Official Central Bank Interventions in the Foreign Exchange Markets: A DCC Approach with Exogenous Variables

This paper assesses the impact of official central bank interventions (CBIs) on exchange rate returns, their volatility and bilateral correlations. By exploiting the recent publication of intervention data by the Bank of England, this study is able to investigate fficial interventions by a total number of four central banks, while the previous studies have been limited to three (the Federal Reserve, Bundesbank and Bank of Japan). The results of the existing literature are reappraised and refined. In particular, unilateral CBI is found to be more successful than coordinated CBI. The likely implications of these findings are then discussed.

Work Hours, Social Value of Leisure and Globalisation

We examine how openness interacts with the coordination of consumption-leisure decisions in determining the equilibrium working hours and wage rate when there are leisure externalities (e.g., due to social interactions). The latter are modelled by allowing a worker’s marginal utility of leisure to be increasing in the leisure time taken by other workers. Coordination takes the form of internalising the leisure externality and other relevant constraints (e.g., labour demand). The extent of openness is measured by the degree of capital mobility. We find that: coordination lowers equilibrium work hours and raises the wage rate; there is a U-shaped (inverse-U-shaped) relationship between work hours (wages) and the degree of coordination; coordination is welfare improving; and, the gap between the coordinated and uncoordinated work hours (and the corresponding wage rates) is affected by the extent and nature of openness.

Who Ultimately Bears the Burden of Greater Non-Wage Labour costs?

We investigate the effect of a rise in non-wage labour costs (NWLC) on real anufacturing labour costs in OECD countries, taking into account the degree of coordination in the wage bargaining process. We find that, in countries in which wage bargaining is not highly coordinated, 55% of an increase in NWLC appears to be shifted to workers in the long run, whereas in countries operating under a highly coordinated bargaining regime, full shifting occurs. Overall, our results suggest that high NWLC can be associated with a high equilibrium unemployment rate, but only in those OECD countries that do not have highly coordinated wage bargaining.