Self-Fulfilling Price Cycles

This paper presents a model of a self-fulfilling price cycle in an asset market. Price oscillates deterministically even though the underlying environment is stationary. The mechanism that we uncover is driven by endogenous variation in the investment horizons of the different market participants, informed and uninformed. On even days, the price is high; on odd days it is low. On even days, informed traders are willing to jettison their good assets, knowing that they can buy them back the next day, when the price is low. The anticipated drop in price more than offsets any potential loss in dividend. Because of these asset sales, the informed build up their cash holdings. Understanding that the market is flooded with good assets, the uninformed traders are willing to pay a high price. But their investment horizon is longer than that of the informed traders: their intention is to hold the assets they purchase, not to resell. On odd days, the price is low because the uninformed recognise that the informed are using their cash holdings to cherry-pick good assets from the market. Now the uninformed, like the informed, are investing short-term. Rather than buy-and-hold as they do with assets purchased on even days, on odd days the uninformed are buying to sell. Notice that, at the root of the model, there lies a credit constraint. Although the informed are flush with cash on odd days, they are not deep pockets. On each cherry that they pick out of the market, they earn a high return: buying cheap, selling dear. However they don't have enough cash to strip the market of cherries and thereby bid the price up.

Asset Prices, Business Cycles, and Markov-Perfect Fiscal Policy when Agents are Risk-Sensitive

We study a business cycle model in which a benevolent fiscal authority must determine the optimal provision of government services, while lacking credibility, lump-sum taxes, and the ability to bond finance deficits. Households and the fiscal authority have risk sensitive preferences. We find that outcomes are affected importantly by the household's risk sensitivity, but not by the fiscal authority's. Further, while household risk-sensitivity induces a strong precautionary saving motive, which raises capital and lowers the return on assets, its effects on fluctuations and the business cycle are generally small, although more pronounced for negative shocks. Holding the stochastic steady state constant, increases in household risk-sensitivity lower the risk-free rate and raise the return on equity, increasing the equity premium. Finally, although risk-sensitivity has little effect on the provision of government services, it does cause the fiscal authority to lower the income tax rate. An additional contribution of this paper is to present a method for computing Markov-perfect equilibria in models where private agents and the government are risk-sensitive decisionmakers.

News Shocks and Business Cycles: Bridging the Gap from Different Methodologies

An important disconnect in the news driven view of the business cycle formalized by Beaudry and Portier (2004), is the lack of agreement between different—VAR and DSGE—methodologies over the empirical plausibility of this view. We argue that this disconnect can be largely resolved once we augment a standard DSGE model with a financial channel that provides amplification to news shocks. Both methodologies suggest news shocks to the future growth prospects of the economy to be significant drivers of U.S. business cycles in the post-Greenspan era (1990-2011), explaining as much as 50% of the forecast error variance in hours worked in cyclical frequencies

Money Cycles

Operating overheads are widespread and lead to concentrated bursts of activity. To transfer resources between active and idle spells, agents demand financial assets. Futures contracts and lotteries are unsuitable, as they have substantial overheads of their own.We show that money – under efficient monetary policy – is a liquid asset that leads to efficient allocations. Under all other policies, agents follow inefficient “money cycle” patterns of saving, activity, and inactivity. Agents spend their money too quickly – a “hot potato effect of inflation”. We show that inflation can stimulate inefficiently high aggregate output.