Strong reciprocity or strong ferocity? A population genetic view of the evolution of altruistic punishment.

Strong reciprocity, defined as a predisposition to help others and to punish those that are not helping, has been proposed as a potent force leading to the evolution of cooperation and altruism. However, the conditions under which strong reciprocity might be favored are not clear. Here we investigate the selective pressure on strong reciprocity by letting both limited dispersal (i.e., spatial structure) and recombination between helping and punishment jointly determine the evolutionary dynamics of strong reciprocity. Our analytical model suggests that when helping and punishment are perfectly linked traits (no recombination occurring between them), strong reciprocity can spread even when the initial frequency of strong reciprocators is close to 0 in the population (i.e., a rare mutant can invade). By contrast, our results indicate that when recombination can occur between helping and punishment (i.e., both traits coevolve) and is stronger than selection, punishment is likely to invade a population of defectors only when it gives a direct fitness benefit to the actor. Overall, our results delineate the conditions under which strong reciprocity is selected for in a spatially structured population and highlight that the forces behind its evolution involves kinship (be it genetic or cultural).

Small farmers of the Florida Province (Bolivia) : Reciprocity in Practice

Peasant societies are often seen by neoliberal or Marxist theorists as passive subjects of political-economic transformations occurring at a higher level, only surviving through acculturation to market requirements. By analyzing agricultural work organization in highland communities and a local system of water management called Acuerdos Reciprocos por el Agua (Reciprocal Agreements for Water), developed in 2003 by the Natura Bolivia foundation in Florida Province in Bolivia, we show that, contrary to this perception, traditional reciprocal norms still play an essential role in decision making. This suggests the agency of rural societies and the resilience of traditional reciprocity-based norms in mountain regions.

Conformity, upstream reciprocity and social diversity: secondary mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation

Cooperation is ubiquitous in nature: genes cooperate in genomes, cells in muti- cellular organims, and individuals in societies. In humans, division of labor and trade are key elements of most known societies, where social life is regulated by- moral systems specifying rights and duties often enforced by third party punish¬ment. Over the last decades, several primary mechanisms, such as kin selection, direct and indirect reciprocity, have been advanced to explain the evolution of cooperation from a naturalistic approach. In this thesis, I focus on the study of three secondary mechanisms which, although insufficient to allow for the evo¬lution of cooperation, have been hypothesized to further promote it when they are linked to proper primary mechanisms: conformity (the tendency to imitate common behaviors), upstream reciprocity (the tendency to help somebody once help has been received from somebody else) and social diversity (heterogeneous social contexts). I make use of mathematical and computational models in the formal framework of evolutionary game theory in order to investigate the theoret¬ical conditions under which conformity, upstream reciprocity and social diversity are able to raise the levels of cooperation attained in evolving populations. - La coopération est ubiquitaire dans la nature: les gènes coopèrent dans les génomes, les cellules dans les organismes muticellulaires, et les organismes dans les sociétés. Chez les humains, la division du travail et le commerce sont des éléments centraux de la plupart des sociétés connues, où la vie sociale est régie par des systèmes moraux établissant des droits et des devoirs, souvent renforcés par la punition. Au cours des dernières décennies, plusieurs mécanismes pri¬maires, tels que la sélection de parentèle et les réciprocités directe et indirecte, ont été avancés pour expliquer l'évolution de la coopération d'un point de vue nat¬uraliste. Dans cette thèse, nous nous concentrons sur l'étude de trois mécanismes secondaires qui, bien qu'insuffisants pour permettre l'évolution de la coopération, sont capables de la promouvoir davantage s'ils sont liés aux mécanismes primaires appropriés: la conformité (tendance à imiter des comportements en commun), la 'réciprocité en amont' (tendance à aider quelqu'un après avoir reçu l'aide de quelqu'un d'autre) et la diversité sociale (contextes sociaux hétérogènes). Nous faisons usage de modèles mathématiques et informatiques dans le cadre formel de la théorie des jeux évolutionnaires afin d'examiner les conditions théoriques dans lesquelles la conformité, la 'réciprocité en amont' et la diversité sociale sont capables d'élever le niveau de coopération des populations en évolution.

The evolution of judgement bias in indirect reciprocity.

Indirect reciprocity is a form of reciprocity where help is given to individuals based on their reputation. In indirect reciprocity, bad acts (such as not helping) reduce an individual's reputation while good acts (such as helping) increase an individual's reputation. Studies of indirect reciprocity assume that good acts and bad acts are weighted equally when assessing the reputation of an individual. As different information can be processed in different ways, this is not likely to be the case, and it is possible that an individual could bias an actor's reputation by putting more weight to acts of defection (not helping) than acts of co-operation (helping) or vice versa. We term this difference 'judgement bias', and build an individual-based model of image scoring to investigate the conditions under which it may evolve. We find that, if the benefits of co-operation are small, judgement bias is weighted towards acts perceived to be bad; if the benefits are high, the reverse is true. Our result is consistent under both scoring and standing strategies, and we find that allowing judgement bias to evolve increases the level of co-operation in the population.

Risk Behavior and Reciprocity of Organ Donation Attitudes in Young Men.

BACKGROUND: Lack of donor organs remains a major obstacle in organ transplantation. Our aim was to evaluate (1) the association between engaging in high-risk recreational activities and attitudes toward organ donation and (2) the degree of reciprocity between organ acceptance and donation willingness in young men. METHODS: A 17-item, close-ended survey was offered to male conscripts ages 18 to 26 years in all Swiss military conscription centers. Predictors of organ donation attitudes were assessed in bivariate analyses and multiple logistic regression. Reciprocity of the intentions to accept and to donate organs was assessed by means of donor card status. RESULTS: In 1559 responses analyzed, neither motorcycling nor practicing extreme sports reached significant association with donor card holder status. Family communication about organ donation, student, or academic profession and living in a Latin linguistic region were predictors of positive organ donation attitudes, whereas residence in a German-speaking region and practicing any religion predicted reluctance. Significantly more respondents were willing to accept than to donate organs, especially among those without family communication concerning organ donation. CONCLUSIONS: For the first time, it was shown that high-risk recreational activities do not influence organ donation attitudes. Second, a considerable discrepancy in organ donation reciprocity was identified. We propose that increasing this reciprocity could eventually increase organ donation rates.

Stochasticity in economic losses increases the value of reputation in indirect reciprocity.

Recent theory predicts harsh and stochastic conditions to generally promote the evolution of cooperation. Here, we test experimentally whether stochasticity in economic losses also affects the value of reputation in indirect reciprocity, a type of cooperation that is very typical for humans. We used a repeated helping game with observers. One subject (the "Unlucky") lost some money, another one (the "Passer-by") could reduce this loss by accepting a cost to herself, thereby building up a reputation that could be used by others in later interactions. The losses were either stable or stochastic, but the average loss over time and the average efficiency gains of helping were kept constant in both treatments. We found that players with a reputation of being generous were generally more likely to receive help by others, such that investing into a good reputation generated long-term benefits that compensated for the immediate costs of helping. Helping frequencies were similar in both treatments, but players with a reputation to be selfish lost more resources under stochastic conditions. Hence, returns on investment were steeper when losses varied than when they did not. We conclude that this type of stochasticity increases the value of reputation in indirect reciprocity.

Tacit Collusion under Fairness and Reciprocity

This paper departs from the standard profit-maximizing model of firm behavior by assuming that firms are motivated in part by personal animosity-or respect-towards their competitors. A reciprocal firm responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind actions (negative reciprocity), while at the same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with kind actions (positive reciprocity). We find that collusion is easier to sustain when firms have a concern for reciprocity towards competing firms provided that they consider collusive prices to be kind and punishment prices to be unkind. Thus, reciprocity concerns among firms can have adverse welfare consequences for consumers.

Gender-role alternation in the simultaneously hermaphroditic freshwater snail Physa acuta: not with the same partner

In simultaneous hermaphrodites, gender conflicts that arise from two potential mates sharing the same gender preference may be solved through conditional reciprocity (or gamete trading). Conditional reciprocity had initially been considered widespread, but recent studies suggest that its real occurrence may have been overestimated, possibly because most mating observations have been performed on isolated pairs of individuals. Some resulting patterns (e. g., non-random alternation of sexual roles) were indeed compatible with conditional reciprocity but could also have stemmed from the two partners independently executing their own mating strategy and being experimentally enforced to do so with the same partner. Non-random alternation of gender roles was recently documented in the simultaneously hermaphroditic freshwater snail Physa acuta. To distinguish between conditional and unconditional gender alternations, we observed copulations of individually marked snails reared at three contrasted densities. We showed that density affected the overall frequency of copulations during the first 2 days of the experiment with high-density boxes showing more copulations than low density boxes, but it did not affect gender alternation patterns. A change in gender role was observed more often than expected by chance over two successive copulations by the same individual, confirming previous studies. However, gender switches did not preferentially occur with the same partner. We conclude that gender alternation is not due to conditional reciprocity in P. acuta. It may rather stem from each individual having a preference for gender alternation. We finally discuss the mechanisms and the potential extent of this unconditional reciprocity.

Human cooperation based on punishment reputation.

The threat of punishment usually promotes cooperation. However, punishing itself is costly, rare in nonhuman animals, and humans who punish often finish with low payoffs in economic experiments. The evolution of punishment has therefore been unclear. Recent theoretical developments suggest that punishment has evolved in the context of reputation games. We tested this idea in a simple helping game with observers and with punishment and punishment reputation (experimentally controlling for other possible reputational effects). We show that punishers fully compensate their costs as they receive help more often. The more likely defection is punished within a group, the higher the level of within-group cooperation. These beneficial effects perish if the punishment reputation is removed. We conclude that reputation is key to the evolution of punishment.

Eager for fairness or revenge: psychological altruism in economics

To understand the human capacity for psychological altruism, one requires a proper understanding of how people actually think and feel. This paper addresses the possible relevance of recent findings in experimental economics and neuroeconomics to the philosophical controversy over altruism and egoism. After briefly sketching and contextualizing the controversy, we survey and discuss the results of various studies on behaviourally altruistic helping and punishing behaviour, which provide stimulating clues for the debate over psychological altruism. On closer analysis, these studies prove less relevant than originally expected because the data obtained admit competing interpretations such as people seeking fairness versus people seeking revenge. However, this mitigated conclusion does not preclude the possibility of more fruitful research in the area in the future. Throughout our analysis, we provide hints for the direction of future research on the question.

Effect of mating history on gender preference in the hermaphroditic snail physa acuta

Several internally fertilizing hermaphroditic animals can only perform one sexual role at a time. In such species, two individuals that engage in a copulation may have different interests in acting as male or female. A gender choice must be made which, if both individuals have the same preference, may give rise to a severe sexual conflict. Here we tested the hypothesis that gender choice could be influenced by mating history, using the freshwater snail, Physa acuta. We recorded the copulatory behaviour of 240 pairs composed of a focal individual and a partner, each either short- or long-isolated. We found that the time to the first copulation was unaffected by isolation status, suggesting that first contacts in this species are random processes. In contrast, the duration of copulations and the frequency of rejection behaviours suggested that individual gender preference switches from male biased to female biased as isolation increases. In addition, snails rejected copulations more frequently when presented to a partner with the same isolation status. Reciprocity, measured as the rate of gender swapping between the first and second copulations, was high irrespective of gender status. We suggest possible evolutionary causes for this gender preference switch and discuss its potential importance in natural population as well as its consequences for the maintenance of hermaphroditism

Reputation based on punishment rather than generosity allows for evolution of cooperation in sizable groups

Cooperation among unrelated individuals can arise if decisions to help others can be based on reputation. While working for dyadic interactions, reputation-use in social dilemmas involving many individuals (e.g. public goods games) becomes increasingly difficult as groups become larger and errors more frequent. Reputation is therefore believed to have played a minor role for the evolution of cooperation in collective action dilemmas such as those faced by early humans. Here, we show in computer simulations that a reputation system based on punitive actions can overcome these problems and, compared to reputation system based on generous actions, (i) is more likely to lead to the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups, (ii) more effectively sustains cooperation within larger groups, and (iii) is more robust to errors in reputation assessment. Punishment and punishment reputation could therefore have played crucial roles in the evolution of cooperation within larger groups of humans.

A pseudo-spectral method for the simulation of poro-elastic seismic wave propagation in 2D polar coordinates using domain decomposition

We present a novel numerical approach for the comprehensive, flexible, and accurate simulation of poro-elastic wave propagation in 2D polar coordinates. An important application of this method and its extensions will be the modeling of complex seismic wave phenomena in fluid-filled boreholes, which represents a major, and as of yet largely unresolved, computational problem in exploration geophysics. In view of this, we consider a numerical mesh, which can be arbitrarily heterogeneous, consisting of two or more concentric rings representing the fluid in the center and the surrounding porous medium. The spatial discretization is based on a Chebyshev expansion in the radial direction and a Fourier expansion in the azimuthal direction and a Runge-Kutta integration scheme for the time evolution. A domain decomposition method is used to match the fluid-solid boundary conditions based on the method of characteristics. This multi-domain approach allows for significant reductions of the number of grid points in the azimuthal direction for the inner grid domain and thus for corresponding increases of the time step and enhancements of computational efficiency. The viability and accuracy of the proposed method has been rigorously tested and verified through comparisons with analytical solutions as well as with the results obtained with a corresponding, previously published, and independently bench-marked solution for 2D Cartesian coordinates. Finally, the proposed numerical solution also satisfies the reciprocity theorem, which indicates that the inherent singularity associated with the origin of the polar coordinate system is adequately handled.