A Foundation System and a State System - Private-School Implications on Welfare and Education Expenditure

This paper examines the effects of two different education - financing systems: a foundation system and a state system on the level and distribution of resources devoted to education in the presence of private schools. We use political economy approach where households differ in their level of income, and the central tax rate used to nance education is determined by a majority vote. Our analysis focuses on implications of allowing for a private-school option. To evaluate the importance of private schools we develop a computational model and calibrate it using USA data. The results reveal that the private school option is very important quantitatively in terms of welfare, total resources spent on education and equity.

Welfare Implications of Public Education Spending Rules

In this paper, we quantitatively assess the welfare implications of alternative public education spending rules. To this end, we employ a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which human capital externalities and public education expenditures, nanced by distorting taxes, enhance the productivity of private education choices. We allow public education spending, as share of output, to respond to various aggregate indicators in an attempt to minimize the market imperfection due to human capital externalities. We also expose the economy to varying degrees of uncertainty via changes in the variance of total factor productivity shocks. Our results indicate that, in the face of increasing aggregate uncertainty, active policy can signi cantly outperform passive policy (i.e. maintaining a constant public education to output ratio) but only when the policy instrument is successful in smoothing the growth rate of human capital.