Temper and Temperature: The Missing Link of Climate on Armed Conflicts

We investigate the causes of a conflict by adding ambient climate factors to the existing bundle of most significant variables. It turns out that – controlling for possible associations – temperature could actually induce a conflict. We emphasise that temperature could not be a dominant reason in starting a conflict; however, it could escalate the chances when other factors are present. This paper references some of the related psychological studies to support this claim. We also show that grievance factors could actually be rightfully effective in starting an internal conflict alongside greed based reasons. In the end, we believe that it could be informative to study ambient factors more often in economics.

Bargaining and Conflict with Incomplete Information

This paper studies bargaining and conflict under incomplete information, provides an overview and a critical account of the literature on the topic and contributes with original research. We first revise models of mechanism design and sequential bargaining that take confrontation as final. Conflict and inefficiencies are to be expected in these models whenever parties have optimistic prospects on the outcome of the all-out conflict. After examining the causes and reasons for this optimism, we move to the analysis of the recent literature that considers the existence of limited confrontations that allow bargaining to resume. In the presence of private information, these limited conflicts convey information and thus become a bargaining instrument. The paper closes with a discussion on the related empirical literature, the challenges that it faces and some potential avenues for further research.