Inequalities in Child Mortality in India: A District-Level Analysis

This paper measures the degree of inequality in child mortality rates across districts in India, using data from the 1981, 1991 and 2001 Indian population censuses. The results show that child mortality is more concentrated in less developed districts in all three census years. Further, between 1981 and 2001, the inequality in child mortality seems to have increased to the advantage of the more developed districts (i.e., there was an increasing concentration of child mortality in less developed districts). However, the inequality in female child mortality rates seems to have declined between 1991 and 2001, even as it increased – albeit at a slower rate than before – for male child mortality rates. In the decomposition analysis, it is found that while a more equitable distribution of medical facilities and safe drinking water across districts did contribute towards reducing inequality in child mortality between 1981 and 1991, different levels of structural change among districts were responsible for a very large part of the inequality in child mortality to the advantage of the more developed districts in all three census years. Other variables which played important roles in increasing inequality included a measure of infrastructure development, female literacy, and a social group status variable. The paper concludes with some brief comments on the policy implications of the findings.

Rationalising ‘Irrational’ Support for Political Violence

This paper provides a rationale for group support for political violence when violence does not provide a material benefi t. A theory of fairness is adopted to demonstrate that although group violence may not be the equilibrium of a material game it may be a fairness equilibrium in a game containing psychological payoffs. For this to happen the material stakes must be perceived as low and psychological payoffs are expressive. Although the material stakes are actually high, members of each group may choose expressively to support the use of violence because the probability of being decisive is low. The paper also considers the possibility of peace emerging as a fairness equilibrium. This can only happen if each group perceives the other as making some sacrifi ce in choosing peace.