Measuring Avoidable Health Inequality with Realization of Conditional Potential Life Years (RCPLY)

In a series of papers (Tang, Chin and Rao, 2008; and Tang, Petrie and Rao 2006 & 2007), we have tried to improve on a mortality-based health status indicator, namely age-at-death (AAD), and its associated health inequality indicators that measure the distribution of AAD. The main contribution of these papers is to propose a frontier method to separate avoidable and unavoidable mortality risks. This has facilitated the development of a new indicator of health status, namely the Realization of Potential Life Years (RePLY). The RePLY measure is based on the concept of a “frontier country” that, by construction, has the lowest mortality risks for each age-sex group amongst all countries. The mortality rates of the frontier country are used as a proxy for the unavoidable mortality rates, and the residual between the observed mortality rates and the unavoidable mortality rates are considered as avoidable morality rates. In this approach, however, countries at different levels of development are benchmarked against the same frontier country without considering their heterogeneity. The main objective of the current paper is to control for national resources in estimating (conditional) unavoidable and avoidable mortality risks for individual countries. This allows us to construct a new indicator of health status – Realization of Conditional Potential Life Years (RCPLY). The paper presents empirical results from a dataset of life tables for 167 countries from the year 2000, compiled and updated by the World Health Organization. Measures of national average health status and health inequality based on RePLY and RCPLY are presented and compared.

Minu, Startu and all that:- Pitfalls in estimating the sensitivity of a worker’s wage to aggregate unemployment

In this paper we show that the inclusion of unemployment-tenure interaction variates in Mincer wage equations is subject to serious pitfalls. These variates were designed to test whether or not the sensitivity to the business cycle of a worker’s wage varies according to her tenure. We show that three canonical variates used in the literature - the minimum unemployment rate during a worker’s time at the firm(min u), the unemployment rate at the start of her tenure(Su) and the current unemployment rate interacted with a new hire dummy(δu) - can all be significant and "correctly" signed even when each worker in the firm receives the same wage, regardless of tenure (equal treatment). In matched data the problem can be resolved by the inclusion in the panel of firm-year interaction dummies. In unmatched data where this is not possible, we propose a solution for min u and Su based on Solon, Barsky and Parker’s(1994) two step method. This method is sub-optimal because it ignores a large amount of cross tenure variation in average wages and is only valid when the scaled covariances of firm wages and firm employment are acyclical. Unfortunately δu cannot be identified in unmatched data because a differential wage response to unemployment of new hires and incumbents will appear under both equal treatment and unequal treatment.