Memory of Recessions

This paper reviews the evidence on the effects of recessions on potential output. In contrast to the assumption in mainstream macroeconomic models that economic fluctuations do not change potential output paths, the evidence is that they do in the case of recessions. A model is proposed to explain this phenomenon, based on an analogy with water flows in porous media. Because of the discrete adjustments made by heterogeneous economic agents in such a world, potential output displays hysteresis with regard to aggregate demand shocks, and thus retains a memory of the shocks associated with recessions.

Non-cooperative incentives to share knowledge in competitive environments

In this paper we study a model where non-cooperative agents may exchange knowledge in a competitive environment. As a potential factor that could induce the knowledge disclosure between humans we consider the timing of the moves of players. We develop a simple model of a multistage game in which there are only three players and competition takes place only within two stages. Players can share their private knowledge with their opponents and the knowledge is modelled as in uencing their marginal cost of e¤ort. We identify two main mechanisms that work towards knowledge disclosure. One of them is that before the actual competition starts, the stronger player of the rst stage of a game may have desire to share his knowledge with the "observer", be- cause this reduces the valuation of the prize of the weaker player of that stage and as a result his e¤ort level and probability of winning in a ght. Another mechanism is that the "observer" may have sometimes desire to share knowledge with the weaker player of the rst stage, because in this way, by increasing his probability of winning in that stage, he decreases the probability of winning of the stronger player. As a result, in the second stage the "observer" may have greater chances to meet the weaker player rather than the stronger one. Keywords: knowledge sharing, strategic knowledge disclosure, multistage contest game, non-cooperative games

Non-Cooperative Asymptotic Oligopoly in Economies with Infinitely Many Commodities

In this paper, we extend the non-cooperative analysis of oligopoly to exchange economics with infinitely many commodities by using strategic market games. This setting can be interpreted as a model of oligopoly with differentiated commodities by using the Hotelling line. We prove the existence of an "active" Cournot-Nash equilibrium and show that, when traders are replicated, the price vector and the allocation converge to the Walras equilibrium. We examine how the notion of oligopoly extends to our setting with a countable infinity of commodities by distinguishing between asymptotic oligopolists and asymptotic price-takes. We illustrate these notions via a number of examples.

A test of long memory hypothesis based on self-similarity

This paper develops a new test of true versus spurious long memory, based on log-periodogram estimation of the long memory parameter using skip-sampled data. A correction factor is derived to overcome the bias in this estimator due to aliasing. The procedure is designed to be used in the context of a conventional test of significance of the long memory parameter, and composite test procedure described that has the properties of known asymptotic size and consistency. The test is implemented using the bootstrap, with the distribution under the null hypothesis being approximated using a dependent-sample bootstrap technique to approximate short-run dependence following fractional differencing. The properties of the test are investigated in a set of Monte Carlo experiments. The procedure is illustrated by applications to exchange rate volatility and dividend growth series.