A Foundation System and a State System - Private-School Implications on Welfare and Education Expenditure

This paper examines the effects of two different education - financing systems: a foundation system and a state system on the level and distribution of resources devoted to education in the presence of private schools. We use political economy approach where households differ in their level of income, and the central tax rate used to nance education is determined by a majority vote. Our analysis focuses on implications of allowing for a private-school option. To evaluate the importance of private schools we develop a computational model and calibrate it using USA data. The results reveal that the private school option is very important quantitatively in terms of welfare, total resources spent on education and equity.

Affirmative Action Policy and Effort Levels. Sequential-Move Contest Game Argument

In this paper we analyse a simple two-person sequential-move contest game with heterogeneous players. Assuming that the heterogeneity could be the consequence of past discrimination, we study the effects of implementation of affirmative action policy, which tackles this heterogeneity by compensating discriminated players, and compare them with the situation in which the heterogeneity is ignored and the contestants are treated equally. In our analysis we consider different orders of moves. We show that the order of moves of contestants is a very important factor in determination of the effects of the implementation of the affirmative action policy. We also prove that in such cases a significant role is played by the level of the heterogeneity of individuals. In particular, in contrast to the present-in-the-literature predictions, we demonstrate that as a consequence of the interplay of these two factors, the response to the implementation of the affirmative action policy option may be the decrease in the total equilibrium effort level of the contestants in comparison to the unbiased contest game.

Exclusive Nightclubs and Lonely Hearts Columns: Nonmonotone Participation in Optional Intermediation

In many decentralised markets, the traders who benefit most from an exchange do not employ intermediaries even though they could easily afford them. At the same time, employing intermediaries is not worthwhile for traders who benefit little from trade. Together, these decisions amount to non-monotone participation choices in intermediation: only traders of middle “type” employ intermediaries, while the rest, the high and the low types, prefer to search for a trading partner directly. We provide a theoretical foundation for this, hitherto unexplained, phenomenon. We build a dynamic matching model, where a trader’s equilibrium bargaining share is a convex increasing function of her type. We also show that this is indeed a necessary condition for the existence of non-monotone equilibria.

The Distributional Consequences of Supply-Side Reforms in General Equilibrium

This paper addresses the issue on whether tax reforms consisten with lower public debt-to-GDP in the long-run can lead to a more efficient and equitable economy. To this end we solve a heterogeneous agent model comprised of a government, a representative capitalist and representative skilled and unskilled workers, under both rational expectations and adaptive learning. Our main ndings are that (i) reductions in capital taxation, while bene cial at the aggregate level, lead to increased inequality mainly due to the substitutability of un- skilled labour and capital; (ii) a fall in taxation for skilled labour is Pareto improving, which is largely explained by its complementarity with the other factor inputs; (iii) all agents would prefer increasing the tax rate on capital to increasing the tax rate on skilled and un- skilled labour since it leads to relatively lower welfare losses; and (iv) heterogeneity in initial beliefs under adaptive learning quantitatively matters for welfare.

Contracting Institutions and Development

The quality of contracting institutions has been thought to be of second-order importance next to the impact that good property rights institutions can have on long-run growth. Using a large range of proxies for each type of institution, we find a robust negative link between the quality of contracting institutions and long-run growth when we condition on property rights and a number of additional macroeconomic variables. Although the result remains something of a puzzle, we present evidence which suggests that only when property rights institutions are good do contracting institutions appear also to be good for development. Good contracting institutions can reduce long-run growth when property rights are not secured, presumably because the gains from the (costly) contracting institutions cannot be realised. This suggests that contracting institutions can benefit growth, and that the sequence of institutional change can matter.

Non-cooperative incentives to share knowledge in competitive environments

In this paper we study a model where non-cooperative agents may exchange knowledge in a competitive environment. As a potential factor that could induce the knowledge disclosure between humans we consider the timing of the moves of players. We develop a simple model of a multistage game in which there are only three players and competition takes place only within two stages. Players can share their private knowledge with their opponents and the knowledge is modelled as in uencing their marginal cost of e¤ort. We identify two main mechanisms that work towards knowledge disclosure. One of them is that before the actual competition starts, the stronger player of the rst stage of a game may have desire to share his knowledge with the "observer", be- cause this reduces the valuation of the prize of the weaker player of that stage and as a result his e¤ort level and probability of winning in a ght. Another mechanism is that the "observer" may have sometimes desire to share knowledge with the weaker player of the rst stage, because in this way, by increasing his probability of winning in that stage, he decreases the probability of winning of the stronger player. As a result, in the second stage the "observer" may have greater chances to meet the weaker player rather than the stronger one. Keywords: knowledge sharing, strategic knowledge disclosure, multistage contest game, non-cooperative games

The Expenditure Impacts of Individual Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) and their Students on the Welsh Economy: Homogeneity or Heterogeneity?

This paper replicates the analysis of Scottish HEIs in Hermannsson et al (2010a) for the case of Wales in order to provide a self-contained analysis that is readily accessible by those whose primary concern is with the regional impacts of Welsh HEIs. When we treat each of the twelve Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) that existed in Wales in 2006 as separate sectors in conventional input-output analysis, their expenditure impacts per unit of final demand appear rather homogenous, with the apparent heterogeneity of their overall impacts being primarily driven by scale. However, a disaggregation of their income by source reveals considerable variation in their dependence upon funding from the devolved Welsh Assembly Government and their ability to draw in income/funding from external sources. Acknowledging the binding budget constraint of the Welsh Assembly Government and deriving balanced expenditure multipliers reveals large differences in the net-expenditure impact of HEIs upon the Welsh economy, with the source of variation being the origin of income. Applying a novel treatment of student expenditure impacts, identifying the amount of exogenous spending per student, modifies the heterogeneity of the overall expenditure impacts. On balance this suggests that the impacts of impending budget cut-backs will be quite different by institution depending on their sensitivity to public funding. However, predicting the outcome of budget cutbacks at the margin is problematic for reasons that we identify.

The Changing Inter-Industry Wage Structure of the Organised Manufacturing Sector in India, 1973-74 to 2003-04

This study examines the inter-industry wage structure of the organised manufacturing sector in India for the period 1973-74 to 2003-04 by estimating the growth of average real wages for production workers by industry. In order to estimate the growth rates, the study adopts a methodological framework that differs from other studies in that the time series properties of the concerned variables are closely considered in order to obtain meaningful estimates of growth that are unbiased and (asymptotically) efficient. Using wage data on 51 manufacturing industries at three digit level of the National Industrial Classification 1998 (India), our estimation procedure obtains estimates of growth of real wages per worker that are deterministic in nature by accounting for any potential structural break(s). Our findings show that the inter-industry wage structure in India has changed a lot in the period 1973-74 to 2003-04 and that it provides some evidence that the inter-industry wage differences have become more pronounced in the post-reforms period. Thus this paper provides new evidence from India on the need to consider the hypothesis that industry affiliation is potentially an important determinant of wages when studying any relationship between reforms and wages.

Competitive Altruism, Mentalizing and Signalling

The human tendency to cooperate with nonkin even in short-run relationships remains a puzzle. Recently it has been hypothesized that altruism may be a byproduct of “mentalizing”, the process of understanding and predicting the mental states of others. Another idea is based on sexual selection: altruism is a costly signal of good genes. The paper shows that these two arguments are stronger when combined in that altruists who can mentalize have a greater advantage over non-altruists when they can signal their type, even though these signals are costly. Further, once such an equilibrium is established, altruists will not be supplanted by mutants who have similar mentalizing abilities but who lack altruism.

Corruption and the Military in Politics: Theory and Evidence from around the World

Recent theoretical developments and case study evidence suggests a relationship between the military in politics and corruption. This study contributes to this literature by analyzing theoretically and empirically the role of the military in politics and corruption for the first time. By drawing on a cross sectional and panel data set covering a large number of countries, over the period 1984-2007, and using a variety of econometric methods substantial empirical support is found for a positive relationship between the military in politics and corruption. In sum, our results reveal that a one standard deviation increase in the military in politics leads to a 0.22 unit increase in corruption index. This relationship is shown to be robust to a variety of specification changes, different econometric techniques, different sample sizes, alternative corruption indices and the exclusion of outliers. This study suggests that the explanatory power of the military in politics is at least as important as the conventionally accepted causes of corruption, such as economic development.

Growth Rate Estimation in the presence of Unit Roots

This study addresses the issue of the presence of a unit root on the growth rate estimation by the least-squares approach. We argue that when the log of a variable contains a unit root, i.e., it is not stationary then the growth rate estimate from the log-linear trend model is not a valid representation of the actual growth of the series. In fact, under such a situation, we show that the growth of the series is the cumulative impact of a stochastic process. As such the growth estimate from such a model is just a spurious representation of the actual growth of the series, which we refer to as a “pseudo growth rate”. Hence such an estimate should be interpreted with caution. On the other hand, we highlight that the statistical representation of a series as containing a unit root is not easy to separate from an alternative description which represents the series as fundamentally deterministic (no unit root) but containing a structural break. In search of a way around this, our study presents a survey of both the theoretical and empirical literature on unit root tests that takes into account possible structural breaks. We show that when a series is trendstationary with breaks, it is possible to use the log-linear trend model to obtain well defined estimates of growth rates for sub-periods which are valid representations of the actual growth of the series. Finally, to highlight the above issues, we carry out an empirical application whereby we estimate meaningful growth rates of real wages per worker for 51 industries from the organised manufacturing sector in India for the period 1973-2003, which are not only unbiased but also asymptotically efficient. We use these growth rate estimates to highlight the evolving inter-industry wage structure in India.

Disaggregating the Household Sector in a 2004 UK Input Output Table and Social Accounting Matrix by Income Quintiles

This paper disaggregates a UK Input-Output (IO) table for 2004 based on household income quintiles from published survey data. In addition to the Input-Output disaggregation, the household components of a UK Income Expenditure (I-E) account used to inform a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM),have also been disaggregated by household income quintile. The focus of this paper is on household expenditure on the UK energy sector.

Inflation Uncertainty, Exchange Rate Depreciation and Volatility: Evidence from Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania

While flexible exchange rates facilitate stabilisation, exchange rate fluctuations can cause real volatility. This gives policy importance to the causal relationship between exchange rate depreciation and its volatility. An exchange rate may be expected to become more volatile when the underlying currency loses value. We conjecture that a reverse causation, which further weakens the currency, may be mitigated by price stability. Data from Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania support this: depreciation makes exchange rate more volatile for all but volatility does not causes depreciation in Tanzania which has enjoyed a more stable inflation despite all countries adopting similar macro-policies since early 1990s.

The effects of the generalized use of iodized salt on occupational patterns in Switzerland.

This paper examines the impact of salt iodization in Switzerland in the 1920s and 1930s on occupational patterns of cohorts born after the intervention. The generalized use of iodized salt successfully combatted iodine deficiency disorders, which were previously endemic in some areas of Switzerland. The most important effect of universal prophylaxis by means of iodized salt was the eradication of mental retardation inflicted in utero by lack of iodine. This paper looks for evidence of increased cognitive ability of those treated with iodine in utero by examining the occupational choice and characteristics of occupations chosen by cohorts born after the intervention. By exploiting variation in pre-existing conditions and in the timing of the intervention, I find that cohorts born in previously highly-deficient areas after the introduction of iodized salt self-selected into higher-paying occupations. I also find that the characteristics of occupations in those areas changed, and that cohorts born after the intervention engaged to a higher degree in occupations with higher cognitive demands, whereas they opted out of physical-labor-intensive occupations.

Subsidies as Optimal Fiscal Stimuli

In the theoretical macroeconomics literature, fiscal policy is almost uniformly taken to mean taxing and spending by a ‘benevolent government’ that exploits the potential aggregate demand externalities inherent in the imperfectly competitive nature of goods markets. Whilst shown to raise aggregate output and employment, these policies crowd-out private consumption and hence typically reduce welfare. In this paper we consider the use of ‘tax-and-subsidise’ instead of ‘taxand- spend’ policies on account of their widespread use by governments, even in the recent recession, to stimulate economic activity. Within a static general equilibrium macro-model with imperfectly competitive good markets we examine the effect of wage and output subsidies and show that, for a small open economy, positive tax and subsidy rates exist which maximise welfare, rendering no intervention as a suboptimal state. We also show that, within a two-country setting, a Nash non-cooperative symmetric equilibrium with positive tax and subsidy rates exists, and that cooperation between trading partners in setting these rates is more expansionary and leads to an improvement upon the non-cooperative solution.