Fear of model misspecifcation and the robustness premium

Robust decision making implies welfare costs or robustness premia when the approximating model is the true data generating process. To examine the importance of these premia at the aggregate level we employ a simple two-sector dynamic general equilibrium model with human capital and introduce an additional form of precautionary behavior. The latter arises from the robust decision maker s ability to reduce the effects of model misspecification through allocating time and existing human capital to this end. We find that the extent of the robustness premia critically depends on the productivity of time relative to that of human capital. When the relative efficiency of time is low, despite transitory welfare costs, there are gains from following robust policies in the long-run. In contrast, high relative productivity of time implies misallocation costs that remain even in the long-run. Finally, depending on the technology used to reduce model uncertainty, we fi nd that while increasing the fear of model misspecfi cation leads to a net increase in precautionary behavior, investment and output can fall.

Effects of stress on economic decision-making: Evidence from laboratory experiments

The ways in which preferences respond to the varying stress of economic environments is a key question for behavioral economics and public policy. We conducted a laboratory experiment to investigate the effects of stress on financial decision making among individuals aged 50 and older. Using the cold pressor task as a physiological stressor, and a series of intelligence tests as cognitive stressors, we find that stress increases subjective discounting rates, has no effect on the degree of risk-aversion, and substantially lowers the effort individuals make to learn about financial decisions.

Monetary Policy in Times of Financial Stress.

Some studies argue that the Fed reacts to financial market developments. Using data covering the period 1985:Q1 - 2008:Q4 and employing an augmented Taylor rule specification, we re-examine that conjecture. We find that evidence in favour of such a reaction is largely driven by the Fed’s behaviour during the 2007-2008 financial crisis.