Democratization as a cost-saving device

We propose a theoretical analysis of democratization processes in which an elite extends the franchise to the poor when threatened with a revolution. The poor could govern without changing the political system by maintaining a continuous revolutionary threat on the elite. Revolutionary threats, however, are costly to the poor and democracy is a superior sys- tem in which political agreement is reached through costless voting. This provides a rationale for democratic transitions that has not been discussed in the literature.

The Difference, System and ‘Double-D’ GMM Panel Estimators in the Presence of Structural Breaks

The effects of structural breaks in dynamic panels are more complicated than in time series models as the bias can be either negative or positive. This paper focuses on the effects of mean shifts in otherwise stationary processes within an instrumental variable panel estimation framework. We show the sources of the bias and a Monte Carlo analysis calibrated on United States bank lending data demonstrates the size of the bias for a range of auto-regressive parameters. We also propose additional moment conditions that can be used to reduce the biases caused by shifts in the mean of the data.