Can a Lucas model with habit generate realistic conditional volatility in exchange rate returns?

In this paper, we attempt to give a theoretical underpinning to the well established empirical stylized fact that asset returns in general and the spot FOREX returns in particular display predictable volatility characteristics. Adopting Moore and Roche s habit persistence version of Lucas model we nd that both the innovation in the spot FOREX return and the FOREX return itself follow "ARCH" style processes. Using the impulse response functions (IRFs) we show that the baseline simulated FOREX series has "ARCH" properties in the quarterly frequency that match well the "ARCH" properties of the empirical monthly estimations in that when we scale the x-axis to synchronize the monthly and quarterly responses we find similar impulse responses to one unit shock in variance. The IRFs for the ARCH processes we estimate "look the same" with an approximately monotonic decreasing fashion. The Lucas two-country monetary model with habit can generate realistic conditional volatility in spot FOREX return.

Moral Behaviour, Altruism and Environmental Policy

Free‐riding is often associated with self‐interested behaviour. However if there is a global mixed pollutant, free‐riding will arise if individuals calculate that their emissions are negligible relative to the total, so total emissions and hence any damage that they and others suffer will be unaffected by whatever consumption choice they make. In this context consumer behaviour and the optimal environmental tax are independent of the degree of altruism. For behaviour to change, individuals need to make their decisions in a different way. We propose a new theory of moral behaviour whereby individuals recognise that they will be worse off by not acting in their own self‐interest, and balance this cost off against the hypothetical moral value of adopting a Kantian form of behaviour, that is by calculating the consequences of their action by asking what would happen if everyone else acted in the same way as they did. We show that: (a) if individuals behave this way, then altruism matters and the greater the degree of altruism the more individuals cut back their consumption of a ’dirty’ good; (b) nevertheless the optimal environmental tax is exactly the same as that emerging from classical analysis where individuals act in self‐interested fashion.