Understanding Liquidity and Credit Risks in the Financial Crisis

This paper develops a structured dynamic factor model for the spreads between London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and overnight index swap (OIS) rates for a panel of banks. Our model involves latent factors which reflect liquidity and credit risk. Our empirical results show that surges in the short term LIBOR-OIS spreads during the 2007-2009 fi nancial crisis were largely driven by liquidity risk. However, credit risk played a more signifi cant role in the longer term (twelve-month) LIBOR-OIS spread. The liquidity risk factors are more volatile than the credit risk factor. Most of the familiar events in the financial crisis are linked more to movements in liquidity risk than credit risk.

Dynamic Option Adjusted Spread and the Value of Mortgage Backed Securities (Draft 1)

We extend a reduced form model for pricing pass-through mortgage backed securities (MBS) and provide a novel hedging tool for investors in this market. To calculate the price of an MBS, traders use what is known as option-adjusted spread (OAS). The resulting OAS value represents the required basis points adjustment to reference curve discounting rates needed to match an observed market price. The OAS suffers from some drawbacks. For example, it remains constant until the maturity of the bond (thirty years in mortgage-backed securities), and does not incorporate interest rate volatility. We suggest instead what we call dynamic option adjusted spread (DOAS). The latter allows investors in the mortgage market to account for both prepayment risk and changes of the yield curve.

Hawtreyan “Credit Deadlock” or Keynesian “Liquidity Trap”? Lessons for Japan from the Great Depression

This paper outlines the ideas of Ralph Hawtrey and Lauchlin Currie on the need for monetised fiscal deficit spending in 1930s USA to combat the deep depression into which the economy had been allowed to sink. In such exceptional circumstances of “credit deadlock” in which banks were afraid to lend and households and business afraid to borrow, the deadlock could best be broken through the spending of new money into circulation via large fiscal deficits. This complementarity of fiscal and monetary policy was shown to be essential, and as such indicates the potential power of monetary policy – in contrast to the Keynesian “liquidity trap” view that it is powerless This lesson was not learned by the Japanese authorities in their response to the asset price collapse of 1991-92, resulting in a lost decade as ballooning fiscal deficits were neutralised throughout the 1990s by unhelpfully tight monetary policy with the Bank of Japan refusing to monetise the deficits.

Dynamic Option Adjusted Spread and the Value of Mortgage Backed Securities (Draft 2)

We extend a reduced form model for pricing pass-through mortgage backed securities (MBS) and provide a novel hedging tool for investors in this market. To calculate the price of an MBS, traders use what is known as option-adjusted spread (OAS). The resulting OAS value represents the required basis points adjustment to reference curve discounting rates needed to match an observed market price. The OAS suffers from some drawbacks. For example, it remains constant until the maturity of the bond (thirty years in mortgage-backed securities), and does not incorporate interest rate volatility. We suggest instead what we call dynamic option adjusted spread (DOAS), which allows investors in the mortgage market to account for both prepayment risk and changes of the yield curve.

Interest Rate Co-movements, Global Factors and the Long End of the Term Spread

The disconnect between rising short and low long interest rates has been a distinctive feature of the 2000s. Both research and policy circles have argued that international forces, such as global monetary policy (e.g. Rogoff, 2006); international business cycles (e.g. Borio and Filardo, 2007); or a global savings glut (e.g Bernanke, 2005) may be responsible. In this paper, we employ recent advances in panel data econometrics to document the disconnect and link it explicitly to the existence of a global latent factor that dominates the long end of the term spread for the recent period; the saving glut story emerges as the most likely contender for the global factor.

Estimating Phillips Curves in Turbulent Times using the ECB’s Survey of Professional Forecasters

This paper uses forecasts from the European Central Bank's Survey of Professional Forecasters to investigate the relationship between inflation and inflation expectations in the euro area. We use theoretical structures based on the New Keynesian and Neoclassical Phillips curves to inform our empirical work. Given the relatively short data span of the Survey of Professional Forecasters and the need to control for many explanatory variables, we use dynamic model averaging in order to ensure a parsimonious econometric speci cation. We use both regression-based and VAR-based methods. We find no support for the backward looking behavior embedded in the Neo-classical Phillips curve. Much more support is found for the forward looking behavior of the New Keynesian Phillips curve, but most of this support is found after the beginning of the financial crisis.

Estimating United States Phillips Curves With Expectations Consistent With The Statistical Process Of Inflation

‘Modern’ Phillips curve theories predict inflation is an integrated, or near integrated, process. However, inflation appears bounded above and below in developed economies and so cannot be ‘truly’ integrated and more likely stationary around a shifting mean. If agents believe inflation is integrated as in the ‘modern’ theories then they are making systematic errors concerning the statistical process of inflation. An alternative theory of the Phillips curve is developed that is consistent with the ‘true’ statistical process of inflation. It is demonstrated that United States inflation data is consistent with the alternative theory but not with the existing ‘modern’ theories.

Pecuniary Externality through Credit Constraints: Two Examples without Uncertainty

This paper is a contribution to the growing literature on constrained inefficiencies in economies with financial frictions. The purpose is to present two simple examples, inspired by the stochastic models in Gersbach-Rochet (2012) and Lorenzoni (2008), of deterministic environments in which such inefficiencies arise through credit constraints. Common to both examples is a pecuniary externality, which operates through an asset price. In the second example, a simple transfer between two groups of agents can bring about a Pareto improvement. In a first best economy, there are no pecuniary externalities because marginal productivities are equalised. But when agents face credit constraints, there is a wedge between their marginal productivities and those of the non-credit-constrained agents. The wedge is the source of the pecuniary externality: economies with these kinds of imperfections in credit markets are not second-best efficient. This is akin to the constrained inefficiency of an economy with incomplete markets, as in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986).

A Multiple Break Panel Approach to Estimating United States Phillips Curves

Phillips curves are often estimated without due attention being paid to the underlying time series properties of the data. In particular, the consequences of inflation having discrete breaks in mean have not been studied adequately. We show by means of simulations and a detailed empirical example based on United States data that not taking account of breaks may lead to biased, and therefore spurious, estimates of Phillips curves. We suggest a method to account for the breaks in mean inflation and obtain meaningful and unbiased estimates of the short- and long-run Phillips curves in the United States.

'Modern' Phillips Curves and the Implications For The Statistical Process of Inflation

'Modern' theories of the Phillips curve imply that inflation is an integrated, or near integrated process. This paper explains this implication and why these 'modern' theories are logically inconsistent with what is commonly known about the statistical process of inflation.