Optimism and commitment: An elementary theory of bargaining and war

We propose an elementary theory of wars fought by fully rational contenders. Two parties play a Markov game that combines stages of bargaining with stages where one side has the ability to impose surrender on the other. Under uncertainty and incomplete information, in the unique equilibrium of the game, long confrontations occur: war arises when reality disappoints initial (rational) optimism, and it persist longer when both agents are optimists but reality proves both wrong. Bargaining proposals that are rejected initially might eventually be accepted after several periods of confrontation. We provide an explicit computation of the equilibrium, evaluating the probability of war, and its expected losses as a function of i) the costs of confrontation, ii) the asymmetry of the split imposed under surrender, and iii) the strengths of contenders at attack and defense. Changes in these parameters display non-monotonic effects.

Financial health, exports, and rm survival: Evidence from UK and French firms

We use firm level data to assess the role of exporting in the link between financial health and rm survival. The data are for the UK and France. We examine whether fi rms at diff erent stages of export activity (starters, exiters, continuers, switchers) react di fferently to changes in financial variables. In general, export starters and exiters experience much stronger adverse e ffects of fi nancial constraints for their survival prospects. By contrast, the exit probability of continuous exporters and export switchers is less negatively a ffected by financial characteristics. These relationships between exporting, finance and survival are broadly similar in the British and French sub-samples.