The Relative Efficiency of Automatic and Discretionary Industrial Aid

For the last two decades, the primary instruments for UK regional policy have been discretionary subsidies. Such aid is targeted at “additional” projects - projects that would not have been implemented without the subsidy - and the subsidy should be the minimum necessary for the project to proceed. Discretionary subsidies are thought to be more efficient than automatic subsidies, where many of the aided projects are non-additional and all projects receive the same subsidy rate. The present paper builds on Swales (1995) and Wren (2007a) to compare three subsidy schemes: an automatic scheme and two types of discretionary scheme, one with accurate appraisal and the other with appraisal error. These schemes are assessed on their expected welfare impacts. The particular focus is the reduction in welfare gain imposed by the interaction of appraisal error and the requirements for accountability. This is substantial and difficult to detect with conventional evaluation techniques.

Responsibility for regional waste generation: A single region extended input-output analysis with uni-directional trade flows

The paper uses a regional input-output (IO) framework and data derived on waste generation by industry to examine regional accountability for waste generation. In addition to estimating a series of industry output-waste coefficients, the paper considers two methods for waste attribution but focuses first on one (trade endogenised linear attribution system (TELAS)) that permits a greater focus on private and public final consumption as the main exogenous driver of waste generation. Second, the paper uses a domestic technology assumption (DTA) to consider a regional ‘waste footprint’ where local consumption requirements are assumed to be met through domestic production.

The regional electricity generation mix in Scotland: A portfolio selection approach

Standalone levelised cost assessments of electricity supply options miss an important contribution that renewable and non-fossil fuel technologies can make to the electricity portfolio: that of reducing the variability of electricity costs, and their potentially damaging impact upon economic activity. Portfolio theory applications to the electricity generation mix have shown that renewable technologies, their costs being largely uncorrelated with non-renewable technologies, can offer such benefits. We look at the existing Scottish generation mix and examine drivers of changes out to 2020. We assess recent scenarios for the Scottish generation mix in 2020 against mean-variance efficient portfolios of electricity-generating technologies. Each of the scenarios studied implies a portfolio cost of electricity that is between 22% and 38% higher than the portfolio cost of electricity in 2007. These scenarios prove to be “inefficient” in the sense that, for example, lower variance portfolios can be obtained without increasing portfolio costs, typically by expanding the share of renewables. As part of extensive sensitivity analysis, we find that Wave and Tidal technologies can contribute to lower risk electricity portfolios, while not increasing portfolio cost.

Joint estimates of automatic and discretionary fiscal policy for the OECD

Official calculations of automatic stabilizers are seriously flawed since they rest on the assumption that the only element of social spending that reacts automatically to the cycle is unemployment compensation. This puts into question many estimates of discretionary fiscal policy. In response, we propose a simultaneous estimate of automatic and discretionary fiscal policy. This leads us, quite naturally, to a tripartite decomposition of the budget balance between revenues, social spending and other spending as a bare minimum. Our headline results for a panel of 20 OECD countries in 1981-2003 are .59 automatic stabilization in percentage-points of primary surplus balances. All of this stabilization remains following discretionary responses during contractions, but arguably only about 3/5 of it remains so in expansions while discretionary behavior cancels the rest. We pay a lot of attention to the impact of the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP on the EU members of our sample and to real time data.

Joint estimates of automatic and discretionary fiscal policy: the OECD 1981-2003

Official calculations of automatic stabilizers are seriously flawed since they rest on the assumption that the only element of social spending that reacts automatically to the cycle is unemployment compensation. This puts into question many estimates of discretionary fiscal policy. In response, we propose a simultaneous estimate of automatic and discretionary fiscal policy. This leads us, quite naturally, to a tripartite decomposition of the budget balance between revenues, social spending and other spending as a bare minimum. Our headline results for a panel of 20 OECD countries in 1981-2003 are .59 automatic stabilization in percentage-points of primary surplus balances. All of this stabilization remains following discretionary responses during contractions, but arguably only about 3/5 of it remains so in expansions while discretionary behavior cancels the rest. We pay a lot of attention to the impact of the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP on the EU members of our sample and to real time data.

Joint estimates of automatic and discretionary fiscal policy: the OECD 1981-2003

Official calculations of automatic stabilizers are seriously flawed since they rest on the assumption that the only element of social spending that reacts automatically to the cycle is unemployment compensation. This puts into question many estimates of discretionary fiscal policy. In response, we propose a simultaneous estimate of automatic and discretionary fiscal policy. This leads us, quite naturally, to a tripartite decomposition of the budget balance between revenues, social spending and other spending as a bare minimum. Our headline results for a panel of 20 OECD countries in 1981-2003 are .59 automatic stabilization in percentage-points of primary surplus balances. All of this stabilization remains following discretionary responses during contractions, but arguably only about 3/5 of it remains so in expansions while discretionary behavior cancels the rest. We pay a lot of attention to the impact of the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP on the EU members of our sample and to real time data.