Managing the crises : How do Swiss municipalities react to the crisis and what explains the differences ?

Swiss municipalities are to an import ant extent responsible for their own resources. Since these resources primarily depend on income and property tax from individuals and enterprises, their budgets are likely to be directly affected by the actual crisis of the financial sector and the economy. This paper investigates how the municipalities perceive this threat and how they reacted to it or plan to do so. In a nationwide survey conducted at the end of 2009 in all 2596 Swiss municipalities, we asked the local secretaries which measures they launch in order to cope with expected losses in tax income and a possible increase of welfare spending. Do the municipalities rather rely on Keynesian measures increasing public spending and accepting greater deficits, or do they try to avoid further deficits by austerity measures and a withdrawal of planned investments? The paper shows that only a few municipalities - mainly the bigger ones - expect to be strongly hit by the crisis. Their reactions, however, do not reveal the clear patterns theory lets to expect. Preferences for austerity measures and deficit spending become visible but many municipalities take measures from both theories. The strongest explaining factor whether municipalities react is the affectedness by the crisis followed by the fact that the municipality belongs to the French speaking part of the country. Size also has an effect whereas the strength of the Social Democrats is negligible. More difficult is it, to explain what kind of measures municipalities are likely to take.

Activation of HTLV-I transcription in the presence of Tax is independent of the acetylation of CREB-2 (ATF-4).

We have previously demonstrated that the bZIP transcription factor CREB-2, also called ATF-4, trans-activates, in association with the viral protein Tax, the human T-cell leukemia virus type I (HTLV-I) promoter. In this study, we have examined whether CREB-2 acetylation affects transcriptional activation mediated by Tax. We present evidence that CREB-2 is acetylated in vitro and in vivo. CREB-2 is acetylated in two regions: the basic domain of the bZIP (from amino acid residue 270 to 300) and the short basic domain (from 342 to 351) located downstream from the bZIP. We also demonstrate that CREB-2 is acetylated by p300/CBP but not by p/CAF. Moreover, replacement of lysine by arginine in the basic domains decreases the trans-activating capacity of CREB-2. However, in the presence of Tax, the HTLV-I transcription remains fully activated by these CREB-2 mutants. Although we cannot totally exclude that the mutations could also affect CREB-2 structure and activity independent of acetylation, our results suggest that activation of the viral promoter in the presence of Tax is independent of the CREB-2 acetylation.

Three Essays on the Formation and Impact of Economic Policy

Introduction In my thesis I argue that economic policy is all about economics and politics. Consequently, analysing and understanding economic policy ideally has at least two parts. The economics part, which is centered around the expected impact of a specific policy on the real economy both in terms of efficiency and equity. The insights of this part point into which direction the fine-tuning of economic policies should go. However, fine-tuning of economic policies will be most likely subject to political constraints. That is why, in the politics part, a much better understanding can be gained by taking into account how the incentives of politicians and special interest groups as well as the role played by different institutional features affect the formation of economic policies. The first part and chapter of my thesis concentrates on the efficiency-related impact of economic policies: how does corporate income taxation in general, and corporate income tax progressivity in specific, affect the creation of new firms? Reduced progressivity and flat-rate taxes are in vogue. By 2009, 22 countries are operating flat-rate income tax systems, as do 7 US states and 14 Swiss cantons (for corporate income only). Tax reform proposals in the spirit of the "flat tax" model typically aim to reduce three parameters: the average tax burden, the progressivity of the tax schedule, and the complexity of the tax code. In joint work, Marius Brülhart and I explore the implications of changes in these three parameters on entrepreneurial activity, measured by counts of firm births in a panel of Swiss municipalities. Our results show that lower average tax rates and reduced complexity of the tax code promote firm births. Controlling for these effects, reduced progressivity inhibits firm births. Our reading of these results is that tax progressivity has an insurance effect that facilitates entrepreneurial risk taking. The positive effects of lower tax levels and reduced complexity are estimated to be significantly stronger than the negative effect of reduced progressivity. To the extent that firm births reflect desirable entrepreneurial dynamism, it is not the flattening of tax schedules that is key to successful tax reforms, but the lowering of average tax burdens and the simplification of tax codes. Flatness per se is of secondary importance and even appears to be detrimental to firm births. The second part of my thesis, which corresponds to the second and third chapter, concentrates on how economic policies are formed. By the nature of the analysis, these two chapters draw on a broader literature than the first chapter. Both economists and political scientists have done extensive research on how economic policies are formed. Thereby, researchers in both disciplines have recognised the importance of special interest groups trying to influence policy-making through various channels. In general, economists base their analysis on a formal and microeconomically founded approach, while abstracting from institutional details. In contrast, political scientists' frameworks are generally richer in terms of institutional features but lack the theoretical rigour of economists' approaches. I start from the economist's point of view. However, I try to borrow as much as possible from the findings of political science to gain a better understanding of how economic policies are formed in reality. In the second chapter, I take a theoretical approach and focus on the institutional policy framework to explore how interactions between different political institutions affect the outcome of trade policy in presence of special interest groups' lobbying. Standard political economy theory treats the government as a single institutional actor which sets tariffs by trading off social welfare against contributions from special interest groups seeking industry-specific protection from imports. However, these models lack important (institutional) features of reality. That is why, in my model, I split up the government into a legislative and executive branch which can both be lobbied by special interest groups. Furthermore, the legislative has the option to delegate its trade policy authority to the executive. I allow the executive to compensate the legislative in exchange for delegation. Despite ample anecdotal evidence, bargaining over delegation of trade policy authority has not yet been formally modelled in the literature. I show that delegation has an impact on policy formation in that it leads to lower equilibrium tariffs compared to a standard model without delegation. I also show that delegation will only take place if the lobby is not strong enough to prevent it. Furthermore, the option to delegate increases the bargaining power of the legislative at the expense of the lobbies. Therefore, the findings of this model can shed a light on why the U.S. Congress often practices delegation to the executive. In the final chapter of my thesis, my coauthor, Antonio Fidalgo, and I take a narrower approach and focus on the individual politician level of policy-making to explore how connections to private firms and networks within parliament affect individual politicians' decision-making. Theories in the spirit of the model of the second chapter show how campaign contributions from lobbies to politicians can influence economic policies. There exists an abundant empirical literature that analyses ties between firms and politicians based on campaign contributions. However, the evidence on the impact of campaign contributions is mixed, at best. In our paper, we analyse an alternative channel of influence in the shape of personal connections between politicians and firms through board membership. We identify a direct effect of board membership on individual politicians' voting behaviour and an indirect leverage effect when politicians with board connections influence non-connected peers. We assess the importance of these two effects using a vote in the Swiss parliament on a government bailout of the national airline, Swissair, in 2001, which serves as a natural experiment. We find that both the direct effect of connections to firms and the indirect leverage effect had a strong and positive impact on the probability that a politician supported the government bailout.

The Rise of The Swiss Tax Haven in the Interwar Period: An International Comparison

The history of tax havens during the decades before World War II is still little known. To date, the studies that have focused on the 1920s and 1930s have presented either a very general perspective on the development of tax havens or a narrow national point of view. Based on unpublished historical archives of five countries (Switzerland, Great Britain, Belgium, France, Germany), this paper offers therefore a new comparative appraisal of international tax competition during this period in order to answer the following question: What was the specificity of the Swiss case - already considered a quintessential tax haven at the time - in comparison to other banking centres? The findings of this research study are twofold. First, the 1920s and 1930s appear as something of a golden age of opportunity for avoiding taxation through the relocation of assets. Most of the financial centres granted consistent tax benefits for imported capital, while the limited degree of international cooperation and the usual guarantee of banking secrecy in European countries prevented the taxation of exported assets. Second, within this general environment, the fiscal strategies of a tax haven like Switzerland differed from those of a great financial power like Great Britain. Whereas the Swiss administration readily placed itself at the service of the banking community, British policy was more balanced between the contradictory interests of the Board of Inland Revenue, the Treasury, and the English business circles.

Clarification of the Meaning of "Beneficial Owner" in the OECD Model Tax Convention: Comment on the April 2011 Discussion Draft

In April 2011, the OECD released an important discussion draft that is intended to clarify the meaning of the term "beneficial ownership" under articles 10, 11 and 12 of the OECD Model (2010). This article discusses these proposals and demonstrates that some refinement is necessary.

Financial protection of patients through compensation of providers: the impact of Health Equity Funds in Cambodia

Public providers have no financial incentive to respect their legal obligation to exempt the poor from user fees. Health Equity Funds (HEFs) aim to make exemptions effective by giving NGOs responsibility for assessing eligibility and compensating providers for lost revenue. We use the geographic spread of HEFs over time in Cambodia to identify their impact on out-of-pocket (OOP) payments. Among households with some OOP payment, HEFs reduce the amount paid by 35%, on average. The effect is larger for households that are poorer and mainly use public health care. Reimbursement of providers through a government operated scheme also reduces household OOP payments but the effect is not as well targeted on the poor. Both compensation models raise household non-medical consumption but have no impact on health-related debt. HEFs reduce the probability of primarily seeking care in the private sector.

The Rise of The Swiss Tax Haven in the Interwar Period: An International Comparison

The history of tax havens is still little known for the decades before World War II. Up to now the studies that have focused on the 1920s and 30s have presented either a very general perspective on the development of tax havens or a narrow national point of view. Based on unpublished historical archives of four countries, this paper offers therefore a new comparative look on international tax competition during this period in order to answer the following question: was the Swiss case - already considered as a quintessential tax haven at the time - specific in comparison to other banking centres? This research has two results. On the one hand, the 1920s and 30s appear as something of a golden age of opportunity for avoiding taxation through the relocation of assets. Actually, most of the financial centres granted consistent tax benefits for imported capital, while the extremely limited degree of international cooperation and the usual guarantee of banking secrecy in European countries prevented the taxation of exported assets. On the other hand, within this general balance sheet, the fiscal strategies of a tax haven like Switzerland differed from those of a great financial power like Great Britain. Whereas the Swiss administration readily placed itself at the service of the bankers, the British policy was more balanced between the contradictory interests of the Board of Inland Revenue, the Treasury and the English business circles.

CREB-2, a cellular CRE-dependent transcription repressor, functions in association with Tax as an activator of the human T-cell leukemia virus type 1 promoter.

The Tax protein of the human T-cell leukemia virus type 1 (HTLV-1) has been implicated in human T-cell immortalization. The primary function of Tax is to transcriptionally activate the HTLV-1 promoter, but Tax is also known to stimulate expression of cellular genes. It has been reported to associate with several transcription factors, as well as proteins not involved in transcription. To better characterize potential cellular targets of Tax present in infected cells, a Saccharomyces cerevisiae two-hybrid screening was performed with a cDNA library constructed from the HTLV-1-infected MT2 cell line. From this study, we found 158 positive clones representing seven different cDNAs. We focused our attention on the cDNA encoding the transcription factor CREB-2. CREB-2 is an unconventional member of the ATF/CREB family in that it lacks a protein kinase A (PKA) phosphorylation site and has been reported to negatively regulate transcription from the cyclic AMP response element of the human enkephalin promoter. In this study, we demonstrate that CREB-2 cooperates with Tax to enhance viral transcription and that its basic-leucine zipper C-terminal domain is required for both in vitro and in vivo interactions with Tax. Our results confirm that the activation of the HTLV-1 promoter through Tax and factors of the ATF/CREB family is PKA independent.

Do Nasty and Pleasant Surprises Regarding Tax Revenue Explain Spending Drifts ? : The Case of the Swiss Cantons

This article aims to explain the difference between the expenditure reported in governmental end-of-the-year budgets and the amounts previously forecasted in the approved beginning-of-the-year budgets. We measure how political, financial, and institutional variables affect this spending drift. We focus on two much-debated factors, namely, tax revenue budgeting errors and the stringency of fiscal rules. Our econometric approach uses a panel based on the 26 Swiss cantons covering the period of 1980 to 2011. Results suggest that stringent fiscal rules discourage budget overruns, whereas underestimating tax revenue-i.e., a budgetary "pleasant surprise"-offers the opportunity for some overspending.

Education, Equity and Distributive Beliefs: Evidences from the Chilean Case

During the year 2011, Chile has been scenario of several student's demonstrations claiming for more equity in the access to the higher education. The high support to the protests by the side of the general population (nearly 89% of approval in public opinion polls) seems to suggest the existence of a large consensus about the weaknesses of the Chilean educative model, a model that would challenge the traditional ideals of meritocracy and social mobility that are at the core of the educational systems in modern societies. In this context, a question that remains open is to what extent these claims are mostly based on consensual equality ideals, or whether they are influenced by individual socio-economic determinants vis-à-vis rational motives. Using data of the social inequality module International Social Survey Program (ISSP) of 2009, this research analyzes perceptions and beliefs about education and the distributive system as well as the influence of income and educational variables, through a structural equation modeling framework. Preliminary results indicate the presence of socioeconomic cleavages in relation to the fairness of the educational system, questioning the assumption about a normative consensus.