Interactive Epistemology and Reasoning: On the Foundations of Game Theory

Game theory describes and analyzes strategic interaction. It is usually distinguished between static games, which are strategic situations in which the players choose only once as well as simultaneously, and dynamic games, which are strategic situations involving sequential choices. In addition, dynamic games can be further classified according to perfect and imperfect information. Indeed, a dynamic game is said to exhibit perfect information, whenever at any point of the game every player has full informational access to all choices that have been conducted so far. However, in the case of imperfect information some players are not fully informed about some choices. Game-theoretic analysis proceeds in two steps. Firstly, games are modelled by so-called form structures which extract and formalize the significant parts of the underlying strategic interaction. The basic and most commonly used models of games are the normal form, which rather sparsely describes a game merely in terms of the players' strategy sets and utilities, and the extensive form, which models a game in a more detailed way as a tree. In fact, it is standard to formalize static games with the normal form and dynamic games with the extensive form. Secondly, solution concepts are developed to solve models of games in the sense of identifying the choices that should be taken by rational players. Indeed, the ultimate objective of the classical approach to game theory, which is of normative character, is the development of a solution concept that is capable of identifying a unique choice for every player in an arbitrary game. However, given the large variety of games, it is not at all certain whether it is possible to device a solution concept with such universal capability. Alternatively, interactive epistemology provides an epistemic approach to game theory of descriptive character. This rather recent discipline analyzes the relation between knowledge, belief and choice of game-playing agents in an epistemic framework. The description of the players' choices in a given game relative to various epistemic assumptions constitutes the fundamental problem addressed by an epistemic approach to game theory. In a general sense, the objective of interactive epistemology consists in characterizing existing game-theoretic solution concepts in terms of epistemic assumptions as well as in proposing novel solution concepts by studying the game-theoretic implications of refined or new epistemic hypotheses. Intuitively, an epistemic model of a game can be interpreted as representing the reasoning of the players. Indeed, before making a decision in a game, the players reason about the game and their respective opponents, given their knowledge and beliefs. Precisely these epistemic mental states on which players base their decisions are explicitly expressible in an epistemic framework. In this PhD thesis, we consider an epistemic approach to game theory from a foundational point of view. In Chapter 1, basic game-theoretic notions as well as Aumann's epistemic framework for games are expounded and illustrated. Also, Aumann's sufficient conditions for backward induction are presented and his conceptual views discussed. In Chapter 2, Aumann's interactive epistemology is conceptually analyzed. In Chapter 3, which is based on joint work with Conrad Heilmann, a three-stage account for dynamic games is introduced and a type-based epistemic model is extended with a notion of agent connectedness. Then, sufficient conditions for backward induction are derived. In Chapter 4, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa, a topological approach to interactive epistemology is initiated. In particular, the epistemic-topological operator limit knowledge is defined and some implications for games considered. In Chapter 5, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa and Andrés Perea, Aumann's impossibility theorem on agreeing to disagree is revisited and weakened in the sense that possible contexts are provided in which agents can indeed agree to disagree.

Kitcher's Revolutionary Reasoning Inversion in Ethics

This paper examines three specific issues raised by The Ethical Project. First, I discuss the varieties of altruism and spell out the differences between the definitions proposed by Kitcher and the ways altruism is usually conceived in biology, philosophy, psychology, and economics literature. Second, with the example of Kitcher's account, I take a critical look at evolutionary stories of the emergence of human ethical practices. Third, I point to the revolutionary implications of the Darwinian methodology when it is thoughtfully applied to ethics.

Can routine offering of influenza vaccination in office-based settings reduce racial and ethnic disparities in adult influenza vaccination?

BACKGROUND: Influenza vaccination remains below the federally targeted levels outlined in Healthy People 2020. Compared to non-Hispanic whites, racial and ethnic minorities are less likely to be vaccinated for influenza, despite being at increased risk for influenza-related complications and death. Also, vaccinated minorities are more likely to receive influenza vaccinations in office-based settings and less likely to use non-medical vaccination locations compared to non-Hispanic white vaccine users. OBJECTIVE: To assess the number of "missed opportunities" for influenza vaccination in office-based settings by race and ethnicity and the magnitude of potential vaccine uptake and reductions in racial and ethnic disparities in influenza vaccination if these "missed opportunities" were eliminated. DESIGN: National cross-sectional Internet survey administered between March 4 and March 14, 2010 in the United States. PARTICIPANTS: Non-Hispanic black, Hispanic and non-Hispanic white adults living in the United States (N = 3,418). MAIN MEASURES: We collected data on influenza vaccination, frequency and timing of healthcare visits, and self-reported compliance with a potential provider recommendation for vaccination during the 2009-2010 influenza season. "Missed opportunities" for seasonal influenza vaccination in office-based settings were defined as the number of unvaccinated respondents who reported at least one healthcare visit in the Fall and Winter of 2009-2010 and indicated their willingness to get vaccinated if a healthcare provider strongly recommended it. "Potential vaccine uptake" was defined as the sum of actual vaccine uptake and "missed opportunities." KEY RESULTS: The frequency of "missed opportunities" for influenza vaccination in office-based settings was significantly higher among racial and ethnic minorities than non-Hispanic whites. Eliminating these "missed opportunities" could have cut racial and ethnic disparities in influenza vaccination by roughly one half. CONCLUSIONS: Improved office-based practices regarding influenza vaccination could significantly impact Healthy People 2020 goals by increasing influenza vaccine uptake and reducing corresponding racial and ethnic disparities.