Moral Hazard with Counterfeit Signals

In many moral hazard problems, the principal evaluates the agent's performance based on signals which the agent may suppress and replace with counterfeits. This form of fraud may affect the design of optimal contracts drastically, leading to complete market failure in extreme cases. I show that in optimal contracts, the principal deters all fraud, and does so by two complementary mechanisms. First, the principal punishes signals that are suspicious, i.e. appear counterfeit. Second, the principal is lenient on bad signals that the agent could suppress, but does not.

Liquidity, moral hazard and bank crises

Bank crises, by interrupting liquidity provision, have been viewed as resulting in welfare losses. In a model of banking with moral hazard, we show that second best bank contracts that improve on autarky ex ante require costly crises to occur with positive probability at the interim stage. When bank payoffs are partially appropriable, either directly via imposition of fines or indirectly by the use of bank equity as a collateral, we argue that an appropriately designed ex-ante regime of policy intervention involving conditional monitoring can prevent bank crises.

How much does a single graduation cohort from further education colleges contribute to an open regional economy?

Econometric analysis has been inconclusive in determining the contribution that increased skills have on macroeconomic performance whilst conventional growth accounting approaches to the same problem rest on restrictive assumptions. We propose an alternative micro-to-macro method which combines elements of growth accounting and numerical general equilibrium modelling. The usefulness of this approach for applied education policy analysis is demonstrated by evaluating the macroeconomic impact on the Scottish economy of a single graduation cohort from further education colleges. We find the macroeconomic impact to be significant. From a policy point of view this supports a revival of interest in the conventional teaching role of education institutions.

Determinants of public education expenditure: Evidence from Indian states

Public education expenditure varies significantly across Indian states. Using data on sixteen Indian states from 2001-2010, the paper tries to identify the determinants of per capita education expenditure of state governments in India. The econometric findings indicate that richer states spend more on education compared to the poorer states. A lower share of child population (0-14 years) is found to significantly enhance education expenditure at the state level. We do not find any evidence that political factors such as political ideology of the ruling party and level of corruption affect education expenditure of state governments.

Moral Behaviour, Altruism and Environmental Policy

Free‐riding is often associated with self‐interested behaviour. However if there is a global mixed pollutant, free‐riding will arise if individuals calculate that their emissions are negligible relative to the total, so total emissions and hence any damage that they and others suffer will be unaffected by whatever consumption choice they make. In this context consumer behaviour and the optimal environmental tax are independent of the degree of altruism. For behaviour to change, individuals need to make their decisions in a different way. We propose a new theory of moral behaviour whereby individuals recognise that they will be worse off by not acting in their own self‐interest, and balance this cost off against the hypothetical moral value of adopting a Kantian form of behaviour, that is by calculating the consequences of their action by asking what would happen if everyone else acted in the same way as they did. We show that: (a) if individuals behave this way, then altruism matters and the greater the degree of altruism the more individuals cut back their consumption of a ’dirty’ good; (b) nevertheless the optimal environmental tax is exactly the same as that emerging from classical analysis where individuals act in self‐interested fashion.

The role of education in equity portfolios during the recent financial crisis

Using a panel of 38 economies, over the period 2001 to 2010, we analyse the link between diversification in equity portfolios and different facets of education. We find that traditionally used measures of education play an important role in reducing equity home bias. After separating countries according to their level of financial development, we find that less developed economies tend to benefit more from an improvement in the level of education compared to their more developed counterparts. We also find that the beneficial effect of education is more pronounced during the most recent financial crisis, especially for economies with less developed financial markets.

Education and the local equity bias around the world

Using a panel of 38 economies, over the period 2001 to 2010, we analyse the link between different facets of education and diversification in international portfolios. We find that university education, mathematical numeracy, in addition to financial skill, play an important role in reducing home bias. After separating countries according to their level of financial development, we find that less developed economies with more university graduates, or with higher level of mathematical numeracy, have lower level of local equity bias compared to more developed countries. We also find that the beneficial effect of education is more pronounced during the most recent financial crisis, especially for economies with less developed financial markets.