Residual antimalarials in malaria patients from Tanzania--implications on drug efficacy assessment and spread of parasite resistance.

Repeated antimalarial treatment for febrile episodes and self-treatment are common in malaria-endemic areas. The intake of antimalarials prior to participating in an in vivo study may alter treatment outcome and affect the interpretation of both efficacy and safety outcomes. We report the findings from baseline plasma sampling of malaria patients prior to inclusion into an in vivo study in Tanzania and discuss the implications of residual concentrations of antimalarials in this setting. In an in vivo study conducted in a rural area of Tanzania in 2008, baseline plasma samples from patients reporting no antimalarial intake within the last 28 days were screened for the presence of 14 antimalarials (parent drugs or metabolites) using liquid chromatography-tandem mass spectrometry. Among the 148 patients enrolled, 110 (74.3%) had at least one antimalarial in their plasma: 80 (54.1%) had lumefantrine above the lower limit of calibration (LLC = 4 ng/mL), 7 (4.7%) desbutyl-lumefantrine (4 ng/mL), 77 (52.0%) sulfadoxine (0.5 ng/mL), 15 (10.1%) pyrimethamine (0.5 ng/mL), 16 (10.8%) quinine (2.5 ng/mL) and none chloroquine (2.5 ng/mL). The proportion of patients with detectable antimalarial drug levels prior to enrollment into the study is worrying. Indeed artemether-lumefantrine was supposed to be available only at government health facilities. Although sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine is only recommended for intermittent preventive treatment in pregnancy (IPTp), it was still widely used in public and private health facilities and sold in drug shops. Self-reporting of previous drug intake is unreliable and thus screening for the presence of antimalarial drug levels should be considered in future in vivo studies to allow for accurate assessment of treatment outcome. Furthermore, persisting sub-therapeutic drug levels of antimalarials in a population could promote the spread of drug resistance. The knowledge on drug pressure in a given population is important to monitor standard treatment policy implementation.

History of biological warfare and bioterrorism.

Bioterrorism literally means using microorganisms or infected samples to cause terror and panic in populations. Bioterrorism had already started 14 centuries before Christ, when the Hittites sent infected rams to their enemies. However, apart from some rare well-documented events, it is often very difficult for historians and microbiologists to differentiate natural epidemics from alleged biological attacks, because: (i) little information is available for times before the advent of modern microbiology; (ii) truth may be manipulated for political reasons, especially for a hot topic such as a biological attack; and (iii) the passage of time may also have distorted the reality of the past. Nevertheless, we have tried to provide to clinical microbiologists an overview of some likely biological warfare that occurred before the 18th century and that included the intentional spread of epidemic diseases such as tularaemia, plague, malaria, smallpox, yellow fever, and leprosy. We also summarize the main events that occurred during the modern microbiology era, from World War I to the recent 'anthrax letters' that followed the World Trade Center attack of September 2001. Again, the political polemic surrounding the use of infectious agents as a weapon may distort the truth. This is nicely exemplified by the Sverdlovsk accident, which was initially attributed by the authorities to a natural foodborne outbreak, and was officially recognized as having a military cause only 13 years later.

The Stealthy Superbug: the Role of Asymptomatic Enteric Carriage in Maintaining a Long-Term Hospital Outbreak of ST228 Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus.

UNLABELLED: Whole-genome sequencing (WGS) of 228 isolates was used to elucidate the origin and dynamics of a long-term outbreak of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) sequence type 228 (ST228) SCCmec I that involved 1,600 patients in a tertiary care hospital between 2008 and 2012. Combining of the sequence data with detailed metadata on patient admission and movement confirmed that the outbreak was due to the transmission of a single clonal variant of ST228, rather than repeated introductions of this clone into the hospital. We note that this clone is significantly more frequently recovered from groin and rectal swabs than other clones (P < 0.0001) and is also significantly more transmissible between roommates (P < 0.01). Unrecognized MRSA carriers, together with movements of patients within the hospital, also seem to have played a major role. These atypical colonization and transmission dynamics can help explain how the outbreak was maintained over the long term. This "stealthy" asymptomatic colonization of the gut, combined with heightened transmissibility (potentially reflecting a role for environmental reservoirs), means the dynamics of this outbreak share some properties with enteric pathogens such as vancomycin-resistant enterococci or Clostridium difficile. IMPORTANCE: Using whole-genome sequencing, we showed that a large and prolonged outbreak of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus was due to the clonal spread of a specific strain with genetic elements adapted to the hospital environment. Unrecognized MRSA carriers, the movement of patients within the hospital, and the low detection with clinical specimens were also factors that played a role in this occurrence. The atypical colonization of the gut means the dynamics of this outbreak may share some properties with enteric pathogens.