Equilibrium Exchange Rate Determination and Multiple Structural Changes

The large appreciation and depreciation of the US dollar in the 1980s stimulated an important debate on the usefulness of unit root tests in the presence of structural breaks. In this paper, we propose a simple model to describe the evolution of the real exchange rate. We then propose a more general smooth transition (STR) function than has hitherto been employed, which is able to capture structural changes along the (long-run) equilibrium path, and show that this is consistent with our economic model. Our framework allows for a gradual adjustment between regimes and allows for under- and/or over-valued exchange rate adjustments. Using monthly and quarterly data for up to twenty OECD countries, we apply our methodology to investigate the univariate time series properties of CPI-based real exchange rates with both the U.S. dollar and German mark as the numeraire currencies. The empirical results show that, for more than half of the quarterly series, the evidence in favour of the stationarity of the real exchange rate was clearer in the sub-sample period post-1980.

Outsourcing versus FDI in oligopoly equilibrium

We consider the make-or-buy decision of oligopolistic firms in an industry in which final good production requires specialised inputs. Factor price considerations dictate that firms acquire the intermediate abroad, by either producing it in a wholly owned subsidiary or outsourcing it to a supplier who must make a relationship specific investment. Firms’ internationalisation mode depends on cost and strategic considerations. Crucially, asymmetric equilibria emerge, with firms choosing different modes of internationalisation, even when they are ex-ante identical. With ex-ante asymmetries, lower cost producers have a stronger incentive to vertically integrate (FDI), while higher cost firms are more likely to outsource.

Harmful competition in the insurance markets

There is a general presumption that competition is a good thing. In this paper we show that competition in the insurance markets can be bad and that adverse selection is in general worse under competition than under monopoly. The reason is that monopoly can exploit its market power to relax incentive constraints by cross-subsidization between different risk types. Cream-skimming behavior, on the contrary, prevents competitive firms from using implicit transfers. In effect monopoly is shown to provide better coverage to those buying insurance but at the cost of limiting participation to insurance. Performing simulation for di erent distributions of risk, we find that monopoly in general performs (much) better than competition in terms of the realization of the gains from trade across all traders in equilibrium. However, most of the surplus is retained by the firm and, as a result, most individuals prefer competitive markets notwithstanding their performance is generally poorer than monopoly.

The Rebound Effect with Energy Production: A Partial Equilibrium Analysis

Rebound is the extent to which improvements in energy efficiency fail to translate fully into reductions in energy use because of the implicit fall in the price of energy, when measured in efficiency units. This paper discusses aspects of the rebound effect that are introduced once energy is considered as a domestically produced commodity. A partial equilibrium approach is adopted in order to incorporate both energy use and production in a conceptually tractable way. The paper explores analytically two interesting results revealed in previous numerical simulations. The first is the possibility that energy use could fall by more than the implied improvement in efficiency. This corresponds to negative rebound. The second is the finding that the short-run rebound value can be greater than the corresponding long-run value.

Revisiting the Dollar-Euro Permanent Equilibrium Exchange Rate: Evidence from Multivariate Unobserved Components Models

We propose an alternative approach to obtaining a permanent equilibrium exchange rate (PEER), based on an unobserved components (UC) model. This approach offers a number of advantages over the conventional cointegration-based PEER. Firstly, we do not rely on the prerequisite that cointegration has to be found between the real exchange rate and macroeconomic fundamentals to obtain non-spurious long-run relationships and the PEER. Secondly, the impact that the permanent and transitory components of the macroeconomic fundamentals have on the real exchange rate can be modelled separately in the UC model. This is important for variables where the long and short-run effects may drive the real exchange rate in opposite directions, such as the relative government expenditure ratio. We also demonstrate that our proposed exchange rate models have good out-of sample forecasting properties. Our approach would be a useful technique for central banks to estimate the equilibrium exchange rate and to forecast the long-run movements of the exchange rate.

Adaptive Continuous time Markov Chain Approximation Model to General Jump-Diusions

We propose a non-equidistant Q rate matrix formula and an adaptive numerical algorithm for a continuous time Markov chain to approximate jump-diffusions with affine or non-affine functional specifications. Our approach also accommodates state-dependent jump intensity and jump distribution, a flexibility that is very hard to achieve with other numerical methods. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test shows that the proposed Markov chain transition density converges to the one given by the likelihood expansion formula as in Ait-Sahalia (2008). We provide numerical examples for European stock option pricing in Black and Scholes (1973), Merton (1976) and Kou (2002).

A bayesian spatial individual effects probit model of the 2010 UK general election

The Conservative Party emerged from the 2010 United Kingdom General Election as the largest single party, but their support was not geographically uniform. In this paper, we estimate a hierarchical Bayesian spatial probit model that tests for the presence of regional voting effects. This model allows for the estimation of individual region-specic effects on the probability of Conservative Party success, incorporating information on the spatial relationships between the regions of the mainland United Kingdom. After controlling for a range of important covariates, we find that these spatial relationships are significant and that our individual region-specic effects estimates provide additional evidence of North-South variations in Conservative Party support.

Payoff levels, loss avoidance, and equilibrium selection in the Stag Hunt: an experimental study

Game theorists typically assume that changing a game’s payoff levels—by adding the same constant to, or subtracting it from, all payoffs—should not affect behavior. While this invariance is an implication of the theory when payoffs mirror expected utilities, it is an empirical question when the “payoffs” are actually money amounts. In particular, if individuals treat monetary gains and losses differently, then payoff–level changes may matter when they result in positive payoffs becoming negative, or vice versa. We report the results of a human–subjects experiment designed to test for two types of loss avoidance: certain–loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a sure loss, in favor of an alternative that might lead to a gain) and possible–loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a possible loss, in favor of an alternative that leads to a sure gain). Subjects in the experiment play three versions of Stag Hunt, which are identical up to the level of payoffs, under a variety of treatments. We find differences in behavior across the three versions of Stag Hunt; these differences are hard to detect in the first round of play, but grow over time. When significant, the differences we find are in the direction predicted by certain– and possible–loss avoidance. Our results carry implications for games with multiple equilibria, and for theories that attempt to select among equilibria in such games.

Monetary Policy Delegation and Equilibrium Coordination

This paper revisits the argument that the stabilisation bias that arises under discretionary monetary policy can be reduced if policy is delegated to a policymaker with redesigned objectives. We study four delegation schemes: price level targeting, interest rate smoothing, speed limits and straight conservatism. These can all increase social welfare in models with a unique discretionary equilibrium. We investigate how these schemes perform in a model with capital accumulation where uniqueness does not necessarily apply. We discuss how multiplicity arises and demonstrate that no delegation scheme is able to eliminate all potential bad equilibria. Price level targeting has two interesting features. It can create a new equilibrium that is welfare dominated, but it can also alter equilibrium stability properties and make coordination on the best equilibrium more likely.

Efficient Nash Equilibrium under Adverse Selection

This paper revisits the problem of adverse selection in the insurance market of Rothschild and Stiglitz [28]. We propose a simple extension of the game-theoretic structure in Hellwig [14] under which Nash-type strategic interaction between the informed customers and the uninformed firms results always in a particular separating equilibrium. The equilibrium allocation is unique and Pareto-efficient in the interim sense subject to incentive-compatibility and individual rationality. In fact, it is the unique neutral optimum in the sense of Myerson [22].

Did Keynes in the General Theory significantly misrepresent J S Mill?

It has been alleged that J M Keynes, quoting in the General Theory a passage from J S Mill's Principles, misunderstood the passage in question and was therefore wrong to cite Mill as an upholder of the 'classical' proposition that 'supply creates its own demand'. We believe that, although Keynes was admittedly in error with respect to, so-to-say, the 'letter' of Mill's exposition, he did not mislead readers as to the 'substance' of Mill's conception. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that J S Mill did indeed stand for a 'classical' position, vulnerable to Keynes's critique as developed in the General Theory. [This is a revised version of an earlier working paper: 'Keynes, Mill and Say's Law', Strathclyde Papers in Economics, 2000/11]

Competing for Attention: Is the Showiest also the Best?

We introduce attention games. Alternatives ranked by quality (producers, politicians, sexual partners...) desire to be chosen and compete for the imperfect attention of a chooser by investing in their own salience. We prove that if alternatives can control the attention they get, then ”the showiest is the best”: the equilibrium ordering of salience (weakly) reproduces the quality ranking and the best alternative is the one that gets picked most often. This result also holds under more general conditions. However, if those conditions fail, then even the worst alternative can be picked most often.

Measuring the Euro-Dollar Permanent Equilibrium Exchange Rate using the Unobserved Components Model

This paper employs an unobserved component model that incorporates a set of economic fundamentals to obtain the Euro-Dollar permanent equilibrium exchange rates (PEER) for the period 1975Q1 to 2008Q4. The results show that for most of the sample period, the Euro-Dollar exchange rate closely followed the values implied by the PEER. The only significant deviations from the PEER occurred in the years immediately before and after the introduction of the single European currency. The forecasting exercise shows that incorporating economic fundamentals provides a better long-run exchange rate forecasting performance than a random walk process.

Decision Errors, Legal Uncertainty and Welfare: a General Treatment

This paper provides a general treatment of the implications for welfare of legal uncertainty. We distinguish legal uncertainty from decision errors: though the former can be influenced by the latter, the latter are neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of legal uncertainty. We show that an increase in decision errors will always reduce welfare. However, for any given level of decision errors, information structures involving more legal uncertainty can improve welfare. This holds always, even when there is complete legal uncertainty, when sanctions on socially harmful actions are set at their optimal level. This transforms radically one’s perception about the “costs” of legal uncertainty. We also provide general proofs for two results, previously established under restrictive assumptions. The first is that Effects-Based enforcement procedures may welfare dominate Per Se (or object-based) procedures and will always do so when sanctions are optimally set. The second is that optimal sanctions may well be higher under enforcement procedures involving more legal uncertainty.

A General and Intuitive Envelope Theorem

We present an envelope theorem for establishing first-order conditions in decision problems involving continuous and discrete choices. Our theorem accommodates general dynamic programming problems, even with unbounded marginal utilities. And, unlike classical envelope theorems that focus only on differentiating value functions, we accommodate other endogenous functions such as default probabilities and interest rates. Our main technical ingredient is how we establish the differentiability of a function at a point: we sandwich the function between two differentiable functions from above and below. Our theory is widely applicable. In unsecured credit models, neither interest rates nor continuation values are globally differentiable. Nevertheless, we establish an Euler equation involving marginal prices and values. In adjustment cost models, we show that first-order conditions apply universally, even if optimal policies are not (S,s). Finally, we incorporate indivisible choices into a classic dynamic insurance analysis.