How Optimal is US Monetary Policy?

Most of the literature estimating DSGE models for monetary policy analysis assume that policy follows a simple rule. In this paper we allow policy to be described by various forms of optimal policy - commitment, discretion and quasi-commitment. We find that, even after allowing for Markov switching in shock variances, the inflation target and/or rule parameters, the data preferred description of policy is that the US Fed operates under discretion with a marked increase in conservatism after the 1970s. Parameter estimates are similar to those obtained under simple rules, except that the degree of habits is significantly lower and the prevalence of cost-push shocks greater. Moreover, we find that the greatest welfare gains from the ‘Great Moderation’ arose from the reduction in the variances in shocks hitting the economy, rather than increased inflation aversion. However, much of the high inflation of the 1970s could have been avoided had policy makers been able to commit, even without adopting stronger anti-inflation objectives. More recently the Fed appears to have temporarily relaxed policy following the 1987 stock market crash, and has lost, without regaining, its post-Volcker conservatism following the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2000.

Monetary Policy Delegation and Equilibrium Coordination

This paper revisits the argument that the stabilisation bias that arises under discretionary monetary policy can be reduced if policy is delegated to a policymaker with redesigned objectives. We study four delegation schemes: price level targeting, interest rate smoothing, speed limits and straight conservatism. These can all increase social welfare in models with a unique discretionary equilibrium. We investigate how these schemes perform in a model with capital accumulation where uniqueness does not necessarily apply. We discuss how multiplicity arises and demonstrate that no delegation scheme is able to eliminate all potential bad equilibria. Price level targeting has two interesting features. It can create a new equilibrium that is welfare dominated, but it can also alter equilibrium stability properties and make coordination on the best equilibrium more likely.

Imperfect Credibility and Robust Monetary Policy

This paper studies the behavior of a central bank that seeks to conduct policy optimally while having imperfect credibility and harboring doubts about its model. Taking the Smets-Wouters model as the central bank.s approximating model, the paper's main findings are as follows. First, a central bank.s credibility can have large consequences for how policy responds to shocks. Second, central banks that have low credibility can bene.t from a desire for robustness because this desire motivates the central bank to follow through on policy announcements that would otherwise not be time-consistent. Third, even relatively small departures from perfect credibility can produce important declines in policy performance. Finally, as a technical contribution, the paper develops a numerical procedure to solve the decision-problem facing an imperfectly credible policymaker that seeks robustness.

Cyclical and Welfare Effects of Public Sector Unions in a Real-Business-Cycle Model

Motivated by the highly-unionized public sectors, the high public shares in total employment, and the public sector wage premia observed in Europe, this paper examines the importance of public sector unions for macroeconomic theory. The model generates cyclical behavior in hours and wages that is consistent with data behavior in an economy with highly-unionized public sector, namely Germany during the period 1970-2007. The union model is a signifi cant improvement over a model with exogenous public employment. In addition, endogenously-determined public wage and hours add to the distortionary e ffect of contractionary tax reforms by generating greater tax rate changes, thus producing signi ficantly higher welfare losses.

Monetary Policy in Times of Financial Stress.

Some studies argue that the Fed reacts to financial market developments. Using data covering the period 1985:Q1 - 2008:Q4 and employing an augmented Taylor rule specification, we re-examine that conjecture. We find that evidence in favour of such a reaction is largely driven by the Fed’s behaviour during the 2007-2008 financial crisis.

An Empirical Assessment of Optimal Monetary Policy Delegation in the Euro Area

We estimate a New Keynesian DSGE model for the Euro area under alternative descriptions of monetary policy (discretion, commitment or a simple rule) after allowing for Markov switching in policy maker preferences and shock volatilities. This reveals that there have been several changes in Euro area policy making, with a strengthening of the anti-inflation stance in the early years of the ERM, which was then lost around the time of German reunification and only recovered following the turnoil in the ERM in 1992. The ECB does not appear to have been as conservative as aggregate Euro-area policy was under Bundesbank leadership, and its response to the financial crisis has been muted. The estimates also suggest that the most appropriate description of policy is that of discretion, with no evidence of commitment in the Euro-area. As a result although both ‘good luck’ and ‘good policy’ played a role in the moderation of inflation and output volatility in the Euro-area, the welfare gains would have been substantially higher had policy makers been able to commit. We consider a range of delegation schemes as devices to improve upon the discretionary outcome, and conclude that price level targeting would have achieved welfare levels close to those attained under commitment, even after accounting for the existence of the Zero Lower Bound on nominal interest rates.

An Empirical Assessment of Optimal Monetary Policy Delegation in the Euro Area

We estimate a New Keynesian DSGE model for the Euro area under alternative descriptions of monetary policy (discretion, commitment or a simple rule) after allowing for Markov switching in policy maker preferences and shock volatilities. This reveals that there have been several changes in Euro area policy making, with a strengthening of the anti-inflation stance in the early years of the ERM, which was then lost around the time of German reunification and only recovered following the turnoil in the ERM in 1992. The ECB does not appear to have been as conservative as aggregate Euro-area policy was under Bundesbank leadership, and its response to the financial crisis has been muted. The estimates also suggest that the most appropriate description of policy is that of discretion, with no evidence of commitment in the Euro-area. As a result although both ‘good luck’ and ‘good policy’ played a role in the moderation of inflation and output volatility in the Euro-area, the welfare gains would have been substantially higher had policy makers been able to commit. We consider a range of delegation schemes as devices to improve upon the discretionary outcome, and conclude that price level targeting would have achieved welfare levels close to those attained under commitment, even after accounting for the existence of the Zero Lower Bound on nominal interest rates.

Multiple Objectives in Monetary Policy: A de Facto Analysis for ‘Advanced’ Countries

A statistical methodology is developed by which realised outcomes can be used to identify, for calendar years between 1974 and 2012, when policy makers in ‘advanced’ economies have successfully pursued single objectives of different kinds, or multiple objectives. A simple criterion is then used to distinguish between multiple objectives pure and simple and multiple objectives subject to a price stability constraint. The overall and individual country results which this methodology produces seem broadly plausible. Unconditional and conditional analyses of the inflation and growth associated with different types of objectives reveal that multiple objectives subject to a price stability constraint are associated with roughly as good economic performance as the single objective of inflation. A proposal is then made as to how the remit of an inflation-targeting central bank could be adjusted to allow it to pursue other objectives in extremis without losing the credibility effects associated with inflation targeting.

From Bretton Woods to inflation targeting: financial change and monetary policy evolution in Europe

Different ‘monetary architectures’ are distinguished, as a background to a discussion of the change in developed country monetary policy frameworks from fixed exchange rates under the Bretton Woods international monetary system to, ultimately, formal or informal inflation targeting. The introduction and experience of monetary targets in the 1970s is considered, followed by an analysis of the changes in countries’ monetary architectures, with particular reference to money and bond markets and to France and Italy, in the 1980s. Exchange rate targeting in Europe in the 1980s and 1990s is examined, followed by the changes in central bank independence in the 1990s. This leads to a discussion of the introduction of inflation targeting, and the issues raised for inflation targeting by the financial crisis of the late 2000s.

Monetary policy strategies, financial institutions and financial markets in the Middle East and North Africa: an overview

Three polar types of monetary architecture are identified together with the institutional and market infrastructure required for each type and the kinds of monetary policy feasible in each case: a ‘basic’ architecture where there is little or no financial system as such but an elementary central bank which is able to fix the exchange rate, as a substitute for a proper monetary policy; a ‘modern’ monetary architecture with developed banks, financial markets and central bank where policy choices include types of inflation targeting; and an ‘intermediate’ monetary architecture where less market-based monetary policies involving less discretion are feasible. A range of data is used to locate the various MENA countries with respect to these polar types. Five countries (Iran, Libya, Sudan, Syria and Yemen) are identified as those with the least developed monetary architecture, while Bahrain and Jordan are identified as the group at the other end of the spectrum, reaching beyond the intermediate polar type in some dimensions but not others. The countries in between vary on different dimensions but all lie between basic and intermediate architectures. The key general findings are that the MENA countries are both less differentiated and less ‘developed’ than might have been expected. The paper ends by calling for research on the costs and benefits of different types of monetary architecture.

The Optimal Degree of Monetary-Discretion in a New Keynesian Model with Private Information

This paper considers the optimal degree of discretion in monetary policy when the central bank conducts policy based on its private information about the state of the economy and is unable to commit. Society seeks to maximize social welfare by imposing restrictions on the central bank's actions over time, and the central bank takes these restrictions and the New Keynesian Phillips curve as constraints. By solving a dynamic mechanism design problem we find that it is optimal to grant "constrained discretion" to the central bank by imposing both upper and lower bounds on permissible inflation, and that these bounds must be set in a history-dependent way. The optimal degree of discretion varies over time with the severity of the time-inconsistency problem, and, although no discretion is optimal when the time-inconsistency problem is very severe, our numerical experiment suggests that no-discretion is a transient phenomenon, and that some discretion is granted eventually.

US Monetary and Fiscal Policies - Conflict or Cooperation?

Most of the literature estimating DSGE models for monetary policy analysis ignores fiscal policy and assumes that monetary policy follows a simple rule. In this paper we allow both fiscal and monetary policy to be described by rules and/or optimal policy which are subject to switches over time. We find that US monetary and fiscal policy have often been in conflict, and that it is relatively rare that we observe the benign policy combination of an conservative monetary policy paired with a debt stabilizing fiscal policy. In a series of counterfactuals, a conservative central bank following a time-consistent fiscal policy leader would come close to mimicking the cooperative Ramsey policy. However, if policy makers cannot credibly commit to such a regime, monetary accommodation of the prevailing fiscal regime may actually be welfare improving.