A comparison of results from MRIO and interregional computable general equilibrium (CGE) analyses of the impacts of a positive demand shock on the ‘CO2 trade balance’ between Scotland and the rest of the UK

In previous work we have applied the environmental multi-region input-output (MRIO) method proposed by Turner et al (2007) to examine the ‘CO2 trade balance’ between Scotland and the Rest of the UK. In McGregor et al (2008) we construct an interregional economy-environment input-output (IO) and social accounting matrix (SAM) framework that allows us to investigate methods of attributing responsibility for pollution generation in the UK at the regional level. This facilitates analysis of the nature and significance of environmental spillovers and the existence of an environmental ‘trade balance’ between regions. While the existence of significant data problems mean that the quantitative results of this study should be regarded as provisional, we argue that the use of such a framework allows us to begin to consider questions such as the extent to which a devolved authority like the Scottish Parliament can and should be responsible for contributing to national targets for reductions in emissions levels (e.g. the UK commitment to the Kyoto Protocol) when it is limited in the way it can control emissions, particularly with respect to changes in demand elsewhere in the UK. However, while such analysis is useful in terms of accounting for pollution flows in the single time period that the accounts relate to, it is limited when the focus is on modelling the impacts of any marginal change in activity. This is because a conventional demand-driven IO model assumes an entirely passive supply-side in the economy (i.e. all supply is infinitely elastic) and is further restricted by the assumption of universal Leontief (fixed proportions) technology implied by the use of the A and multiplier matrices. In this paper we argue that where analysis of marginal changes in activity is required, a more flexible interregional computable general equilibrium approach that models behavioural relationships in a more realistic and theory-consistent manner, is more appropriate and informative. To illustrate our analysis, we compare the results of introducing a positive demand stimulus in the UK economy using both IO and CGE interregional models of Scotland and the rest of the UK. In the case of the latter, we demonstrate how more theory consistent modelling of both demand and supply side behaviour at the regional and national levels affect model results, including the impact on the interregional CO2 ‘trade balance’.

Solovian and New Growth Theory from the Perspective of Allyn Young on Macroeconomic Increasing Returns

This paper evaluates, from an Allyn Youngian perspective, the neoclassical Solow model of growth and the associated empirical estimates of the sources of growth based on it. It attempts to clarify Young’s particular concept of generalised or macroeconomic “increasing returns” to show the limitations of a model of growth based on an assumption that the aggregate production function is characterised by constant returns to scale but “augmented” by exogenous technical progress. Young’s concept of endogenous, self-sustaining growth is also shown to differ in important respects (including in its policy implications) from modern endogenous growth theory.

How do improvements in labour productivity in the Scottish economy affect the UK position on the Environmental Kuznets Curve?

The research reported here is an output of Karen Turner’s ESRC Climate Change Leadership Fellow project (Grant reference RES-066-27-0029). However, this research builds on previous work funded by the ESRC on modelling the economic and environmental impacts of technological improvement (Grant reference: RES-061-25-0010) and by the EPSRC through the SuperGen Marine Energy Research Consortium on accounting for and modeling environmental indicators (Grant reference: EP/E040136/1).

A Soft Edge Target Zone Model: Theory And Application To Hong Kong

Hong Kong’s currency is pegged to the US dollar in a currency board arrangement. In autumn 2003, the Hong Kong dollar appreciated from close to 7.80 per US dollar to 7.70, as investors feared that the currency board would be abandoned. In the wake of this appreciation, the monetary authorities revamped the one-sided currency board mechanism into a symmetric two-sided system with a narrow exchange rate band. This paper reviews the characteristics of the new currency board arrangement and embeds a theoretical soft edge target zone model typifying many intermediate regimes, to explain the notable achievement of speculative peace and credibility since May 2005.

A Salience Theory of Choice Errors

We study a psychologically based foundation for choice errors. The decision maker applies a preference ranking after forming a 'consideration set' prior to choosing an alternative. Membership of the consideration set is determined both by the alternative specific salience and by the rationality of the agent (his general propensity to consider all alternatives). The model turns out to include a logit formulation as a special case. In general, it has a rich set of implications both for exogenous parameters and for a situation in which alternatives can a¤ect their own salience (salience games). Such implications are relevant to assess the link between 'revealed' preferences and 'true' preferences: for example, less rational agents may paradoxically express their preference through choice more truthfully than more rational agents.

Off-the-Record Target Zones: Theory with an Application to Hong Kongs Currency Board

This paper provides a modelling framework for evaluating the exchange rate dynamics of a target zone regime with undisclosed bands. We generalize the literature to allow for asymmetric one-sided regimes. Market participants' beliefs concerning an undisclosed band change as they learn more about central bank intervention policy. We apply the model to Hong Kong's one-sided currency board mechanism. In autumn 2003, the Hong Kong dollar appreciated from close to 7.80 per US dollar to 7.70, as investors feared that the currency board would be abandoned. In the wake of this appreciation, the monetary authorities finally revamped the regime as a symmetric two-sided system with a narrow exchange rate band.

Corruption and the Military in Politics: Theory and Evidence from around the World

Recent theoretical developments and case study evidence suggests a relationship between the military in politics and corruption. This study contributes to this literature by analyzing theoretically and empirically the role of the military in politics and corruption for the first time. By drawing on a cross sectional and panel data set covering a large number of countries, over the period 1984-2007, and using a variety of econometric methods substantial empirical support is found for a positive relationship between the military in politics and corruption. In sum, our results reveal that a one standard deviation increase in the military in politics leads to a 0.22 unit increase in corruption index. This relationship is shown to be robust to a variety of specification changes, different econometric techniques, different sample sizes, alternative corruption indices and the exclusion of outliers. This study suggests that the explanatory power of the military in politics is at least as important as the conventionally accepted causes of corruption, such as economic development.

Optimism and commitment: An elementary theory of bargaining and war

We propose an elementary theory of wars fought by fully rational contenders. Two parties play a Markov game that combines stages of bargaining with stages where one side has the ability to impose surrender on the other. Under uncertainty and incomplete information, in the unique equilibrium of the game, long confrontations occur: war arises when reality disappoints initial (rational) optimism, and it persist longer when both agents are optimists but reality proves both wrong. Bargaining proposals that are rejected initially might eventually be accepted after several periods of confrontation. We provide an explicit computation of the equilibrium, evaluating the probability of war, and its expected losses as a function of i) the costs of confrontation, ii) the asymmetry of the split imposed under surrender, and iii) the strengths of contenders at attack and defense. Changes in these parameters display non-monotonic effects.

A Producer Theory with Business Risks

In this paper, we consider a producer who faces uninsurable business risks due to incomplete spanning of asset markets over stochastic goods market outcomes, and examine how the presence of the uninsurable business risks affects the producer's optimal pricing and production behaviours. Three key (inter-related) results we find are: (1) optimal prices in goods markets comprise ‘markup’ to the extent of market power and ‘premium’ by shadow price of the risks; (2) price inertia as we observe in data can be explained by a joint work of risk neutralization motive and marginal cost equalization condition; (3) the relative responsiveness of risk neutralization motive and marginal cost equalization at optimum is central to the cyclical variation of markups, providing a consistent explanation for procyclical and countercyclical movements. By these results, the proposed theory of producer leaves important implications both micro and macro, and both empirical and theoretical.

The Marginal Productivity Theory Of The Price Of Capital: An Historical Perspective On The Origins Of The Codswallop

Although it might have been expected that, by this point in time, the unacceptability of the marginal productivity theory of the return on capital would be universally agreed, that is evidently not the case. Popular textbooks still propound the dogma to the innocent. This note is presented in the hope that a succinct indication of the origins of the theory it will contribute to a more general appreciation of the unrealistic and illogical nature of this doctrine.

An Inquiry Into The Theory, Causes And Consequences Of Monitoring Indicators Of Health And Safety At Work

This paper engages in an interdisciplinary survey of the current state of knowledge related to the theory, determinants and consequences of occupational safety and health (OSH). First, it synthesizes the available theoretical frameworks used by economists and psychologists to understand the issues related to the optimal provision of OSH in the labour market. Second, it reviews the academic literature investigating the correlates of a comprehensive set of OSH indicators, which portray the state of OSH infrastructure (social security expenditure, prevention, regulations), inputs (chemical and physical agents, ergonomics, working time, violence) and outcomes (injuries, illnesses, absenteeism, job satisfaction) within workplaces. Third, it explores the implications of the lack of OSH in terms of the economic and social costs that are entailed. Finally, the survey identifies areas of future research interests and suggests priorities for policy initiatives that can improve the health and safety of workers.

Payoff levels, loss avoidance, and equilibrium selection in the Stag Hunt: an experimental study

Game theorists typically assume that changing a game’s payoff levels—by adding the same constant to, or subtracting it from, all payoffs—should not affect behavior. While this invariance is an implication of the theory when payoffs mirror expected utilities, it is an empirical question when the “payoffs” are actually money amounts. In particular, if individuals treat monetary gains and losses differently, then payoff–level changes may matter when they result in positive payoffs becoming negative, or vice versa. We report the results of a human–subjects experiment designed to test for two types of loss avoidance: certain–loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a sure loss, in favor of an alternative that might lead to a gain) and possible–loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a possible loss, in favor of an alternative that leads to a sure gain). Subjects in the experiment play three versions of Stag Hunt, which are identical up to the level of payoffs, under a variety of treatments. We find differences in behavior across the three versions of Stag Hunt; these differences are hard to detect in the first round of play, but grow over time. When significant, the differences we find are in the direction predicted by certain– and possible–loss avoidance. Our results carry implications for games with multiple equilibria, and for theories that attempt to select among equilibria in such games.

Still More On Why We Should Bury The Marginal Productivity Theory Of The Price Of Capital: A Supplementary Note

The purpose of this note is to supplement the author’s earlier remarks on the unsatisfactory nature of the neoclassical account of how the return on capital is determined. (See Strathclyde Discussion Paper 12-03: “The Marginal Productivity Theory of the Price of Capital: An Historical Perspective on the Origins of the Codswallop”). The point is made via a simple illustration that certain matters which are problematical in neoclassical terms are perfectly straightforward when viewed from a classical perspective. Basically, the marginalist model of the nature of an economic system is not fit for purpose in that it fails to comprehend the essential features of a surplus-producing economic system as distinct from one merely of exchange.

Caught Between Theory and Practice: Government, Market, and Regulatory Failure in Electricity Sector Reforms

The world-wide electricity sector reforms of the early 1990s have revealed the considerable complexities of making market driven reforms in network and infrastructure industries. This paper reflects on the experiences to date with the process and outcomes of marketbased electricity reforms across less-developed, transition and developed economies. The reforms outcomes suggest similar problems facing the electricity sector of these countries though their contexts vary significantly. Many developing and developed economies continue to have investment inadequacy concerns and the need to balance economy efficiency, sustainability and social equity after more than two decades of experience with reforms. We also use a case study of selected countries that in many respects represent the current state of the reform though they are rarely examined. Nepal, Belarus and Ireland are chosen as country-specific case studies for this purpose. We conclude that the changing dynamics of the electricity supply industry (ESI) and policy objectives imply that analysing the success and failure of reforms will indeed remain a complex process.

Suppliers of Priors: A Theory of Retailing Inspired by the Market for Chinese Antiquities

Adverse selection may thwart trade between an informed seller, who knows the probability p that an item of antiquity is genuine, and an uninformed buyer, who does not know p. The buyer might not be wholly uninformed, however. Suppose he can perform a simple inspection, a test of his own: the probability that an item passes the test is g if the item is genuine, but only f < g if it is fake. Given that the buyer is no expert, his test may have little power: f may be close to g. Unfortunately, without much power, the buyer's test will not resolve the difficulty of adverse selection; gains from trade may remain unexploited. But now consider a "store", where the seller groups a number of items, perhaps all with the same quality, the same probability p of being genuine. (We show that in equilibrium the seller will choose to group items in this manner.) Now the buyer can conduct his test across a large sample, perhaps all, of a group of items in the seller's store. He can thereby assess the overall quality of these items; he can invert the aggregate of his test results to uncover the underlying p; he can form a "prior". There is thus no longer asymmetric information between seller and buyer: gains from trade can be exploited. This is our theory of retailing: by grouping items together - setting up a store - a seller is able to supply buyers with priors, as well as the items themselves. We show that the weaker the power of the buyer�s test (the closer f is to g), the greater the seller�s profit. So the seller has no incentive to assist the buyer � e.g., by performing her own tests on the items, or by cleaning them to reveal more about their true age. The paper ends with an analysis of which sellers should specialise in which qualities. We show that quality will be low in busy locations and high in expensive locations.