Why do UK banks securitize?

The eight years from 2000 to 2008 saw a rapid growth in the use of securitization by UK banks. We aim to identify the reasons that contributed to this rapid growth. The time period (2000 to 2010) covered by our study is noteworthy as it covers the pre- financial crisis credit-boom, the peak of the fi nancial crisis and its aftermath. In the wake of the financial crisis, many governments, regulators and political commentators have pointed an accusing finger at the securitization market - even in the absence of a detailed statistical and economic analysis. We contribute to the extant literature by performing such an analysis on UK banks, focussing principally on whether it is the need for liquidity (i.e. the funding of their balance sheets), or the desire to engage in regulatory capital arbitrage or the need for credit risk transfer that has led to UK banks securitizing their assets. We show that securitization has been signi ficantly driven by liquidity reasons. In addition, we observe a positive link between securitization and banks credit risk. We interpret these latter findings as evidence that UK banks which engaged in securitization did so, in part, to transfer credit risk and that, in comparison to UK banks which did not use securitization, they had more credit risk to transfer in the sense that they originated lower quality loans and held lower quality assets. We show that banks which issued more asset-backed securities before the financial crisis suffered more defaults after the financial crisis.

Firm size and trade secret intensity: evidence from the Economic Espionage Act

This paper considers trade secrecy as an appropriation mechanism in the context ofb the US Economic Espionage Act (EEA) 1996. We examine the relation between trade secret intensity and firm size, using a cross section of 95 court cases. The paper builds on extant work in three respects. First, we create a unique body of evidence, using EEA prosecutions from 1996 to 2008. Second, we use an econometric approach to measurement, estimation and hypothesis testing. This allows us comprehensively to test the robustness of findings. Third, we focus on objectively measured valuations, instead of the subjective, self-reported values used elsewhere. We find a stable, robust value for the elasticity of trade secret intensity with respect to firm size, which indicates that a 10% reduction in firm size leads to a 7% increase in trade secret intensity. We find that this result is not sensitive to industrial sector, sample trimming, or functional form.