Electoral Uncertainty and the Deficit Bias in a New Keynesian Economy

Recent attempts to incorporate optimal fiscal policy into New Keynesian models subject to nominal inertia, have tended to assume that policy makers are benevolent and have access to a commitment technology. A separate literature, on the New Political Economy, has focused on real economies where there is strategic use of policy instruments in a world of political conflict. In this paper we combine these literatures and assume that policy is set in a New Keynesian economy by one of two policy makers facing electoral uncertainty (in terms of infrequent elections and an endogenous voting mechanism). The policy makers generally share the social welfare function, but differ in their preferences over fiscal expenditure (in its size and/or composition). Given the environment, policy shall be realistically constrained to be time-consistent. In a sticky-price economy, such heterogeneity gives rise to the possibility of one policy maker utilising (nominal) debt strategically to tie the hands of the other party, and influence the outcome of any future elections. This can give rise to a deficit bias, implying a sub-optimally high level of steady-state debt, and can also imply a sub-optimal response to shocks. The steady-state distortions and inflation bias this generates, combined with the volatility induced by the electoral cycle in a sticky-price environment, can significantly

Ecological-economic modelling of interactions between wild and commercial bees and pesticide use

The decline in extent of wild pollinators in recent years has been partly associated with changing farm practices and in particular with increase of pesticide use. In this paper we combine ecological modelling with economic analysis of a single farm output under the assumption that both pollination and pest control are essential inputs. We show that the drive to increase farm output can lead to a local decline in the wild bee population. Commercial bees are often considered an alternative to wild pollinators, but we show that their introduction can lead to further decline and finally local extinction of wild bees. The transitions between different outcomes are characterised by threshold behaviour and are potentially difficult to predict and detect in advance. Small changes in economic (input prices) and ecological (wild bees carrying capacity and effect of pesticides on bees) can move the economic-ecological system beyond the extinction threshold. We also show that increasing the pesticide price or decreasing the commercial bee price might lead to reestablishment of wild bees following their local extinction. Thus, we demonstrate the importance of combining ecological modelling with economics to study the provision of ecosystem services and to inform sustainable management of ecosystem service providers.

Social norms, morals and self-interest as determinants of pro-environment behaviour.

This paper considers the role which selfish, moral and social incentives and pressures play in explaining the extent to which stated choices over pro-environment behaviours vary across individuals. The empirical context is choices over household waste contracts and recycling actions in Poland. A theoretical model is used to show how cost-based motives and the desire for a positive self- and social image combine to determine the utility from alternative choices of recycling behaviour. We then describe a discrete choice experiment designed to empirically investigate the effects such drivers have on stated choices. Using a latent class model, we distinguish three types of individual who are described as duty-orientated recyclers, budget recyclers and homo oeconomicus. These groups vary in their preferences for how frequently waste is collected, and the number of categories into which household waste must be recycled. Our results have implications for the design of future policies aimed at improving participation in recycling schemes.