Periodic Sequences of Arbitrage: A Tale of Four Currencies

This paper investigates arbitrage chains involving four currencies and four foreign exchange trader-arbitrageurs. In contrast with the three-currency case, we fi nd that arbitrage operations when four currencies are present may appear periodic in nature, and not involve smooth convergence to a \balanced" ensemble of exchange rates in which the law of one price holds. The goal of this article is to understand some interesting features of sequences of arbitrage operations, features which might well be relevant in other contexts in finance and economics.

Fact And Fiction In FX Arbitrage Processes

The efficient markets hypothesis implies that arbitrage opportunities in markets such as those for foreign exchange (FX) would be, at most, short-lived. The present paper surveys the fragmented nature of FX markets, revealing that information in these markets is also likely to be fragmented. The “quant” workforce in the hedge fund featured in The Fear Index novel by Robert Harris would have little or no reason for their existence in an EMH world. The four currency combinatorial analysis of arbitrage sequences contained in Cross, Kozyakin, O’Callaghan, Pokrovskii and Pokrovskiy (2012) is then considered. Their results suggest that arbitrage processes, rather than being self-extinguishing, tend to be periodic in nature. This helps explain the fact that arbitrage dealing tends to be endemic in FX markets.

The Spillover Effects of Monitoring: A Field Experiment.

We provide field experimental evidence of the effects of monitoring in a context where productivity is multi-dimensional and only one dimension is monitored and incentivised. We hire students to do a job for us. The job consists of identifying euro coins. We study the effects of monitoring and penalising mistakes on work quality, and evaluate spillovers on non- incentivised dimensions of productivity (punctuality and theft). We .nd that monitoring improves work quality only if incentives are large, but reduces punctuality substantially irrespectively of the size of incentives. Monitoring does not affect theft, with ten per cent of participants stealing overall. Our setting also allows us to disentangle between possible theoretical mechanisms driving the adverse effects of monitoring. Our .ndings are supportive of a reciprocity mechanism, whereby workers retaliate for being distrusted.