4 resultados para roommate
em Université de Lausanne, Switzerland
Resumo:
BACKGROUND: Adherence to combination antiretroviral therapy (cART) is a dynamic process, however, changes in adherence behavior over time are insufficiently understood. METHODS: Data on self-reported missed doses of cART was collected every 6 months in Swiss HIV Cohort Study participants. We identified behavioral groups associated with specific cART adherence patterns using trajectory analyses. Repeated measures logistic regression identified predictors of changes in adherence between consecutive visits. RESULTS: Six thousand seven hundred nine individuals completed 49,071 adherence questionnaires [median 8 (interquartile range: 5-10)] during a median follow-up time of 4.5 years (interquartile range: 2.4-5.1). Individuals were clustered into 4 adherence groups: good (51.8%), worsening (17.4%), improving (17.6%), and poor adherence (13.2%). Independent predictors of worsening adherence were younger age, basic education, loss of a roommate, starting intravenous drug use, increasing alcohol intake, depression, longer time with HIV, onset of lipodystrophy, and changing care provider. Independent predictors of improvements in adherence were regimen simplification, changing class of cART, less time on cART, and starting comedications. CONCLUSIONS: Treatment, behavioral changes, and life events influence patterns of drug intake in HIV patients. Clinical care providers should routinely monitor factors related to worsening adherence and intervene early to reduce the risk of treatment failure and drug resistance.
Resumo:
We consider one-to-one matching markets in which agents can either be matched as pairs or remain single. In these so-called roommate markets agents are consumers and resources at the same time. Klaus (Games Econ Behav 72:172-186, 2011) introduced two new "population sensitivity" properties that capture the effect newcomers have on incumbent agents: competition sensitivity and resource sensitivity. On various roommate market domains (marriage markets, no-odd-rings roommate markets, solvable roommate markets),we characterize the core using either of the population sensitivity properties in addition to weak unanimity and consistency. On the domain of all roommate markets, we obtain two associated impossibility results.