Firm survival, uncertainty and financial frictions: Is there a financial uncertainty accelerator?

Using a large panel of unquoted UK over the period 2000-09, we examine the impact of firm-specific uncertainty on corporate failures. In this context we also distinguish between firms which are likely to be more or less dependant on bank finance as well as public and non-public companies. Our results document a significant effect of uncertainty on firm survival. This link is found to be more potent during the recent financial crisis compared with tranquil periods. We also uncover significant firm-level heterogeneity since the survival chance of bank-dependent and non-public firms are most affected by changes in uncertainty, especially during the recent global financial crisis.

Firm survival, uncertainty and financial frictions: Is there a financial uncertainty accelerator?

Using a large panel of unquoted UK firms over the period 2000-09, we examine the impact of firm-specific uncertainty on corporate failures. In this context we also distinguish between firms which are likely to be more or less dependent on bank finance as well as public and non-public companies. Our results document a significant effect of uncertainty on firm survival. This link is found to be more potent during the recent financial crisis compared with tranquil periods. We also uncover significant firm-level heterogeneity since the survival chances of bank-dependent and non-public firms are most affected by changes in uncertainty, especially during the recent global financial crisis.

Financial shocks and the US business cycle

Employing the financial accelerator (FA) model of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) enhanced to include a shock to the FA mechanism, we construct and study shocks to the efficiency of the financial sector in post-war US business cycles. We find that financial shocks are very tightly linked with the onset of recessions, more so than TFP or monetary shocks. The financial shock invariably remains contractionary for sometime after recessions have ended. The shock accounts for a large part of the variance of GDP and is strongly negatively correlated with the external finance premium. Second-moments comparisons across variants of the model with and without a (stochastic) FA mechanism suggests the stochastic FA model helps us understand the data.

The Rise and Fall of the ABS Market

The nancial crisis has raised some concern about the quality of information available on some traded assets on the securities markets to market participants and regulators. Asset-backed securitization in general got partial blame for the paucity of liquidity on bank balance sheets and the consequent credit crunch. After the Asset-Backed Security (ABS) market fell to near inactivity in 2009, the US federal government's Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) provided backing and a boost to the issuance of asset-backed securitization. In this market condition, given the nature of ABS, it is di¢ cult for them not to be relatively illiquid, and this has resulted in unacceptable levels of market risk for most investors. Their liquidity before the crisis was driven by a market in continuous expansion, fed by Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), Conduits, and other low capitalized term-transformation vehicles. Nowadays, the industry is concerned with the ongoing ABS reforms and how these will be implemented. This article reviews the ABS market in the last decade and the possible consequences of the recent regulatory proposals. It proposes a retention policy and the institution of a new nancial body to supervise the quality of the security in an ABS pool, its liquidity, and the model risk implied by the issuer's valuation model.