Did Keynes in the General Theory significantly misrepresent J S Mill?

It has been alleged that J M Keynes, quoting in the General Theory a passage from J S Mill's Principles, misunderstood the passage in question and was therefore wrong to cite Mill as an upholder of the 'classical' proposition that 'supply creates its own demand'. We believe that, although Keynes was admittedly in error with respect to, so-to-say, the 'letter' of Mill's exposition, he did not mislead readers as to the 'substance' of Mill's conception. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that J S Mill did indeed stand for a 'classical' position, vulnerable to Keynes's critique as developed in the General Theory. [This is a revised version of an earlier working paper: 'Keynes, Mill and Say's Law', Strathclyde Papers in Economics, 2000/11]

‘Right Back Where We Started From’: From ‘The Classics’ To Keynes, And Back Again

The purpose of this paper is to highlight the curiously circular course followed by mainstream macroeconomic thinking in recent times. Having broken from classical orthodoxy in the late 1930s via Keynes’s General Theory, over the last three or four decades the mainstream conventional wisdom, regressing rather than progressing, has now come to embrace a conception of the working of the macroeconomy which is again of a classical, essentially pre-Keynesian, character. At the core of the analysis presented in the typical contemporary macro textbook is the (neo)classical model of the labour market, which represents employment as determined (given conditions of productivity) by the terms of labour supply. While it is allowed that changes in aggregate demand may temporarily affect output and employment, the contention is that in due course employment will automatically return to its ‘natural’ (full employment) level. Unemployment is therefore identified as a merely frictional or voluntary phenomenon: involuntary unemployment - in other words persisting demand-deficient unemployment - is entirely absent from the picture. Variations in aggregate demand are understood to have a lasting impact only on the price level, not on output and employment. This in effect amounts to a return to a Pigouvian conception such as targeted by Keynes in the General Theory. We take the view that this reversion to ideas which should by now be obsolete reflects not the discovery of logical or empirical deficiencies in the Keynes analysis, but results rather from doctrinaire blindness and failure of scholarship on account of which essential features of the Keynes theory have been overlooked or misrepresented. There is an urgent need for a critical appraisal of the current conventional macroeconomic wisdom.

The Effects of Experience on Preference Uncertainty: Theory and Empirics for Public and Quasi-Public Environmental Goods

This paper develop and estimates a model of demand estimation for environmental public goods which allows for consumers to learn about their preferences through consumption experiences. We develop a theoretical model of Bayesian updating, perform comparative statics over the model, and show how the theoretical model can be consistently incorporated into a reduced form econometric model. We then estimate the model using data collected for two environmental goods. We find that the predictions of the theoretical exercise that additional experience makes consumers more certain over their preferences in both mean and variance are supported in each case.

A Theory of Wage Setting Behavior

Concerns for fairness, workers' morale and reciprocity infuence firms' wage setting policy. In this paper we formalize a theory of wage setting behavior in a simple and tractable model that explicitly considers these behavioral aspects. A worker is assumed to have reference-dependent preferences and displays loss aversion when evaluating the fairness of a wage contract. The theory establishes a wage-effort relationship that captures the worker's reference-dependent reciprocity, which in turn in uences the firm's optimal wage policy. The paper makes two key contributions: it identifies loss aversion as an explanation for a worker's asymmetric reciprocity; and it provides realistic and generalized microfoundation for downward wage rigidity. We further illustrate the implications of our theory for both wage setting and hiring behavior. Downward wage rigidity generates several implications for the outcome of the initial employment contract. The worker's reference wage, his extent of negative reciprocity and the firms expectations are key drivers of the propositions derived.