Does Ricardian Equivalence Hold When Expectations are not Rational?

This paper considers the Ricardian Equivalence proposition when expectations are not rational and are instead formed using adaptive learning rules. We show that Ricardian Equivalence continues to hold provided suitable additional conditions on learning dynamics are satisfied. However, new cases of failure can also emerge under learning. In particular, for Ricardian Equivalence to obtain, agents’ expectations must not depend on government’s financial variables under deficit financing.

Class-size Reduction Policies and the Quality of Entering Teachers

State-wide class-size reduction (CSR) policies have typically failed to produce large achievement gains. One explanation is that the introduction of such policies forces schools to hire relatively low-quality teachers. This paper uses data from an anonymous state to explore whether teacher quality suff ered from the introduction of CSR. We find that it did, but not nearly enough to explain the small achievement effects of CSR. The combined fall in achievement due to hiring lower quality teachers and more inexperienced teachers is small relative to the unrealized gains. Furthermore, between-school diff erences in the quality of incoming teachers cannot explain the poor estimated CSR performance from previous quasi-experimental treatment-control comparisons.

Nondictatorial Arrovian Social Welfare Functions: An Integer Programming Approach

In the line opened by Kalai and Muller (1997), we explore new conditions on prefernce domains which make it possible to avoid Arrow's impossibility result. In our main theorem, we provide a complete characterization of the domains admitting nondictorial Arrovian social welfare functions with ties (i.e. including indifference in the range) by introducing a notion of strict decomposability. In the proof, we use integer programming tools, following an approach first applied to social choice theory by Sethuraman, Teo and Vohra ((2003), (2006)). In order to obtain a representation of Arrovian social welfare functions whose range can include indifference, we generalize Sethuraman et al.'s work and specify integer programs in which variables are allowed to assume values in the set {0, 1/2, 1}: indeed, we show that, there exists a one-to-one correspondence between solutions of an integer program defined on this set and the set of all Arrovian social welfare functions - without restrictions on the range.

An axiomatization of difference-form contest success functions

This paper presents an axiomatic characterization of difference-form group contests, that is, contests fought among groups and where their probability of victory depends on the difference of their effective efforts. This axiomatization rests on the property of Equalizing Consistency, stating that the difference between winning probabilities in the grand contest and in the smaller contest should be identical across all participants in the smaller contest. This property overcomes some of the drawbacks of the widely-used ratio-form contest success functions. Our characterization shows that the criticisms commonly-held against difference-form contests success functions, such as lack of scale invariance and zero elasticity of augmentation, are unfounded.By clarifying the properties of this family of contest success functions, this axiomatization can help researchers to find the functional form better suited to their application of interest.