89 resultados para interactive customer-supplier dialogue
em Université de Lausanne, Switzerland
Resumo:
Observing infants in triadic situations has revealed their triangular competence; namely, their ability to interact with both parents by simultaneously sharing their attention and affects with them. Infants' triangular interaction is linked with the coparenting unit's degree of coordination; in high-coordination (HC) families, parents act as a team in relation to the child, thus drawing clear and flexible boundaries with them; in low-coordination (LC) families, parents either avoid direct interaction with each other and include the child in their unit or join together against the child and exclude him or her, thus drawing inconsistent boundaries with the child. We explored the interactive strategies of LC 9-month-olds (n = 15) with those of their parents, comparing them with HC parents (n = 23) in two conditions: playing with both parents at the same time and witnessing their parents' dialogue. LC infants' affects were less positive; they addressed fewer positive triangular bids to their parents and tended to use a less triangular interactive mode. Thus, LC infants had fewer opportunities than did HC infants to acquire skills necessary for coping with triangular interaction. L'observation de nourrissons dans des situations triadiques a révélé leur compétence triangulaire, c'est-à-dire la capacité à interagir avec les deux parents en partageant simultanément leur attention et leurs affects avec eux. L'interaction triangulaire des nourrissons est liée au degré de coordination de l'unité de coparentage. Dans les familles à coordination élevée (abrégé HC en anglais, CE en français), les parents agissent en relation à l'enfant en tant qu'équipe, et établissent donc des limites claires et flexibles avec les enfants. Dans les familles à coordination faible (abrégé LC en anglais, CF en français), les parents évitent soit l'interaction directe l'un avec l'autre et incluent l'enfant dans leur unité, ou bien ils se liguent contre l'enfant et l'excluent, établissant donc des limites contradictoires avec l'enfant. Nous explorons les stratégies interactives de bébés de 9 mois CF avec celle de leurs parents, en les comparant avec des parents CE (N = 23) dans deux conditions: le jeu avec les deux parents au même moment et l'observation du dialogue des parents. Les affects des bébés CF étaient moins positifs. Les bébés se tournaient moins triangulairement vers leurs parents et avaient tendance à utiliser un mode interactif moins triangulaire. Les bébés CF avaient donc moins de chances que les bébés CE d'acquérir les compétences nécessaires pour faire face avec une interaction triangulaire.
Resumo:
Game theory describes and analyzes strategic interaction. It is usually distinguished between static games, which are strategic situations in which the players choose only once as well as simultaneously, and dynamic games, which are strategic situations involving sequential choices. In addition, dynamic games can be further classified according to perfect and imperfect information. Indeed, a dynamic game is said to exhibit perfect information, whenever at any point of the game every player has full informational access to all choices that have been conducted so far. However, in the case of imperfect information some players are not fully informed about some choices. Game-theoretic analysis proceeds in two steps. Firstly, games are modelled by so-called form structures which extract and formalize the significant parts of the underlying strategic interaction. The basic and most commonly used models of games are the normal form, which rather sparsely describes a game merely in terms of the players' strategy sets and utilities, and the extensive form, which models a game in a more detailed way as a tree. In fact, it is standard to formalize static games with the normal form and dynamic games with the extensive form. Secondly, solution concepts are developed to solve models of games in the sense of identifying the choices that should be taken by rational players. Indeed, the ultimate objective of the classical approach to game theory, which is of normative character, is the development of a solution concept that is capable of identifying a unique choice for every player in an arbitrary game. However, given the large variety of games, it is not at all certain whether it is possible to device a solution concept with such universal capability. Alternatively, interactive epistemology provides an epistemic approach to game theory of descriptive character. This rather recent discipline analyzes the relation between knowledge, belief and choice of game-playing agents in an epistemic framework. The description of the players' choices in a given game relative to various epistemic assumptions constitutes the fundamental problem addressed by an epistemic approach to game theory. In a general sense, the objective of interactive epistemology consists in characterizing existing game-theoretic solution concepts in terms of epistemic assumptions as well as in proposing novel solution concepts by studying the game-theoretic implications of refined or new epistemic hypotheses. Intuitively, an epistemic model of a game can be interpreted as representing the reasoning of the players. Indeed, before making a decision in a game, the players reason about the game and their respective opponents, given their knowledge and beliefs. Precisely these epistemic mental states on which players base their decisions are explicitly expressible in an epistemic framework. In this PhD thesis, we consider an epistemic approach to game theory from a foundational point of view. In Chapter 1, basic game-theoretic notions as well as Aumann's epistemic framework for games are expounded and illustrated. Also, Aumann's sufficient conditions for backward induction are presented and his conceptual views discussed. In Chapter 2, Aumann's interactive epistemology is conceptually analyzed. In Chapter 3, which is based on joint work with Conrad Heilmann, a three-stage account for dynamic games is introduced and a type-based epistemic model is extended with a notion of agent connectedness. Then, sufficient conditions for backward induction are derived. In Chapter 4, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa, a topological approach to interactive epistemology is initiated. In particular, the epistemic-topological operator limit knowledge is defined and some implications for games considered. In Chapter 5, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa and Andrés Perea, Aumann's impossibility theorem on agreeing to disagree is revisited and weakened in the sense that possible contexts are provided in which agents can indeed agree to disagree.
Resumo:
The MyHits web server (http://myhits.isb-sib.ch) is a new integrated service dedicated to the annotation of protein sequences and to the analysis of their domains and signatures. Guest users can use the system anonymously, with full access to (i) standard bioinformatics programs (e.g. PSI-BLAST, ClustalW, T-Coffee, Jalview); (ii) a large number of protein sequence databases, including standard (Swiss-Prot, TrEMBL) and locally developed databases (splice variants); (iii) databases of protein motifs (Prosite, Interpro); (iv) a precomputed list of matches ('hits') between the sequence and motif databases. All databases are updated on a weekly basis and the hit list is kept up to date incrementally. The MyHits server also includes a new collection of tools to generate graphical representations of pairwise and multiple sequence alignments including their annotated features. Free registration enables users to upload their own sequences and motifs to private databases. These are then made available through the same web interface and the same set of analytical tools. Registered users can manage their own sequences and annotations using only web tools and freeze their data in their private database for publication purposes.