Structural macro factors and the affine term structure of interest rates

This work consists of three essays investigating the ability of structural macroeconomic models to price zero coupon U.S. government bonds. 1. A small scale 3 factor DSGE model implying constant term premium is able to provide reasonable a fit for the term structure only at the expense of the persistence parameters of the structural shocks. The test of the structural model against one that has constant but unrestricted prices of risk parameters shows that the exogenous prices of risk-model is only weakly preferred. We provide an MLE based variance-covariance matrix of the Metropolis Proposal Density that improves convergence speeds in MCMC chains. 2. Affine in observable macro-variables, prices of risk specification is excessively flexible and provides term-structure fit without significantly altering the structural parameters. The exogenous component of the SDF is separating the macro part of the model from the term structure and the good term structure fit has as a driving force an extremely volatile SDF and an implied average short rate that is inexplicable. We conclude that the no arbitrage restrictions do not suffice to temper the SDF, thus there is need for more restrictions. We introduce a penalty-function methodology that proves useful in showing that affine prices of risk specifications are able to reconcile stable macro-dynamics with good term structure fit and a plausible SDF. 3. The level factor is reproduced most importantly by the preference shock to which it is strongly and positively related but technology and monetary shocks, with negative loadings, are also contributing to its replication. The slope factor is only related to the monetary policy shocks and it is poorly explained. We find that there are gains in in- and out-of-sample forecast of consumption and inflation if term structure information is used in a time varying hybrid prices of risk setting. In-sample yield forecast are better in models with non-stationary shocks for the period 1982-1988. After this period, time varying market price of risk models provide better in-sample forecasts. For the period 2005-2008, out of sample forecast of consumption and inflation are better if term structure information is incorporated in the DSGE model but yields are better forecasted by a pure macro DSGE model.

Three essays on the determinants of output, inflation and interest rates

Résumé: Output, inflation and interest rates are key macroeconomic variables, in particular for monetary policy. In modern macroeconomic models they are driven by random shocks which feed through the economy in various ways. Models differ in the nature of shocks and their transmission mechanisms. This is the common theme underlying the three essays of this thesis. Each essay takes a different perspective on the subject: First, the thesis shows empirically how different shocks lead to different behavior of interest rates over the business cycle. For commonly analyzed shocks (technology and monetary policy errors), the patterns square with standard models. The big unknown are sources of inflation persistence. Then the thesis presents a theory of monetary policy, when the central bank can better observe structural shocks than the public. The public will then seek to infer the bank's extra knowledge from its policy actions and expectation management becomes a key factor of optimal policy. In a simple New Keynesian model, monetary policy becomes more concerned with inflation persistence than otherwise. Finally, the thesis points to the huge uncertainties involved in estimating the responses to structural shocks with permanent effects.

The Regulation of Foreign Banks in Switzerland (1956-1972)

The Swiss financial centre witnessed an important shift during the 1960s: the number of foreign banks and their importance in relation to the domestic banking sector significantly increased. Faced with this rapid development, Swiss bank representatives and political and monetary authorities reacted strongly. This paper investigates the evolution of the regulatory response by Swiss banking policy actors to the proliferation of foreign financial in- stitutions. In 1969, those reactions led to the adoption of a discriminatory regime, setting higher entry barriers for foreign banks than for domestic institutions. After examining possible reasons for the attractiveness of Switzerland to foreign banks, this paper will analyse the concerns and fears of the domestic banking sector and its regulators. In this regard, it appears that issues such as mere competition, preservation of the international reputation of the Swiss banks and anti-inflationary monetary policy were central to the chosen regulatory regime. Moreover, this paper shows that foreign banks were used as scapegoats in the evolution of the Swiss system of banking supervision. They were more tightly regulated, yet the general framework remained very lax.