39 resultados para Constant Market Share
Resumo:
During the past four decades both between and within group wage inequality increased significantly in the US. I provide a microfounded justification for this pattern, by introducing private employer learning in a model of signaling with credit constraints. In particular, I show that when financial constraints relax, talented individuals can acquire education and leave the uneducated pool, this decreases unskilled inexperienced wages and boosts wage inequality. This explanation is consistent with US data from 1970 to 1997, indicating that the rise of the skill and the experience premium coincides with a fall in unskilled-inexperienced wages, while at the same time skilled or experienced wages do not change much. The model accounts for: (i) the increase in the skill premium despite the growing supply of skills; (ii) the understudied aspect of rising inequality related to the increase in the experience premium; (iii) the sharp growth of the skill premium for inexperienced workers and its moderate expansion for the experienced ones; (iv) the puzzling coexistence of increasing experience premium within the group of unskilled workers and its stable pattern among the skilled ones. The results hold under various robustness checks and provide some interesting policy implications about the potential conflict between inequality of opportunity and substantial economic inequality, as well as the role of minimum wage policy in determining the equilibrium wage inequality.
Resumo:
We develop an empirical framework that links micro-liquidity, macro-liquidity and stock prices. We provide evidence of a strong link between macro-liquidity shocks and the returns of UK stock portfolios constructed on the basis of micro-liquidity measures between 1999-2012. Specifically, macro-liquidity shocks, which are extracted on the meeting days of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee relative to market expectations embedded in 3-month LIBOR futures prices, are transmitted in a differential manner to the cross-section of liquidity-sorted portfolios, with liquid stocks playing the most active role. We also find that there is a significant increase in shares’ trading activity and a rather small increase in their trading cost on MPC meeting days. Finally, our results emphatically document that during the recent financial crisis the shocks-returns relationship has reversed its sign. Interest rate cuts during the crisis were perceived by market participants as a signal of deteriorating economic prospects and reinforced “flight to safety” trading.
Resumo:
Bilateral oligopoly is a simple model of exchange in which a finite set of sellers seek to exchange the goods they are endowed with for money with a finite set of buyers, and no price-taking assumptions are imposed. If trade takes place via a strategic market game bilateral oligopoly can be thought of as two linked proportional-sharing contests: in one the sellers share the aggregate bid from the buyers in proportion to their supply and in the other the buyers share the aggregate supply in proportion to their bids. The analysis can be separated into two ‘partial games’. First, fix the aggregate bid at B; in the first partial game the sellers contest this fixed prize in proportion to their supply and the aggregate supply in the equilibrium of this game is X˜ (B). Next, fix the aggregate supply at X; in the second partial game the buyers contest this fixed prize in proportion to their bids and the aggregate bid in the equilibrium of this game is ˜B (X). The analysis of these two partial games takes into account competition within each side of the market. Equilibrium in bilateral oligopoly must take into account competition between sellers and buyers and requires, for example, ˜B (X˜ (B)) = B. When all traders have Cobb-Douglas preferences ˜ X(B) does not depend on B and ˜B (X) does not depend on X: whilst there is competition within each side of the market there is no strategic interdependence between the sides of the market. The Cobb-Douglas assumption provides a tractable framework in which to explore the features of fully strategic trade but it misses perhaps the most interesting feature of bilateral oligopoly, the implications of which are investigated.
Resumo:
Adverse selection may thwart trade between an informed seller, who knows the probability p that an item of antiquity is genuine, and an uninformed buyer, who does not know p. The buyer might not be wholly uninformed, however. Suppose he can perform a simple inspection, a test of his own: the probability that an item passes the test is g if the item is genuine, but only f < g if it is fake. Given that the buyer is no expert, his test may have little power: f may be close to g. Unfortunately, without much power, the buyer's test will not resolve the difficulty of adverse selection; gains from trade may remain unexploited. But now consider a "store", where the seller groups a number of items, perhaps all with the same quality, the same probability p of being genuine. (We show that in equilibrium the seller will choose to group items in this manner.) Now the buyer can conduct his test across a large sample, perhaps all, of a group of items in the seller's store. He can thereby assess the overall quality of these items; he can invert the aggregate of his test results to uncover the underlying p; he can form a "prior". There is thus no longer asymmetric information between seller and buyer: gains from trade can be exploited. This is our theory of retailing: by grouping items together - setting up a store - a seller is able to supply buyers with priors, as well as the items themselves. We show that the weaker the power of the buyer�s test (the closer f is to g), the greater the seller�s profit. So the seller has no incentive to assist the buyer � e.g., by performing her own tests on the items, or by cleaning them to reveal more about their true age. The paper ends with an analysis of which sellers should specialise in which qualities. We show that quality will be low in busy locations and high in expensive locations.
Resumo:
The UK government introduced the Renewable Obligation (RO), a system of tradable quotas, to encourage the installation of renewable electricity capacity. Each unit of generation from renewables created a renewable obligation certificate (ROC). Electricity generators must either; earn ROCs through their own production, purchase ROCs in the market or pay the buy-out price to comply with the quota set by the RO. A unique aspect of this regulation is that all entities holding ROCs receive a share of the buy-out fund (the sum of all compliance purchases using the buy-out price). This set-up ensures that the difference between the market price for ROCs and the buy-out price should equal the expected share of the buy-out fund, as regulated entities arbitrage these two compliance options. The expected share of the buy-out fund depends on whether enough renewable generation is available to meet the quota. This analysis tests whether variables associated with renewable generation or electricity demand are correlated with, and thus can help predict, the price of ROCs.
Resumo:
Based on detailed payroll data of blue collar male and female labor in Britain’s engineering and metal working industrial sectors between the mid-1920s and mid-1960s, we provide empirical evidence in respect of several central themes in the piecework-timework wage literature. The period covers part of the heyday of pieceworking as well as the start of its post-war decline. We show the importance of relative piece rate flexibility during the Great Depression as well as during the build up to WWII and during the war itself. We account for the very significant decline in the differentials after the war. Labor market topics include piecework pay in respect of compensating differentials, labor heterogeneity, and the transaction costs of pricing piecework output.
Resumo:
We propose a new model of simultaneous price competition, based on firms offering personalized prices to consumers. In a market for a homogeneous good and decreasing returns, the unique equilibrium leads to a uniform price equal to the marginal cost of each firm, at their share of the market clearing quantity. Using this result for the short-run competition, we then investigate the long-run investment decisions of the firms. While there is underinvestment, the overall outcome is more competitive than the Cournot model competition. Moreover, as the number of firms grows we approach the competitive long-run outcome.
Resumo:
Second Change School programmes are active in a number of European countries. These schools offer vulnerable young adults an alternative opportunity to enhance their employability skills by alternating education with work experience. People enrolling in these programmes disengaged from schools at an early age. They already experienced or are at-risk to enter into unemployment. This paper examines the impact of the Second Chance Schools on their participants’ aspirations towards the labour market through skill-acquisition. We are able to identify the perception of Second Chance Schools’ interns regarding entry to the professional life. A third of them, for example, consider their attitude or their surroundings as a barrier preventing them from getting a job. However, our results emphasise the role of the interns’ coach in improving their aspirations towards the labour market. We also show that when compared to male interns, female interns have a stronger (positive) perception of the school as a place where they can gain skills.
Resumo:
We investigate the dynamic and asymmetric dependence structure between equity portfolios from the US and UK. We demonstrate the statistical significance of dynamic asymmetric copula models in modelling and forecasting market risk. First, we construct “high-minus-low" equity portfolios sorted on beta, coskewness, and cokurtosis. We find substantial evidence of dynamic and asymmetric dependence between characteristic-sorted portfolios. Second, we consider a dynamic asymmetric copula model by combining the generalized hyperbolic skewed t copula with the generalized autoregressive score (GAS) model to capture both the multivariate non-normality and the dynamic and asymmetric dependence between equity portfolios. We demonstrate its usefulness by evaluating the forecasting performance of Value-at-Risk and Expected Shortfall for the high-minus-low portfolios. From back-testing, e find consistent and robust evidence that our dynamic asymmetric copula model provides the most accurate forecasts, indicating the importance of incorporating the dynamic and asymmetric dependence structure in risk management.