Inverted Haavelmo Effects in a General Equilibrium Analysis of the Impact of Implementing the Scottish Variable Rate of Income Tax.

The Scottish Parliament has the authority to make a balanced-budget expansion or contraction in public expenditure, funded by corresponding local changes in the basic rate of income tax of up to 3p in the pound. This fiscal adjustment is known as the Scottish Variable Rate of income tax, though it has never, as yet, been used. In this paper we attempt to identify the impact on aggregate economic activity in Scotland of implementing these devolved fiscal powers. This is achieved through theoretical analysis and simulation using a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model for Scotland. This analysis generalises the conventional Keynesian model so that negative balanced-budget multipliers values are possible, reflecting a regional “inverted Haavelmo effect”. Key parameters determining the aggregate economic impact are the extent to which the Scottish Government create local amenities valuable to the Scottish population and the extent to which this is incorporated into local wage bargaining.

On Identification of Bayesian DSGE Models

In recent years there has been increasing concern about the identification of parameters in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. Given the structure of DSGE models it may be difficult to determine whether a parameter is identified. For the researcher using Bayesian methods, a lack of identification may not be evident since the posterior of a parameter of interest may differ from its prior even if the parameter is unidentified. We show that this can even be the case even if the priors assumed on the structural parameters are independent. We suggest two Bayesian identification indicators that do not suffer from this difficulty and are relatively easy to compute. The first applies to DSGE models where the parameters can be partitioned into those that are known to be identified and the rest where it is not known whether they are identified. In such cases the marginal posterior of an unidentified parameter will equal the posterior expectation of the prior for that parameter conditional on the identified parameters. The second indicator is more generally applicable and considers the rate at which the posterior precision gets updated as the sample size (T) is increased. For identified parameters the posterior precision rises with T, whilst for an unidentified parameter its posterior precision may be updated but its rate of update will be slower than T. This result assumes that the identified parameters are pT-consistent, but similar differential rates of updates for identified and unidentified parameters can be established in the case of super consistent estimators. These results are illustrated by means of simple DSGE models.

Regime-Switching Cointegration

We develop methods for Bayesian inference in vector error correction models which are subject to a variety of switches in regime (e.g. Markov switches in regime or structural breaks). An important aspect of our approach is that we allow both the cointegrating vectors and the number of cointegrating relationships to change when the regime changes. We show how Bayesian model averaging or model selection methods can be used to deal with the high-dimensional model space that results. Our methods are used in an empirical study of the Fisher effect.

UK Macroeconomic Forecasting with Many Predictors: Which Models Forecast Best and When Do They Do So?

Block factor methods offer an attractive approach to forecasting with many predictors. These extract the information in these predictors into factors reflecting different blocks of variables (e.g. a price block, a housing block, a financial block, etc.). However, a forecasting model which simply includes all blocks as predictors risks being over-parameterized. Thus, it is desirable to use a methodology which allows for different parsimonious forecasting models to hold at different points in time. In this paper, we use dynamic model averaging and dynamic model selection to achieve this goal. These methods automatically alter the weights attached to different forecasting model as evidence comes in about which has forecast well in the recent past. In an empirical study involving forecasting output and inflation using 139 UK monthly time series variables, we find that the set of predictors changes substantially over time. Furthermore, our results show that dynamic model averaging and model selection can greatly improve forecast performance relative to traditional forecasting methods.

A bayesian spatial individual effects probit model of the 2010 UK general election

The Conservative Party emerged from the 2010 United Kingdom General Election as the largest single party, but their support was not geographically uniform. In this paper, we estimate a hierarchical Bayesian spatial probit model that tests for the presence of regional voting effects. This model allows for the estimation of individual region-specic effects on the probability of Conservative Party success, incorporating information on the spatial relationships between the regions of the mainland United Kingdom. After controlling for a range of important covariates, we find that these spatial relationships are significant and that our individual region-specic effects estimates provide additional evidence of North-South variations in Conservative Party support.

Unionisation, International Integration and Selection

We study how unionisation affects competitive selection between heterogeneous firms when wage negotiations can occur at the rm or at the profit-centre level. With productivity specific wages, an increase in union power has: (i) a selection-softening; (ii) a counter-competitive; (iii) a wage-inequality; and (iv) a variety effect. In a two-country asymmetric setting, stronger unions soften competition for domestic firms and toughen it for exporters. With profit-centre bargaining, we show how trade liberalisation can affect wage inequality among identical workers both across firms (via its effects on competitive selection) and within firms (via wage discrimination across destination markets).

Regime-Switching Cointegration

We develop methods for Bayesian inference in vector error correction models which are subject to a variety of switches in regime (e.g. Markov switches in regime or structural breaks). An important aspect of our approach is that we allow both the cointegrating vectors and the number of cointegrating relationships to change when the regime changes. We show how Bayesian model averaging or model selection methods can be used to deal with the high-dimensional model space that results. Our methods are used in an empirical study of the Fisher e ffect.

Payoff levels, loss avoidance, and equilibrium selection in the Stag Hunt: an experimental study

Game theorists typically assume that changing a game’s payoff levels—by adding the same constant to, or subtracting it from, all payoffs—should not affect behavior. While this invariance is an implication of the theory when payoffs mirror expected utilities, it is an empirical question when the “payoffs” are actually money amounts. In particular, if individuals treat monetary gains and losses differently, then payoff–level changes may matter when they result in positive payoffs becoming negative, or vice versa. We report the results of a human–subjects experiment designed to test for two types of loss avoidance: certain–loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a sure loss, in favor of an alternative that might lead to a gain) and possible–loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a possible loss, in favor of an alternative that leads to a sure gain). Subjects in the experiment play three versions of Stag Hunt, which are identical up to the level of payoffs, under a variety of treatments. We find differences in behavior across the three versions of Stag Hunt; these differences are hard to detect in the first round of play, but grow over time. When significant, the differences we find are in the direction predicted by certain– and possible–loss avoidance. Our results carry implications for games with multiple equilibria, and for theories that attempt to select among equilibria in such games.

Trade Costs, International Competition and Selection: The Effects of Unionisation on Market Size

Within a two-country model of international trade in which heterogeneous firms face firm-specific unions, we study the effects of different forms of trade liberalisation on market structure and competitive selection in the presence of inter-country asymmetries in size and labour market institutions. For given levels of trade openness, an increase in a country’s relative unions’ strength reduces the average productivity of its domestic producers but increases that of its exporters. Whilst an unfavourable union power differential, by increasing wages, weakens a country’s firms’ competitive position, the higher wages reinforce standard market access mechanisms to give rise to aggregate income effects. When the initial levels of trade openness are sufficiently low, this ‘expansionary’ aggregate effect can attract industry in the country with stronger unions and also result in an increase in the extensive margin of exports. For sufficiently large inter-country differences in the bargaining power of unions, trade liberalization can then result in a pro-variety effect, with an increase in the total availability of varieties to consumers in both countries, regardless of there being inter-country differences in size.

Using VARs and TVP-VARs with Many Macroeconomic Variables

This paper discusses the challenges faced by the empirical macroeconomist and methods for surmounting them. These challenges arise due to the fact that macroeconometric models potentially include a large number of variables and allow for time variation in parameters. These considerations lead to models which have a large number of parameters to estimate relative to the number of observations. A wide range of approaches are surveyed which aim to overcome the resulting problems. We stress the related themes of prior shrinkage, model averaging and model selection. Subsequently, we consider a particular modelling approach in detail. This involves the use of dynamic model selection methods with large TVP-VARs. A forecasting exercise involving a large US macroeconomic data set illustrates the practicality and empirical success of our approach.

A New Index of Financial Conditions

We use factor augmented vector autoregressive models with time-varying coefficients to construct a financial conditions index. The time-variation in the parameters allows for the weights attached to each financial variable in the index to evolve over time. Furthermore, we develop methods for dynamic model averaging or selection which allow the financial variables entering into the FCI to change over time. We discuss why such extensions of the existing literature are important and show them to be so in an empirical application involving a wide range of financial variables.

Sharp Bounds on Heterogeneous Individual Treatment Responses

This paper discusses how to identify individual-specific causal effects of an ordered discrete endogenous variable. The counterfactual heterogeneous causal information is recovered by identifying the partial differences of a structural relation. The proposed refutable nonparametric local restrictions exploit the fact that the pattern of endogeneity may vary across the level of the unobserved variable. The restrictions adopted in this paper impose a sense of order to an unordered binary endogeneous variable. This allows for a uni.ed structural approach to studying various treatment effects when self-selection on unobservables is present. The usefulness of the identi.cation results is illustrated using the data on the Vietnam-era veterans. The empirical findings reveal that when other observable characteristics are identical, military service had positive impacts for individuals with low (unobservable) earnings potential, while it had negative impacts for those with high earnings potential. This heterogeneity would not be detected by average effects which would underestimate the actual effects because different signs would be cancelled out. This partial identification result can be used to test homogeneity in response. When homogeneity is rejected, many parameters based on averages may deliver misleading information.

Efficient Nash Equilibrium under Adverse Selection

This paper revisits the problem of adverse selection in the insurance market of Rothschild and Stiglitz [28]. We propose a simple extension of the game-theoretic structure in Hellwig [14] under which Nash-type strategic interaction between the informed customers and the uninformed firms results always in a particular separating equilibrium. The equilibrium allocation is unique and Pareto-efficient in the interim sense subject to incentive-compatibility and individual rationality. In fact, it is the unique neutral optimum in the sense of Myerson [22].

Partner Selection into Policy Relevant Field Experiments

This study investigates the issue of self-selection of stakeholders into participation and collaboration in policy-relevant experiments. We document and test the implications of self-selection in the context of randomised policy experiment we conducted in primary schools in the UK. The main questions we ask are (1) is there evidence of selection on key observable characteristics likely to matter for the outcome of interest and (2) does selection matter for the estimates of treatment eff ects. The experimental work consists in testing the e ffects of an intervention aimed at encouraging children to make more healthy choices at lunch. We recruited schools through local authorities and randomised schools across two incentive treatments and a control group. We document the selection taking place both at the level of local authorities and at the school level. Overall we nd mild evidence of selection on key observables such as obesity levels and socio-economic characteristics. We find evidence of selection along indicators of involvement in healthy lifestyle programmes at the school level, but the magnitude is small. Moreover, We do not find signifi cant di erences in the treatment e ffects of the experiment between variables which, albeit to a mild degree, are correlated with selection into the experiment. To our knowledge, this is the rst study providing direct evidence on the magnitude of self-selection in fi eld experiments.

Unionisation, International Integration and Selection

We study how unionisation affects competitive selection between heterogeneous firms when wage negotiations can occur at the firm or at the profit-centre level. With productivity specific wages, an increase in union power has: (i) a selection-softening; (ii) a counter-competitive; (iii) a wage-inequality; and (iv) a variety effect. In a two-country asymmetric setting, stronger unions soften competition for domestic firms and toughen it for exporters. With profit-centre bargaining, we show how trade liberalisation can affect wage inequality among identical workers both across firms (via its effects on competitive selection) and within firms (via wage discrimination across destination markets).