Bayesian Model Averaging in the Instrumental Variable Regression Model

This paper considers the instrumental variable regression model when there is uncertainty about the set of instruments, exogeneity restrictions, the validity of identifying restrictions and the set of exogenous regressors. This uncertainty can result in a huge number of models. To avoid statistical problems associated with standard model selection procedures, we develop a reversible jump Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm that allows us to do Bayesian model averaging. The algorithm is very exible and can be easily adapted to analyze any of the di¤erent priors that have been proposed in the Bayesian instrumental variables literature. We show how to calculate the probability of any relevant restriction (e.g. the posterior probability that over-identifying restrictions hold) and discuss diagnostic checking using the posterior distribution of discrepancy vectors. We illustrate our methods in a returns-to-schooling application.

A Comparison Of Forecasting Procedures For Macroeconomic Series: The Contribution Of Structural Break Models

This paper compares the forecasting performance of different models which have been proposed for forecasting in the presence of structural breaks. These models differ in their treatment of the break process, the parameters defining the model which applies in each regime and the out-of-sample probability of a break occurring. In an extensive empirical evaluation involving many important macroeconomic time series, we demonstrate the presence of structural breaks and their importance for forecasting in the vast majority of cases. However, we find no single forecasting model consistently works best in the presence of structural breaks. In many cases, the formal modeling of the break process is important in achieving good forecast performance. However, there are also many cases where simple, rolling OLS forecasts perform well.

A Comparison Of Forecasting Procedures For Macroeconomic Series: The Contribution Of Structural Break Models

This paper compares the forecasting performance of different models which have been proposed for forecasting in the presence of structural breaks. These models differ in their treatment of the break process, the parameters defining the model which applies in each regime and the out-of-sample probability of a break occurring. In an extensive empirical evaluation involving many important macroeconomic time series, we demonstrate the presence of structural breaks and their importance for forecasting in the vast majority of cases. However, we find no single forecasting model consistently works best in the presence of structural breaks. In many cases, the formal modeling of the break process is important in achieving good forecast performance. However, there are also many cases where simple, rolling OLS forecasts perform well.

Legal Uncertainty, Competition Law Enforcement Procedures and Optimal Penalties

In this paper we make three contributions to the literature on optimal Competition Law enforcement procedures. The first (which is of general interest beyond competition policy) is to clarify the concept of “legal uncertainty”, relating it to ideas in the literature on Law and Economics, but formalising the concept through various information structures which specify the probability that each firm attaches – at the time it takes an action – to the possibility of its being deemed anti-competitive were it to be investigated by a Competition Authority. We show that the existence of Type I and Type II decision errors by competition authorities is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of legal uncertainty, and that information structures with legal uncertainty can generate higher welfare than information structures with legal certainty – a result echoing a similar finding obtained in a completely different context and under different assumptions in earlier Law and Economics literature (Kaplow and Shavell, 1992). Our second contribution is to revisit and significantly generalise the analysis in our previous paper, Katsoulacos and Ulph (2009), involving a welfare comparison of Per Se and Effects- Based legal standards. In that analysis we considered just a single information structure under an Effects-Based standard and also penalties were exogenously fixed. Here we allow for (a) different information structures under an Effects-Based standard and (b) endogenous penalties. We obtain two main results: (i) considering all information structures a Per Se standard is never better than an Effects-Based standard; (ii) optimal penalties may be higher when there is legal uncertainty than when there is no legal uncertainty.