of alcohol where intensity and frequency of consumption are separate choices made by individuals in order to maximize their utility. While distinguishing between intensity and frequency of consumption may be unimportant for many goods, this is clearly not the case with alcohol where the likelihood of harm depends not only on the total consumed but also on the pattern of use. The results from the theoretical model are applied to data from rural Australia in order to investigate the factors that affect the patterns of alcohol use for this population group. This research can play an important role in informing policies by identifying those factors which influence preferences for patterns of risky alcohol use and those groups and communities who are most at risk of harm.

Expressive Political Behaviour: Foundations, Scope and Implications

A growing literature has focussed attention on ‘expressive’ rather than ‘instrumental’ behaviour in political settings - particularly voting A common criticism of the expressive idea is that its myriad possibilities make it rather ad hoc and lacking in both predictive and normative bite. We agree that no single clear definition of expressive behaviour has emerged to date, and no detailed foundations of specific expressive motivations have been provided, so that there are rather few specific implications drawn from the analysis of expressive behaviour. In response, we provide a foundational discussion and definition of expressive behaviour that accounts for a range of factors. We also discuss the content of expressive choice distinguishing between moral, social and emotional cases, and relate this more general account to the specific theories of expressive choice in the literature. Finally, we discuss the normative and institutional implications of expressive behaviour.

Unionism and Peer-Referencing

This study assesses the 'fair-wage-effort' hypothesis, by examining (a) the relationship between relative wage comparisons and job satisfaction and quitting intensions, and (b) the relative ranking of stated effort inducing-incentives, in a novel dataset of unionised and non-unionised European employees. By distinguishing between downward and upward-looking wage comparisons, it is shown that wage comparisons to similar workers exert an asymmetric impact on the job satisfaction of union workers, a pattern consistent with inequity-aversion and conformism to the reference point. Moreover, union workers evaluate peer observation and good industrial relations more highly than payment and other incentives. In contrast, non-union workers are found to be more status-seeking in their satisfaction responses and less dependent on their peers in their effort choices The results are robust to endogenous union membership, considerations of generic loss aversion and across different tenure profiles. They are supportive of the individual egalitarian bias of collective wage determination and self-enforcing effort norms.

Pareto or log-normal? A recursive-truncation approach to the distribution of (all) cities

Traditionally, it is assumed that the population size of cities in a country follows a Pareto distribution. This assumption is typically supported by nding evidence of Zipf's Law. Recent studies question this nding, highlighting that, while the Pareto distribution may t reasonably well when the data is truncated at the upper tail, i.e. for the largest cities of a country, the log-normal distribution may apply when all cities are considered. Moreover, conclusions may be sensitive to the choice of a particular truncation threshold, a yet overlooked issue in the literature. In this paper, then, we reassess the city size distribution in relation to its sensitivity to the choice of truncation point. In particular, we look at US Census data and apply a recursive-truncation approach to estimate Zipf's Law and a non-parametric alternative test where we consider each possible truncation point of the distribution of all cities. Results con rm the sensitivity of results to the truncation point. Moreover, repeating the analysis over simulated data con rms the di culty of distinguishing a Pareto tail from the tail of a log-normal and, in turn, identifying the city size distribution as a false or a weak Pareto law.

Choice, Deferral and Consistency

In this paper we study decision making in situations where the individual’s preferences are not assumed to be complete. First, we identify conditions that are necessary and sufficient for choice behavior in general domains to be consistent with maximization of a possibly incomplete preference relation. In this model of maximally dominant choice, the agent defers/avoids choosing at those and only those menus where a most preferred option does not exist. This allows for simple explanations of conflict-induced deferral and choice overload. It also suggests a criterion for distinguishing between indifference and incomparability based on observable data. A simple extension of this model also incorporates decision costs and provides a theoretical framework that is compatible with the experimental design that we propose to elicit possibly incomplete preferences in the lab. The design builds on the introduction of monetary costs that induce choice of a most preferred feasible option if one exists and deferral otherwise. Based on this design we found evidence suggesting that a quarter of the subjects in our study had incomplete preferences, and that these made significantly more consistent choices than a group of subjects who were forced to choose. The latter effect, however, is mitigated once data on indifferences are accounted for.

Measuring Tax Complexity

This paper critically examines a number of issues relating to the measurement of tax complexity. It starts with an analysis of the concept of tax complexity, distinguishing tax design complexity and operational complexity. It considers the consequences/costs of complexity, and then examines the rationale for measuring complexity. Finally it applies the analysis to an examination of an index of complexity developed by the UK Office of Tax Simplification (OTS).

Non-Cooperative Asymptotic Oligopoly in Economies with Infinitely Many Commodities

In this paper, we extend the non-cooperative analysis of oligopoly to exchange economics with infinitely many commodities by using strategic market games. This setting can be interpreted as a model of oligopoly with differentiated commodities by using the Hotelling line. We prove the existence of an "active" Cournot-Nash equilibrium and show that, when traders are replicated, the price vector and the allocation converge to the Walras equilibrium. We examine how the notion of oligopoly extends to our setting with a countable infinity of commodities by distinguishing between asymptotic oligopolists and asymptotic price-takes. We illustrate these notions via a number of examples.