Electoral Uncertainty and the Deficit Bias in a New Keynesian Economy

Recent attempts to incorporate optimal fiscal policy into New Keynesian models subject to nominal inertia, have tended to assume that policy makers are benevolent and have access to a commitment technology. A separate literature, on the New Political Economy, has focused on real economies where there is strategic use of policy instruments in a world of political conflict. In this paper we combine these literatures and assume that policy is set in a New Keynesian economy by one of two policy makers facing electoral uncertainty (in terms of infrequent elections and an endogenous voting mechanism). The policy makers generally share the social welfare function, but differ in their preferences over fiscal expenditure (in its size and/or composition). Given the environment, policy shall be realistically constrained to be time-consistent. In a sticky-price economy, such heterogeneity gives rise to the possibility of one policy maker utilising (nominal) debt strategically to tie the hands of the other party, and influence the outcome of any future elections. This can give rise to a deficit bias, implying a sub-optimally high level of steady-state debt, and can also imply a sub-optimal response to shocks. The steady-state distortions and inflation bias this generates, combined with the volatility induced by the electoral cycle in a sticky-price environment, can significantly

The Inflation Bias under Calvo and Rotemberg Pricing.

New Keynesian models rely heavily on two workhorse models of nominal inertia - price contracts of random duration (Calvo, 1983) and price adjustment costs (Rotemberg, 1982) - to generate a meaningful role for monetary policy. These alternative descriptions of price stickiness are often used interchangeably since, to a first order of approximation they imply an isomorphic Phillips curve and, if the steady-state is efficient, identical objectives for the policy maker and as a result in an LQ framework, the same policy conclusions. In this paper we compute time-consistent optimal monetary policy in bench-mark New Keynesian models containing each form of price stickiness. Using global solution techniques we find that the inflation bias problem under Calvo contracts is significantly greater than under Rotemberg pricing, despite the fact that the former typically significant exhibits far greater welfare costs of inflation. The rates of inflation observed under this policy are non-trivial and suggest that the model can comfortably generate the rates of inflation at which the problematic issues highlighted in the trend inflation literature emerge, as well as the movements in trend inflation emphasized in empirical studies of the evolution of inflation. Finally, we consider the response to cost push shocks across both models and find these can also be significantly different. The choice of which form of nominal inertia to adopt is not innocuous.

Education and the local equity bias around the world

Using a panel of 38 economies, over the period 2001 to 2010, we analyse the link between different facets of education and diversification in international portfolios. We find that university education, mathematical numeracy, in addition to financial skill, play an important role in reducing home bias. After separating countries according to their level of financial development, we find that less developed economies with more university graduates, or with higher level of mathematical numeracy, have lower level of local equity bias compared to more developed countries. We also find that the beneficial effect of education is more pronounced during the most recent financial crisis, especially for economies with less developed financial markets.

Colonialism, European Descendants and Democracy

This paper advances that the share of European descendants in the population is a major determinant of democracy in former colonial countries. We test this hypothesis using cross-section and panel regressions with 60 developing and developed countries that were once colonies. We find that the share of European descendants can explain more than half of the difference in measures of democracy between the least and the most democratic countries in our sample. We control for other potential determinants of democracy and test for endogeneity bias using instrumental variables.

Growth and Survival Determinants of Chinese Private Firms: Fieldwork evidence and econometric estimates

This paper reports on one of the first empirical attempts to investigate small firm growth and survival, and their determinants, in the Peoples’ Republic of China. The work is based on field work evidence gathered from a sample of 83 Chinese private firms (mainly SMEs) collected initially by face-to-face interviews, and subsequently by follow-up telephone interviews a year later. We extend the models of Gibrat (1931) and Jovanovic (1982), which traditionally focus on size and age alone (e.g. Brock and Evans, 1986), to a ‘comprehensive’ growth model with two types of additional explanatory variables: firm-specific (e.g. business planning); and environmental (e.g. choice of location). We estimate two econometric models: a ‘basic’ age-size-growth model; and a ‘comprehensive’ growth model, using Heckman’s two-step regression procedure. Estimation is by log-linear regression on cross-section data, with corrections for sample selection bias and heteroskedasticity. Our results refute a pure Gibrat model (but support a more general variant) and support the learning model, as regards the consequences of size and age for growth; and our extension to a comprehensive model highlights the importance of location choice and customer orientation for the growth of Chinese private firms. In the latter model, growth is explained by variables like planning, R&D orientation, market competition, elasticity of demand etc. as well as by control variables. Our work on small firm growth achieves two things. First, it upholds the validity of ‘basic’ size-age-growth models, and successfully applies them to the Chinese economy. Second, it extends the compass of such models to a ‘comprehensive’ growth model incorporating firm-specific and environmental variables.

Scotland: A New Fiscal Settlement

Executive Summary Many commentators have criticised the strategy currently used to finance the Scottish Parliament – both the block grant system, and the small degree of fiscal autonomy devised in the Calman report and the UK government’s 2009 White Paper. Nevertheless, fiscal autonomy has now been conceded in principle. This paper sets out to identify formally what level of autonomy would be best for the Scottish economy and the institutional changes needed to support that arrangement. Our conclusions are in line with the Steel Commission: that significantly more fiscal powers need to be transferred to Scotland. But what we can then do, which the Steel Commission could not, is to give a detailed blueprint for how this proposal might be implemented in practice. We face two problems. The existing block grant system can and has been criticised from such a wide variety of points of view that it effectively has no credibility left. On the other hand, the Calman proposals (and the UK government proposals that followed) are unworkable because, to function, they require information that the policy makers cannot possibly have; and because, without borrowing for current activities, they contain no mechanism to reconcile contractual spending (most of the budget) with variable revenue flows – which is to invite an eventual breakdown. But in its attempt to fix these problems, the UK White Paper introduces three further difficulties: new grounds for quarrels between the UK and Scottish governments, a long term deflation bias, and a loss of devolution.

Time-consistent fiscal policy under heterogeneity: Conflicting or common interests?

This paper studies the aggregate and distributional implications of Markov-perfect tax-spending policy in a neoclassical growth model with capitalists and workers. Focusing on the long run, our main fi ndings are: (i) it is optimal for a benevolent government, which cares equally about its citizens, to tax capital heavily and to subsidise labour; (ii) a Pareto improving means to reduce ine¢ ciently high capital taxation under discretion is for the government to place greater weight on the welfare of capitalists; (iii) capitalists and workers preferences, regarding the optimal amount of "capitalist bias", are not aligned implying a conflict of interests.

Unionism and Peer-Referencing

This study assesses the 'fair-wage-effort' hypothesis, by examining (a) the relationship between relative wage comparisons and job satisfaction and quitting intensions, and (b) the relative ranking of stated effort inducing-incentives, in a novel dataset of unionised and non-unionised European employees. By distinguishing between downward and upward-looking wage comparisons, it is shown that wage comparisons to similar workers exert an asymmetric impact on the job satisfaction of union workers, a pattern consistent with inequity-aversion and conformism to the reference point. Moreover, union workers evaluate peer observation and good industrial relations more highly than payment and other incentives. In contrast, non-union workers are found to be more status-seeking in their satisfaction responses and less dependent on their peers in their effort choices The results are robust to endogenous union membership, considerations of generic loss aversion and across different tenure profiles. They are supportive of the individual egalitarian bias of collective wage determination and self-enforcing effort norms.

The Difference, System and ‘Double-D’ GMM Panel Estimators in the Presence of Structural Breaks

The effects of structural breaks in dynamic panels are more complicated than in time series models as the bias can be either negative or positive. This paper focuses on the effects of mean shifts in otherwise stationary processes within an instrumental variable panel estimation framework. We show the sources of the bias and a Monte Carlo analysis calibrated on United States bank lending data demonstrates the size of the bias for a range of auto-regressive parameters. We also propose additional moment conditions that can be used to reduce the biases caused by shifts in the mean of the data.

Growth and Survival Determinants of Chinese Private Firms: Fieldwork evidence and econometric estimates

This paper reports on one of the first empirical attempts to investigate small firm growth and survival, and their determinants, in the Peoples’ Republic of China. The work is based on field work evidence gathered from a sample of 83 Chinese private firms (mainly SMEs) collected initially by face-to-face interviews, and subsequently by follow-up telephone interviews a year later. We extend the models of Gibrat (1931) and Jovanovic (1982), which traditionally focus on size and age alone (e.g. Brock and Evans, 1986), to a ‘comprehensive’ growth model with two types of additional explanatory variables: firm-specific (e.g. business planning); and environmental (e.g. choice of location). We estimate two econometric models: a ‘basic’ age-size-growth model; and a ‘comprehensive’ growth model, using Heckman’s two-step regression procedure. Estimation is by log-linear regression on cross-section data, with corrections for sample selection bias and heteroskedasticity. Our results refute a pure Gibrat model (but support a more general variant) and support the learning model, as regards the consequences of size and age for growth; and our extension to a comprehensive model highlights the importance of location choice and customer orientation for the growth of Chinese private firms. In the latter model, growth is explained by variables like planning, R&D orientation, market competition, elasticity of demand etc. as well as by control variables. Our work on small firm growth achieves two things. First, it upholds the validity of ‘basic’ size-age-growth models, and successfully applies them to the Chinese economy. Second, it extends the compass of such models to a ‘comprehensive’ growth model incorporating firm-specific and environmental variables.

A Behavioural Model of Choice in the Presence of Decision Conflict

This paper proposes a model of choice that does not assume completeness of the decision maker’s preferences. The model explains in a natural way, and within a unified framework of choice when preference-incomparable options are present, four behavioural phenomena: the attraction effect, choice deferral, the strengthening of the attraction effect when deferral is per-missible, and status quo bias. The key element in the proposed decision rule is that an individual chooses an alternative from a menu if it is worse than no other alternative in that menu and is also better than at least one. Utility-maximising behaviour is included as a special case when preferences are complete. The relevance of the partial dominance idea underlying the proposed choice procedure is illustrated with an intuitive generalisation of weakly dominated strategies and their iterated deletion in games with vector payoffs.

Monetary Policy Delegation and Equilibrium Coordination

This paper revisits the argument that the stabilisation bias that arises under discretionary monetary policy can be reduced if policy is delegated to a policymaker with redesigned objectives. We study four delegation schemes: price level targeting, interest rate smoothing, speed limits and straight conservatism. These can all increase social welfare in models with a unique discretionary equilibrium. We investigate how these schemes perform in a model with capital accumulation where uniqueness does not necessarily apply. We discuss how multiplicity arises and demonstrate that no delegation scheme is able to eliminate all potential bad equilibria. Price level targeting has two interesting features. It can create a new equilibrium that is welfare dominated, but it can also alter equilibrium stability properties and make coordination on the best equilibrium more likely.

Okun’s law – A meta analysis

This paper seeks to identify whether there is a representative empirical Okun’s Law coefficient (OLC) and to measure its size. We carry out a meta regression analysis on a sample of 269 estimates of the OLC to uncover reasons for differences in empirical results and to estimate the ‘true’ OLC. On statistical (and other) grounds, we find it appropriate to investigate two separate subsamples, using respectively (some measure of) unemployment or output as dependent variable. Our results can be summarized as follows. First, there is evidence of type II publication bias in both sub-samples, but a type I bias is present only among the papers using some measure of unemployment as the dependent variable. Second, after correction for publication bias, authentic and statistically significant OLC effects are present in both sub-samples. Third, bias-corrected estimated true OLCs are significantly lower (in absolute value) with models using some measure of unemployment as the dependent variable. Using a bivariate MRA approach, the estimated true effects are -0.25 for the unemployment sub-sample and -0.61 for the output-sub sample; with a multivariate MRA methodology, the estimated true effects are -0.40 and -1.02 for the unemployment and the output-sub samples respectively.

Complexity and Bounded Rationality in Individual Decision Problemsing.

I develop a model of endogenous bounded rationality due to search costs, arising implicitly from the problems complexity. The decision maker is not required to know the entire structure of the problem when making choices but can think ahead, through costly search, to reveal more of it. However, the costs of search are not assumed exogenously; they are inferred from revealed preferences through her choices. Thus, bounded rationality and its extent emerge endogenously: as problems become simpler or as the benefits of deeper search become larger relative to its costs, the choices more closely resemble those of a rational agent. For a fixed decision problem, the costs of search will vary across agents. For a given decision maker, they will vary across problems. The model explains, therefore, why the disparity, between observed choices and those prescribed under rationality, varies across agents and problems. It also suggests, under reasonable assumptions, an identifying prediction: a relation between the benefits of deeper search and the depth of the search. As long as calibration of the search costs is possible, this can be tested on any agent-problem pair. My approach provides a common framework for depicting the underlying limitations that force departures from rationality in different and unrelated decision-making situations. Specifically, I show that it is consistent with violations of timing independence in temporal framing problems, dynamic inconsistency and diversification bias in sequential versus simultaneous choice problems, and with plausible but contrasting risk attitudes across small- and large-stakes gambles.

Coordination in Public Good Provision: How Individual Volunteering is Impacted by the Volunteering of Others

In this analysis, we examine the relationship between an individual's decision to volunteer and the average level of volunteering in the community where the individual resides. Our theoretical model is based on a coordination game , in which volunteering by others is informative regarding the benefit from volunteering. We demonstrate that the interaction between this information and one's private information makes it more likely that he or she will volunteer, given a higher level of contributions by his or her peers. We complement this theoretical work with an empirical analysis using Census 2000 Summary File 3 and Current Population Survey (CPS) 2004-2007 September supplement file data. We control for various individual and community characteristics, and employ robustness checks to verify the results of the baseline analysis. We additionally use an innovative instrumental variables strategy to account for reflection bias and endogeneity caused by selective sorting by individuals into neighborhoods, which allows us to argue for a causal interpretation. The empirical results in the baseline, as well as all robustness analyses, verify the main result of our theoretical model, and we employ a more general structure to further strengthen our results.