A Panel Data Investigation of Real Exchange Rate Misalignment and Growth

The paper investigates the role of real exchange rate misalignment on long-run growth for a set of ninety countries using time series data from 1980 to 2004. We first estimate a panel data model (using fixed and random effects) for the real exchange rate, with different model specifications, in order to produce estimates of the equilibrium real exchange rate and this is then used to construct measures of real exchange rate misalignment. We also provide an alternative set of estimates of real exchange rate misalignment using panel cointegration methods. The variables used in our real exchange rate models are: real per capita GDP; net foreign assets; terms of trade and government consumption. The results for the two-step System GMM panel growth models indicate that the coefficients for real exchange rate misalignment are positive for different model specification and samples, which means that a more depreciated (appreciated) real exchange rate helps (harms) long-run growth. The estimated coefficients are higher for developing and emerging countries.

Corruption and the Military in Politics: Theory and Evidence from around the World

Recent theoretical developments and case study evidence suggests a relationship between the military in politics and corruption. This study contributes to this literature by analyzing theoretically and empirically the role of the military in politics and corruption for the first time. By drawing on a cross sectional and panel data set covering a large number of countries, over the period 1984-2007, and using a variety of econometric methods substantial empirical support is found for a positive relationship between the military in politics and corruption. In sum, our results reveal that a one standard deviation increase in the military in politics leads to a 0.22 unit increase in corruption index. This relationship is shown to be robust to a variety of specification changes, different econometric techniques, different sample sizes, alternative corruption indices and the exclusion of outliers. This study suggests that the explanatory power of the military in politics is at least as important as the conventionally accepted causes of corruption, such as economic development.

Microstructure Order Flow: Statistical and Economic Evaluation of Nonlinear Forecasts

In this paper we propose a novel empirical extension of the standard market microstructure order flow model. The main idea is that heterogeneity of beliefs in the foreign exchange market can cause model instability and such instability has not been fully accounted for in the existing empirical literature. We investigate this issue using two di¤erent data sets and focusing on out- of-sample forecasts. Forecasting power is measured using standard statistical tests and, additionally, using an alternative approach based on measuring the economic value of forecasts after building a portfolio of assets. We nd there is a substantial economic value on conditioning on the proposed models.

Corruption and Financial Intermediation in a Panel of Regions: Cross-Border Effects of Corruption

The importance of financial market reforms in combating corruption has been highlighted in the theoretical literature but has not been systemically tested empirically. In this study we provide a first pass at testing this relationship using both linear and nonmonotonic forms of the relationship between corruption and financial intermediation. Our study finds a negative and statistically significant impact of financial intermediation on corruption. Specifically, the results imply that a one standard deviation increase in financial intermediation is associated with a decrease in corruption of 0.20 points, or 16 percent of the standard deviation in the corruption index and this relationship is shown to be robust to a variety of specification changes, including: (i) different sets of control variables; (ii) different econometrics techniques; (iii) different sample sizes; (iv) alternative corruption indices; (v) removal of outliers; (vi) different sets of panels; and (vii) allowing for cross country interdependence, contagion effects, of corruption.