Local consumption and territorial based accounting for CO2 Emissions

We examine the complications involved in attributing emissions at a sub-regional or local level. Speci cally, we look at how functional specialisation embedded within the metropolitan area can, via trade between sub-regions, create intra-metropolitan emissions interdependencies; and how this complicates environmental policy implementation in an analogous manner to international trade at the national level. For this purpose we use a 3-region emissions extended input-output model of the Glasgow metropolitan area (2 regions: city and surrounding suburban area) and the rest of Scotland. The model utilises data on commuter flows and household consumption to capture income and consumption flows across sub-regions. This enables a carbon attribution analysis at the sub-regional level, allowing us to shed light on the signi cant emissions interdependencies that can exist within metropolitan areas.

FDI, Trade Costs and Regional Asymmetries

We set up a trade model where three countries compete for an exogenous number of firms. Our innovation lies in the geography of the model. Of the three countries, one is the hub through which all trade takes place. First, we establish the natural geography of the region, which is given by the equilibrium distribution of industrial activity in the absence of taxes or subsidies. We then examine the implications for corporate taxes when the countries compete with each other to attract firms. We find that, even when all countries are the same size, the centrality of the hub gives it an advantage in tax setting, such that its equilibrium tax can be larger than that of the spokes and yet it still attracts a disproportionate share of industry. Thus geographic advantage in tax competition has a second dimension, centrality in addition to size.

Transaction Costs and Institutions: Investments in Exchange

This paper proposes a simple model for understanding transaction costs for their composition, size and policy implications. We distinguish between investments in institutions that facilitate exchange and the cost of conducting exchange itself. Institutional quality and market size are determined by the decisions of risk averse agents and conditions are discussed under which the efficient allocation may be decentralized. We highlight a number of differences with models where transaction costs are exogenous, including the implications for taxation and measurement issues.