Diabetes risk scores and death: predictability and practicability in two different populations.

The aim was to examine the capacity of commonly used type 2 diabetes mellitus (T2DM) risk scores to predict overall mortality. The US-based NHANES III (n = 3138; 982 deaths) and the Swiss-based CoLaus study (n = 3946; 191 deaths) were used. The predictive value of eight T2DM risk scores regarding overall mortality was tested. The Griffin score, based on few self-reported parameters, presented the best (NHANES III) and second best (CoLaus) predictive capacity. Generally, the predictive capacity of scores based on clinical (anthropometrics, lifestyle, history) and biological (blood parameters) data was not better than of scores based solely on clinical self-reported data. T2DM scores can be validly used to predict mortality risk in general populations without diabetes. Comparison with other scores could further show whether such scores also suit as a screening tool for quick overall health risk assessment.

General Equilibrium Analysis. A Century after Walras

2010 marks the hundredth anniversary of the death of Léon Walras, the brilliant originator and first formaliser of general equilibrium theory - one of the pillars of modern economic theory. In advancing much derided practical solutions Walras also displayed more concern for the problems of living in a second best world than is common in modern pure theories of the invisible hand, efficient market hypothesis, DSGE macroeconomics or the thinking of some contemporary free market admirers all based on general equilibrium theory. This book brings contributions from the likes of Kenneth Arrow, Alan Kirman, Richard Posner, Amartya Sen and Robert Solow to share their thoughts and reflections on the theoretical heritage of Léon Walras. Some authors reminisce on the part they played in the development of modern general economics theory; others reflect on the crucial part played by general equilibrium in the development of macroeconomics, microeconomics, growth theory, welfare economics and the theory of justice; others still complain about the wrong path economic theory took under the influence of post 1945 developments in general equilibrium theory.

Three Essays on the Formation and Impact of Economic Policy

Introduction In my thesis I argue that economic policy is all about economics and politics. Consequently, analysing and understanding economic policy ideally has at least two parts. The economics part, which is centered around the expected impact of a specific policy on the real economy both in terms of efficiency and equity. The insights of this part point into which direction the fine-tuning of economic policies should go. However, fine-tuning of economic policies will be most likely subject to political constraints. That is why, in the politics part, a much better understanding can be gained by taking into account how the incentives of politicians and special interest groups as well as the role played by different institutional features affect the formation of economic policies. The first part and chapter of my thesis concentrates on the efficiency-related impact of economic policies: how does corporate income taxation in general, and corporate income tax progressivity in specific, affect the creation of new firms? Reduced progressivity and flat-rate taxes are in vogue. By 2009, 22 countries are operating flat-rate income tax systems, as do 7 US states and 14 Swiss cantons (for corporate income only). Tax reform proposals in the spirit of the "flat tax" model typically aim to reduce three parameters: the average tax burden, the progressivity of the tax schedule, and the complexity of the tax code. In joint work, Marius Brülhart and I explore the implications of changes in these three parameters on entrepreneurial activity, measured by counts of firm births in a panel of Swiss municipalities. Our results show that lower average tax rates and reduced complexity of the tax code promote firm births. Controlling for these effects, reduced progressivity inhibits firm births. Our reading of these results is that tax progressivity has an insurance effect that facilitates entrepreneurial risk taking. The positive effects of lower tax levels and reduced complexity are estimated to be significantly stronger than the negative effect of reduced progressivity. To the extent that firm births reflect desirable entrepreneurial dynamism, it is not the flattening of tax schedules that is key to successful tax reforms, but the lowering of average tax burdens and the simplification of tax codes. Flatness per se is of secondary importance and even appears to be detrimental to firm births. The second part of my thesis, which corresponds to the second and third chapter, concentrates on how economic policies are formed. By the nature of the analysis, these two chapters draw on a broader literature than the first chapter. Both economists and political scientists have done extensive research on how economic policies are formed. Thereby, researchers in both disciplines have recognised the importance of special interest groups trying to influence policy-making through various channels. In general, economists base their analysis on a formal and microeconomically founded approach, while abstracting from institutional details. In contrast, political scientists' frameworks are generally richer in terms of institutional features but lack the theoretical rigour of economists' approaches. I start from the economist's point of view. However, I try to borrow as much as possible from the findings of political science to gain a better understanding of how economic policies are formed in reality. In the second chapter, I take a theoretical approach and focus on the institutional policy framework to explore how interactions between different political institutions affect the outcome of trade policy in presence of special interest groups' lobbying. Standard political economy theory treats the government as a single institutional actor which sets tariffs by trading off social welfare against contributions from special interest groups seeking industry-specific protection from imports. However, these models lack important (institutional) features of reality. That is why, in my model, I split up the government into a legislative and executive branch which can both be lobbied by special interest groups. Furthermore, the legislative has the option to delegate its trade policy authority to the executive. I allow the executive to compensate the legislative in exchange for delegation. Despite ample anecdotal evidence, bargaining over delegation of trade policy authority has not yet been formally modelled in the literature. I show that delegation has an impact on policy formation in that it leads to lower equilibrium tariffs compared to a standard model without delegation. I also show that delegation will only take place if the lobby is not strong enough to prevent it. Furthermore, the option to delegate increases the bargaining power of the legislative at the expense of the lobbies. Therefore, the findings of this model can shed a light on why the U.S. Congress often practices delegation to the executive. In the final chapter of my thesis, my coauthor, Antonio Fidalgo, and I take a narrower approach and focus on the individual politician level of policy-making to explore how connections to private firms and networks within parliament affect individual politicians' decision-making. Theories in the spirit of the model of the second chapter show how campaign contributions from lobbies to politicians can influence economic policies. There exists an abundant empirical literature that analyses ties between firms and politicians based on campaign contributions. However, the evidence on the impact of campaign contributions is mixed, at best. In our paper, we analyse an alternative channel of influence in the shape of personal connections between politicians and firms through board membership. We identify a direct effect of board membership on individual politicians' voting behaviour and an indirect leverage effect when politicians with board connections influence non-connected peers. We assess the importance of these two effects using a vote in the Swiss parliament on a government bailout of the national airline, Swissair, in 2001, which serves as a natural experiment. We find that both the direct effect of connections to firms and the indirect leverage effect had a strong and positive impact on the probability that a politician supported the government bailout.

Policy Diffusion: An Agent-Based Approach

Methods like Event History Analysis can show the existence of diffusion and part of its nature, but do not study the process itself. Nowadays, thanks to the increasing performance of computers, processes can be studied using computational modeling. This thesis presents an agent-based model of policy diffusion mainly inspired from the model developed by Braun and Gilardi (2006). I first start by developing a theoretical framework of policy diffusion that presents the main internal drivers of policy diffusion - such as the preference for the policy, the effectiveness of the policy, the institutional constraints, and the ideology - and its main mechanisms, namely learning, competition, emulation, and coercion. Therefore diffusion, expressed by these interdependencies, is a complex process that needs to be studied with computational agent-based modeling. In a second step, computational agent-based modeling is defined along with its most significant concepts: complexity and emergence. Using computational agent-based modeling implies the development of an algorithm and its programming. When this latter has been developed, we let the different agents interact. Consequently, a phenomenon of diffusion, derived from learning, emerges, meaning that the choice made by an agent is conditional to that made by its neighbors. As a result, learning follows an inverted S-curve, which leads to partial convergence - global divergence and local convergence - that triggers the emergence of political clusters; i.e. the creation of regions with the same policy. Furthermore, the average effectiveness in this computational world tends to follow a J-shaped curve, meaning that not only time is needed for a policy to deploy its effects, but that it also takes time for a country to find the best-suited policy. To conclude, diffusion is an emergent phenomenon from complex interactions and its outcomes as ensued from my model are in line with the theoretical expectations and the empirical evidence.Les méthodes d'analyse de biographie (event history analysis) permettent de mettre en évidence l'existence de phénomènes de diffusion et de les décrire, mais ne permettent pas d'en étudier le processus. Les simulations informatiques, grâce aux performances croissantes des ordinateurs, rendent possible l'étude des processus en tant que tels. Cette thèse, basée sur le modèle théorique développé par Braun et Gilardi (2006), présente une simulation centrée sur les agents des phénomènes de diffusion des politiques. Le point de départ de ce travail met en lumière, au niveau théorique, les principaux facteurs de changement internes à un pays : la préférence pour une politique donnée, l'efficacité de cette dernière, les contraintes institutionnelles, l'idéologie, et les principaux mécanismes de diffusion que sont l'apprentissage, la compétition, l'émulation et la coercition. La diffusion, définie par l'interdépendance des différents acteurs, est un système complexe dont l'étude est rendue possible par les simulations centrées sur les agents. Au niveau méthodologique, nous présenterons également les principaux concepts sous-jacents aux simulations, notamment la complexité et l'émergence. De plus, l'utilisation de simulations informatiques implique le développement d'un algorithme et sa programmation. Cette dernière réalisée, les agents peuvent interagir, avec comme résultat l'émergence d'un phénomène de diffusion, dérivé de l'apprentissage, où le choix d'un agent dépend en grande partie de ceux faits par ses voisins. De plus, ce phénomène suit une courbe en S caractéristique, poussant à la création de régions politiquement identiques, mais divergentes au niveau globale. Enfin, l'efficacité moyenne, dans ce monde simulé, suit une courbe en J, ce qui signifie qu'il faut du temps, non seulement pour que la politique montre ses effets, mais également pour qu'un pays introduise la politique la plus efficace. En conclusion, la diffusion est un phénomène émergent résultant d'interactions complexes dont les résultats du processus tel que développé dans ce modèle correspondent tant aux attentes théoriques qu'aux résultats pratiques.

Best practice report on policy learning infrastructures in innovative labour market policies

This report synthesizes the findings of 11 country reports on policy learning in labour market and social policies that were conducted as part of WP5 of the INSPIRES project, which is funded by the 7th Framework Program of the EU-Commission. Notably, this report puts forward objectives of policy learning, discusses tools, processes and institutions of policy learning and presents the impacts of various tools and structures of the policy learning infrastructure for the actual policy learning process. The report defines three objectives of policy learning: evaluation and assessment of policy effectiveness, vision building and planning, and consensus building. In the 11 countries under consideration, the tools and processes of the policy learning, infrastructure can be classified into three broad groups: public bodies, expert councils, and parties, interest groups and the private sector. Finally, we develop four recommendations for policy learning: Firstly, learning processes should keep the balance between centralisation and plurality. Secondly, learning processes should be kept stable beyond the usual political business cycles. Thirdly, policy learning tools and infrastructures should be sufficiently independent from political influence or bias. Fourth, Policy learning tools and infrastructures should balance out mere effectiveness, evaluation and vision building.

Leniency programs, antitrust enforcement and multimarket contact : three essays in industrial organization

The Layout of My Thesis This thesis contains three chapters in Industrial Organization that build on the work outlined above. The first two chapters combine leniency programs with multimarket contact and provide a thorough analysis of the potential effects of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus. The third chapter puts the whole discussion on leniency programs into perspective by examining other enforcement tools available to an antitrust authority. The main argument in that last chapter is that a specific instrument can only be as effective as the policy in which it is embedded. It is therefore important for an antitrust authority to know how it best accompanies the introduction or modification of a policy instrument that helps deterrence. INTRODUCTION Chapter 1 examines the efféct of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus on the incentives of firms to report cartel activities. The main question is whether the inclusion of these policies in a leniency program undermine the effectiveness of the latter by discouraging the firms to apply for amnesty. The model is static and focus on the ex post incentives of firms to desist from collusion. The results suggest that, because Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus encourage the reporting of a second cartel after a first detection, a firm, anticipating this, may be reluctant to seek leniency and to report in the first place. However, the effect may also go in the opposite direction, and Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may encourage the simultaneous reporting of two cartels. Chapter 2 takes this idea further to the stage of cartel formation. This chapter provides a complete characterization of the potential anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of Amnesty Plus in a infinitely repeated game framework when the firms use their multimarket contact to harshen punishment. I suggest a clear-cut policy rule that prevents potential adverse effects and thereby show that, if policy makers follow this rule, a leniency program with Amnesty Plus performs better than one without. Chapter 3 characterizes the socially optimal enforcement effort of an antitrust authority and shows how this effort changes with the introduction or modification of specific policy instruments. The intuition is that the policy instrument may increase the marginal benefit of conducting investigations. If this effect is strong enough, a more rigorous detection policy becomes socially desirable.

Three essays in international finance

Executive Summary The first essay of this dissertation investigates whether greater exchange rate uncertainty (i.e., variation over time in the exchange rate) fosters or depresses the foreign investment of multinational firms. In addition to the direct capital financing it supplies, foreign investment can be a source of valuable technology and know-how, which can have substantial positive effects on a host country's economic growth. Thus, it is critically important for policy makers and central bankers, among others, to understand how multinationals base their investment decisions on the characteristics of foreign exchange markets. In this essay, I first develop a theoretical framework to improve our knowledge regarding how the aggregate level of foreign investment responds to exchange rate uncertainty when an economy consists of many firms, each of which is making decisions. The analysis predicts a U-shaped effect of exchange rate uncertainty on the total level of foreign investment of the economy. That is, the effect is negative for low levels of uncertainty and positive for higher levels of uncertainty. This pattern emerges because the relationship between exchange rate volatility and 'the probability of investment is negative for firms with low productivity at home (i.e., firms that find it profitable to invest abroad) and the relationship is positive for firms with high productivity at home (i.e., firms that prefer exporting their product). This finding stands in sharp contrast to predictions in the existing literature that consider a single firm's decision to invest in a unique project. The main contribution of this research is to show that the aggregation over many firms produces a U-shaped pattern between exchange rate uncertainty and the probability of investment. Using data from industrialized countries for the period of 1982-2002, this essay offers a comprehensive empirical analysis that provides evidence in support of the theoretical prediction. In the second essay, I aim to explain the time variation in sovereign credit risk, which captures the risk that a government may be unable to repay its debt. The importance of correctly evaluating such a risk is illustrated by the central role of sovereign debt in previous international lending crises. In addition, sovereign debt is the largest asset class in emerging markets. In this essay, I provide a pricing formula for the evaluation of sovereign credit risk in which the decision to default on sovereign debt is made by the government. The pricing formula explains the variation across time in daily credit spreads - a widely used measure of credit risk - to a degree not offered by existing theoretical and empirical models. I use information on a country's stock market to compute the prevailing sovereign credit spread in that country. The pricing formula explains a substantial fraction of the time variation in daily credit spread changes for Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and Russia for the 1998-2008 period, particularly during the recent subprime crisis. I also show that when a government incentive to default is allowed to depend on current economic conditions, one can best explain the level of credit spreads, especially during the recent period of financial distress. In the third essay, I show that the risk of sovereign default abroad can produce adverse consequences for the U.S. equity market through a decrease in returns and an increase in volatility. The risk of sovereign default, which is no longer limited to emerging economies, has recently become a major concern for financial markets. While sovereign debt plays an increasing role in today's financial environment, the effects of sovereign credit risk on the U.S. financial markets have been largely ignored in the literature. In this essay, I develop a theoretical framework that explores how the risk of sovereign default abroad helps explain the level and the volatility of U.S. equity returns. The intuition for this effect is that negative economic shocks deteriorate the fiscal situation of foreign governments, thereby increasing the risk of a sovereign default that would trigger a local contraction in economic growth. The increased risk of an economic slowdown abroad amplifies the direct effect of these shocks on the level and the volatility of equity returns in the U.S. through two channels. The first channel involves a decrease in the future earnings of U.S. exporters resulting from unfavorable adjustments to the exchange rate. The second channel involves investors' incentives to rebalance their portfolios toward safer assets, which depresses U.S. equity prices. An empirical estimation of the model with monthly data for the 1994-2008 period provides evidence that the risk of sovereign default abroad generates a strong leverage effect during economic downturns, which helps to substantially explain the level and the volatility of U.S. equity returns.

Playing Second Fiddle: Expert Advice and Decision-Making in Switzerland

This thesis concerns the role of scientific expertise in the decision-making process at the Swiss federal level of government. It aims to understand how institutional and issue-specific factors influence three things: the distribution of access to scientific expertise, its valuation by participants in policy for- mulation, and the consequence(s) its mobilization has on policy politics and design. The theoretical framework developed builds on the assumption that scientific expertise is a strategic resource. In order to effectively mobilize this resource, actors require financial and organizational resources, as well as the conviction that it can advance their instrumental interests within a particular action situation. Institutions of the political system allocate these financial and organizational resources, influence the supply of scientific expertise, and help shape the venue of its deployment. Issue structures, in turn, condition both interaction configurations and the way in which these are anticipated by actors. This affects the perceived utility of expertise mobilization, mediating its consequences. The findings of this study show that the ability to access and control scientific expertise is strongly concentrated in the hands of the federal administration. Civil society actors have weak capacities to mobilize it, and the autonomy of institutionalized advisory bodies is limited. Moreover, the production of scientific expertise is undergoing a process of professionalization which strengthens the position of the federal administration as the (main) mandating agent. Despite increased political polarization and less inclu- sive decision-making, scientific expertise remains anchored in the policy subsystem, rather than being used to legitimate policy through appeals to the wider population. Finally, the structure of a policy problem matters both for expertise mobilization and for the latter's impact on the policy process, be- cause it conditions conflict structures and their anticipation. Structured problems result in a greater overlap between the principal of expertise mobilization and its intended audience, thereby increasing the chance that expertise shapes policy design. Conversely, less structured problems, especially those that involve conflicts about values and goals, reduce the impact of expertise.

The policy-making structure of European regulatory networks and the domestic adoption of standards

European regulatory networks (ERNs) constitute the main governance instrument for the informal co-ordination of public regulation at the European Union (EU) level. They are in charge of co-ordinating national regulators and ensuring the implementation of harmonized regulatory policies across the EU, while also offering sector-specific expertise to the Commission. To this aim, ERNs develop 'best practices' and benchmarking procedures in the form of standards, norms and guidelines to be adopted in member states. In this paper, we focus on the Committee of European Securities Regulators and examine the consequences of the policy-making structure of ERNs on the domestic adoption of standards. We find that the regulators of countries with larger financial industries tend to occupy more central positions in the network, especially among newer member states. In turn, network centrality is associated with a more prompt domestic adoption of standards.

Supply-side risk adjustment and outlier payment policy

In most health care systems where a prospective payment system is implemented, an outlier payment is used to cover the hospitals' unusually high costs. When the hospital chooses its cost reduction effort before observing a patient's severity, we show that the best outlier payment is based on the realized cost when the hospital exerts the first best level of effort, for any level of severity. [Authors]

Innovation and new business through mutually beneficial collaboration and proactive procurement

ABSTRACT This dissertation focuses on new technology commercialization, innovation and new business development. Industry-based novel technology may achieve commercialization through its transfer to a large research laboratory acting as a lead user and technical partner, and providing the new technology with complementary assets and meaningful initial use in social practice. The research lab benefits from the new technology and innovation through major performance improvements and cost savings. Such mutually beneficial collaboration between the lab and the firm does not require any additional administrative efforts or funds from the lab, yet requires openness to technologies and partner companies that may not be previously known to the lab- Labs achieve the benefits by applying a proactive procurement model that promotes active pre-tender search of new technologies and pre-tender testing and piloting of these technological options. The collaboration works best when based on the development needs of both parties. This means that first of all the lab has significant engineering activity with well-defined technological needs and second, that the firm has advanced prototype technology yet needs further testing, piloting and the initial market and references to achieve the market breakthrough. The empirical evidence of the dissertation is based on a longitudinal multiple-case study with the European Laboratory for Particle Physics. The key theoretical contribution of this study is that large research labs, including basic research, play an important role in product and business development toward the end, rather than front-end, of the innovation process. This also implies that product-orientation and business-orientation can contribute to basic re-search. The study provides practical managerial and policy guidelines on how to initiate and manage mutually beneficial lab-industry collaboration and proactive procurement.

Mainmise sur l'état social : mobilisation patronale et caisse de compensation en Suisse (1908-1960)

Qui sait qu'en Suisse, les associations patronales mettent en oeuvre l'Etat social ? Qui sait que associations organisent la majorité des caisses de compensation, dont la fonction principale est de collecter les cotisations et de payer les rentes de l'Assurance-vieillesse et survivants ? Qui connaît ces caisses par lesquelles transitent les milliards de l'Etat social ? L'objectif de cette thèse consiste à comprendre les raisons qui ont poussé le patronat helvétique à mettre en oeuvre les politiques de protection sociale, dont il a pourtant toujours essayé de limiter le développement. Résoudre ce paradoxe implique de se pencher sur près d'un siècle d'histoire mêlée du patronat et des politiques sociales. Ce travail retrace, sur la base d'archives privées et publiques souvent inédites, les raisons qui ont poussé les patrons à créer les premières caisses de compensation dans l'entre-deux-guerres, puis à imposer cette forme d'organisation pour l'aide aux soldats mobilisés (autour de 1940) et l'Assurance- vieillesse et survivants (autour de 1948). Il étudie également comment les associations patronales sont parvenues à défendre leurs caisses jusqu'à aujourd'hui, contre ceux qui dénonçaient l'irrationalité de l'existence d'une centaine de caisses de compensation publiques et privées concurrentes pour mettre en oeuvre un seul système d'assurances sociales. Cette recherche amène deux grands résultats. D'une part, elle propose une histoire originale des politiques sociales en Suisse. Le prisme des caisses de compensation patronales contribue en effet à interroger notre compréhension de l'histoire des politiques de protection sociale, dans laquelle on sous-estime parfois l'importance des conflits pour fixer les frontières entre formes de protection publique et privée. D'autre part, ce travail présente une histoire inédite de l'action collective des patrons dans les régulations du travail au sens large. A travers les caisses de compensation, c'est en effet à réaliser une histoire de l'Union centrale des associations patronales suisses que je me suis aussi attelé. Faute de parvenir à empêcher tout développement des politiques sociales, les patrons ont fait en sorte d'acquérir sur ces politiques une forme de mainmise. Entre histoire des politiques sociales et histoire du patronat, ce travail tente d'expliquer comment les caisses de compensation y ont contribué. Who knows that, in Switzerland, employers' associations implement the best known policies constituting the welfare state? Who knows that the equalization funds, (Caisses de compensation / Ausgleichskassen), organized by employers' associations or by the Swiss Cantons, are responsible for pooling payroll deductions and for paying benefits of the Swiss public pay-as-you-go, old-age insurance and many other branches of the welfare policies? Who knows these caisses de compensation that channel the monies dedicated to the financing of the Welfare state ? The main objective of this research is to understand the reasons why Swiss employers do implement such welfare policies that they usually reject for political reasons. In order to solve this puzzle, this research investigates half of a century of the connected histories of welfare policies and employers' collective action. It also investigates, based on public and private archive records, how employers founded the first caisses in the Interwar period, and imposed them to organize the main developments of the Welfare state during the Second World War. The research also underlines how employers defended their caisses de compensation against those questioning the rationality of this fragmented system aiming to implement one single set of public welfare through one hundred competing private and public caisses de compensation. This research highlights two main results. On the one hand, it helps to improve our understanding of the history of the welfare policies in Switzerland. Underlining the role of the caisses de compensation helps to highlight the importance of the interplay of public and private actors regarding social polices. On the other hand, this research charts a pioneering history of Swiss' employers' collective action regarding labor issues. Because they could not prevent all public welfare policy, employers achieved a form of stranglehold (mainmise) on the welfare State. Halfway between social policy and employers' associations' history, this research try to reveal how their caisses de compensation helped them in this objective.

Evidence-based Economic Policy - Three Essays in Applied Microeconometrics

Over thirty years ago, Leamer (1983) - among many others - expressed doubts about the quality and usefulness of empirical analyses for the economic profession by stating that "hardly anyone takes data analyses seriously. Or perhaps more accurately, hardly anyone takes anyone else's data analyses seriously" (p.37). Improvements in data quality, more robust estimation methods and the evolution of better research designs seem to make that assertion no longer justifiable (see Angrist and Pischke (2010) for a recent response to Leamer's essay). The economic profes- sion and policy makers alike often rely on empirical evidence as a means to investigate policy relevant questions. The approach of using scientifically rigorous and systematic evidence to identify policies and programs that are capable of improving policy-relevant outcomes is known under the increasingly popular notion of evidence-based policy. Evidence-based economic policy often relies on randomized or quasi-natural experiments in order to identify causal effects of policies. These can require relatively strong assumptions or raise concerns of external validity. In the context of this thesis, potential concerns are for example endogeneity of policy reforms with respect to the business cycle in the first chapter, the trade-off between precision and bias in the regression-discontinuity setting in chapter 2 or non-representativeness of the sample due to self-selection in chapter 3. While the identification strategies are very useful to gain insights into the causal effects of specific policy questions, transforming the evidence into concrete policy conclusions can be challenging. Policy develop- ment should therefore rely on the systematic evidence of a whole body of research on a specific policy question rather than on a single analysis. In this sense, this thesis cannot and should not be viewed as a comprehensive analysis of specific policy issues but rather as a first step towards a better understanding of certain aspects of a policy question. The thesis applies new and innovative identification strategies to policy-relevant and topical questions in the fields of labor economics and behavioral environmental economics. Each chapter relies on a different identification strategy. In the first chapter, we employ a difference- in-differences approach to exploit the quasi-experimental change in the entitlement of the max- imum unemployment benefit duration to identify the medium-run effects of reduced benefit durations on post-unemployment outcomes. Shortening benefit duration carries a double- dividend: It generates fiscal benefits without deteriorating the quality of job-matches. On the contrary, shortened benefit durations improve medium-run earnings and employment possibly through containing the negative effects of skill depreciation or stigmatization. While the first chapter provides only indirect evidence on the underlying behavioral channels, in the second chapter I develop a novel approach that allows to learn about the relative impor- tance of the two key margins of job search - reservation wage choice and search effort. In the framework of a standard non-stationary job search model, I show how the exit rate from un- employment can be decomposed in a way that is informative on reservation wage movements over the unemployment spell. The empirical analysis relies on a sharp discontinuity in unem- ployment benefit entitlement, which can be exploited in a regression-discontinuity approach to identify the effects of extended benefit durations on unemployment and survivor functions. I find evidence that calls for an important role of reservation wage choices for job search be- havior. This can have direct implications for the optimal design of unemployment insurance policies. The third chapter - while thematically detached from the other chapters - addresses one of the major policy challenges of the 21st century: climate change and resource consumption. Many governments have recently put energy efficiency on top of their agendas. While pricing instru- ments aimed at regulating the energy demand have often been found to be short-lived and difficult to enforce politically, the focus of energy conservation programs has shifted towards behavioral approaches - such as provision of information or social norm feedback. The third chapter describes a randomized controlled field experiment in which we discuss the effective- ness of different types of feedback on residential electricity consumption. We find that detailed and real-time feedback caused persistent electricity reductions on the order of 3 to 5 % of daily electricity consumption. Also social norm information can generate substantial electricity sav- ings when designed appropriately. The findings suggest that behavioral approaches constitute effective and relatively cheap way of improving residential energy-efficiency.

Updated survival data of the phase iii clinical trial of novottf-100a versus best standard chemotherapy for recurrent glioblastoma

NovoTTF-100A (TTF) is a portable device delivering low-intensity, intermediate-frequency, alternating electric fields using noninvasive, disposable scalp electrodes. TTF interferes with tumor cell division, and it has been approved by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for the treatment of recurrent glioblastoma (rGBM) based on data from a phase III trial. This presentation describes the updated survival data 2 years after completing recruitment. Adults with rGBM (KPS ≥ 70) were randomized (stratified by surgery and center) to either continuous TTF (20-24 h/day, 7 days/week) or efficacious chemotherapy based on best physician choice (BPC). The primary endpoint was overall survival (OS), and secondary endpoints were PFS6, 1-year survival, and QOL. Patients were randomized (28 US and European centers) to either TTF alone (n ¼ 120) or BPC (n ¼ 117). Patient characteristics were balanced, median age was 54 years (range, 23-80 years), and median KPS was 80 (range, 50-100). One quarter of the patients had debulking surgery, and over half of the patients were at their second or later recurrence. OS in the intent-to-treat (ITT) population was equivalent in TTF versus BPC patients (median OS, 6.6vs. 6.0 months; n ¼ 237; p ¼ 0.26; HR ¼ 0.86). With a median follow-up of 33.6 months, long-term survival in the TTF group was higher than that in the BPC group at 2, 3, and 4 years of follow-up (9.3% vs. 6.6%; 8.4% vs. 1.4%; 8.4% vs. 0.0%, respectively). Analysis of patients who received at least one treatment course demonstrated a survival benefit for TTF patients compared to BPC patients (median OS, 7.8 vs. 6.0 months; n ¼ 93 vs. n ¼ 117; p ¼ 0.012; HR ¼ 0.69). In this group, 1-year survival was 28% vs. 20%, and PFS6 was 26.2% vs. 15.2% (p ¼ 0.034). TTF, a noninvasive, novel cancer treatment modality shows significant therapeutic efficacy with promising long-term survival results. The impact of TTF was more pronounced when comparing only patients who received the minimal treatment course. A large-scale phase III trial in newly diagnosed GBM is ongoing.