The Complete Chromosomal Organization of the Reference Strain of the Leishmania Genome Project, L. major ;Friedlin'.

In recent years, analysis of the genomes of many organisms has received increasing international attention. The bulk of the effort to date has centred on the Human Genome Project and analysis of model organisms such as yeast, Drosophila and Caenorhabditis elegans. More recently, the revolution in genome sequencing and gene identification has begun to impact on infectious disease organisms. Initially, much of the effort was concentrated on prokaryotes, but small eukaryotic genomes, including the protozoan parasites Plasmodium, Toxoplasma and trypanosomatids (Leishmania, Trypanosoma brucei and T. cruzi), as well as some multicellular organisms, such as Brugia and Schistosoma, are benefiting from the technological advances of the genome era. These advances promise a radical new approach to the development of novel diagnostic tools, chemotherapeutic targets and vaccines for infectious disease organisms, as well as to the more detailed analysis of cell biology and function.Several networks or consortia linking laboratories around the world have been established to support these parasite genome projects[1] (for more information, see http://www.ebi.ac.uk/ parasites/paratable.html). Five of these networks were supported by an initiative launched in 1994 by the Specific Programme for Research and Tropical Diseases (TDR) of the WHO[2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. The Leishmania Genome Network (LGN) is one of these[3]. Its activities are reported at http://www.ebi.ac.uk/parasites/leish.html, and its current aim is to map and sequence the genome of Leishmania by the year 2002. All the mapping, hybridization and sequence data are also publicly available from LeishDB, an AceDB-based genome database (http://www.ebi.ac.uk/parasites/LGN/leissssoft.html).

Le système d'information dirigeant des Hospices: conception générale

[Table des matières] 1. Introduction. 2. Structure (introduction, hiérarchie). 3. Processus (généralités, flux de clientèle, flux d'activité, flux de ressources, aspects temporels, aspects comptables). 4. Descripteurs (qualification, quantification). 5. Indicateurs (définitions, productivité, pertinence, adéquation, efficacité, effectivité, efficience, standards). 6. Bibliographie.

Mutation of yeast Ku genes disrupts the subnuclear organization of telomeres.

The mammalian Ku70 and Ku86 proteins form a heterodimer that binds to the ends of double-stranded DNA in vitro and is required for repair of radiation-induced strand breaks and V(D)J recombination [1,2]. Deletion of the Saccharomyces cerevisiae genes HDF1 and HDF2--encoding yKu70p and yKu80p, respectively--enhances radiation sensitivity in a rad52 background [3,4]. In addition to repair defects, the length of the TG-rich repeat on yeast telomere ends shortens dramatically [5,6]. We have shown previously that in yeast interphase nuclei, telomeres are clustered in a limited number of foci near the nuclear periphery [7], but the elements that mediate this localization remained unknown. We report here that deletion of the genes encoding yKu70p or its partner yKu80p altered the positioning of telomeric DNA in the yeast nucleus. These are the first mutants shown to affect the subnuclear localization of telomeres. Strains deficient for either yKu70p or yKu80p lost telomeric silencing, although they maintained repression at the silent mating-type loci. In addition, the telomere-associated silencing factors Sir3p and Sir4p and the TG-repeat-binding protein Rap1p lost their punctate pattern of staining and became dispersed throughout the nucleoplasm. Our results implicate the yeast Ku proteins directly in aspects of telomere organization, which in turn affects the repression of telomere-proximal genes.

Genometric analyses of the organization of circular chromosomes: a universal pressure determines the direction of ribosomal RNA genes transcription relative to chromosome replication.

Selective pressures related to gene function and chromosomal architecture are acting on genome sequences and can be revealed, for instance, by appropriate genometric methods. Cumulative nucleotide skew analyses, i.e., GC, TA, and ORF orientation skews, predict the location of the origin of DNA replication for 88 out of 100 completely sequenced bacterial chromosomes. These methods appear fully reliable for proteobacteria, Gram-positives, and spirochetes as well as for euryarchaeotes. Based on this genome architecture information, coorientation analyses reveal that in prokaryotes, ribosomal RNA (rRNA) genes encoding the small and large ribosomal subunits are all transcribed in the same direction as DNA replication; that is, they are located along the leading strand. This result offers a simple and reliable method for circumscribing the region containing the origin of the DNA replication and reveals a strong selective pressure acting on the orientation of rRNA genes similar to the weaker one acting on the orientation of ORFs. Rate of coorientation of transfer RNA (tRNA) genes with DNA replication appears to be taxon-specific. Analyzing nucleotide biases such as GC and TA skews of genes and plotting one against the other reveals a taxonomic clusterization of species. All ribosomal RNA genes are enriched in Gs and depleted in Cs, the only so far known exception being the rRNA genes of deuterostomian mitochondria. However, this exception can be explained by the fact that in the chromosome of the human mitochondrion, the model of the deuterostomian organelle genome, DNA replication, and rRNA transcription proceed in opposite directions. A general rule is deduced from prokaryotic and mitochondrial genomes: ribosomal RNA genes that are transcribed in the same direction as the DNA replication are enriched in Gs, and those transcribed in the opposite direction are depleted in Gs.

Patterns of calcium-binding proteins support parallel and hierarchical organization of human auditory areas.

The human primary auditory cortex (AI) is surrounded by several other auditory areas, which can be identified by cyto-, myelo- and chemoarchitectonic criteria. We report here on the pattern of calcium-binding protein immunoreactivity within these areas. The supratemporal regions of four normal human brains (eight hemispheres) were processed histologically, and serial sections were stained for parvalbumin, calretinin or calbindin. Each calcium-binding protein yielded a specific pattern of labelling, which differed between auditory areas. In AI, defined as area TC [see C. von Economo and L. Horn (1930) Z. Ges. Neurol. Psychiatr.,130, 678-757], parvalbumin labelling was dark in layer IV; several parvalbumin-positive multipolar neurons were distributed in layers III and IV. Calbindin yielded dark labelling in layers I-III and V; it revealed numerous multipolar and pyramidal neurons in layers II and III. Calretinin labelling was lighter than that of parvalbumin or calbindin in AI; calretinin-positive bipolar and bitufted neurons were present in supragranular layers. In non-primary auditory areas, the intensity of labelling tended to become progressively lighter while moving away from AI, with qualitative differences between the cytoarchitectonically defined areas. In analogy to non-human primates, our results suggest differences in intrinsic organization between auditory areas that are compatible with parallel and hierarchical processing of auditory information.

Tracking individuals shows spatial fidelity is a key regulator of ant social organization.

Ants live in organized societies with a marked division of labor among workers, but little is known about how this division of labor is generated. We used a tracking system to continuously monitor individually tagged workers in six colonies of the ant Camponotus fellah over 41 days. Network analyses of more than 9 million interactions revealed three distinct groups that differ in behavioral repertoires. Each group represents a functional behavioral unit with workers moving from one group to the next as they age. The rate of interactions was much higher within groups than between groups. The precise information on spatial and temporal distribution of all individuals allowed us to calculate the expected rates of within- and between-group interactions. These values suggest that the network of interaction within colonies is primarily mediated by age-induced changes in the spatial location of workers.

Current status of a model system: the gene Gp-9 and its association with social organization in fire ants.

The Gp-9 gene in fire ants represents an important model system for studying the evolution of social organization in insects as well as a rich source of information relevant to other major evolutionary topics. An important feature of this system is that polymorphism in social organization is completely associated with allelic variation at Gp-9, such that single-queen colonies (monogyne form) include only inhabitants bearing B-like alleles while multiple-queen colonies (polygyne form) additionally include inhabitants bearing b-like alleles. A recent study of this system by Leal and Ishida (2008) made two major claims, the validity and significance of which we examine here. After reviewing existing literature, analyzing the methods and results of Leal and Ishida (2008), and generating new data from one of their study sites, we conclude that their claim that polygyny can occur in Solenopsis invicta in the U.S.A. in the absence of expression of the b-like allele Gp-9(b) is unfounded. Moreover, we argue that available information on insect OBPs (the family of proteins to which GP-9 belongs), on the evolutionary/population genetics of Gp-9, and on pheromonal/behavioral control of fire ant colony queen number fails to support their view that GP-9 plays no role in the chemosensory-mediated communication that underpins regulation of social organization. Our analyses lead us to conclude that there are no new reasons to question the existing consensus view of the Gp-9 system outlined in Gotzek and Ross (2007).

Genetic regulation of colony social organization in fire ants: an integrative overview

Expression of colony social organization in fire ants appears to be under the control of a single Mendelian factor of large effect. Variation in colony queen number in Solenopsis invicta and its relatives is associated with allelic variation at the gene Gp-9, but not with variation at other unlinked genes; workers regulate queen identity and number on the basis of Gp-9 genotypic compatibility. Nongeneticfactors, such as prior social experience, queen reproductive status, and local environment, have negligible effects on queen number which illustrates the nearly complete penetrance of Gp-9. As predicted, queen number can be manipulated experimentally by altering worker Gp-9 genotype frequencies. The Gp-9 allele lineage associated with polygyny in South American fire? ants has been retained across multiple speciation events, which may signal the action of balancing selection to maintain social polymorphism in these species. Moreover positive selection is implicated in driving the molecular evolution of Gp-9 in association with the origin of polygyny. The identity of the product of Gp-9 as an odorant-binding protein suggests plausible scenarios for its direct involvement in the regulation of queen number via a role in chemical communication. While these and other lines of evidence show that Gp-9 represents a legitimate candidate gene of major effect, studies aimed at determining (i) the biochemical pathways in which GP-9 functions; (ii) the phenotypic effects of molecular variation at Gp-9 and other pathway genes; and (iii) the potential involvement of genes in linkage disequilibrium with Gp-9 are needed to elucidate the genetic architecture underlying social organization in fire ants. Information that reveals the links between molecular variation, individual phenotype, and colony-level behaviors, combined with behavioral models that incorporate details of the chemical communication involved in regulating queen number will yield a novel integrated view of the evolutionary changes underlying a key social adaptation.

Trail pheromones: an integrative view of their role in social insect colony organization.

Trail pheromones do more than simply guide social insect workers from point A to point B. Recent research has revealed additional ways in which they help to regulate colony foraging, often via positive and negative feedback processes that influence the exploitation of the different resources that a colony has knowledge of. Trail pheromones are often complementary or synergistic with other information sources, such as individual memory. Pheromone trails can be composed of two or more pheromones with different functions, and information may be embedded in the trail network geometry. These findings indicate remarkable sophistication in how trail pheromones are used to regulate colony-level behavior, and how trail pheromones are used and deployed at the individual level.

Insight into oversight : how information commissioners contribute to the achievement of access-to-information policy objectives

This thesis examines how oversight bodies, as part of an ATI policy, contribute to the achievement of the policy's objectives. The aim of the thesis is to see how oversight bodies and the work they do affects the implementation of their respective ATI policies and thereby contributes to the objectives of those policies using a comparative case study approach. The thesis investigates how federal/central government level information commissioners in four jurisdictions - Germany, India, Scotland, and Switzerland - enforce their respective ATI policies, which tasks they carry out in addition to their enforcement duties, the challenges they face in their work and the ways they overcome these. Qualitative data were gathered from primary and secondary documents as well as in 37 semi-structured interviews with staff of the commissioners' offices, administrative officials whose job entails complying with ATI, people who have made ATI requests and appealed to their respective oversight body, and external experts who have studied ATI implementation in their particular jurisdiction. The thesis finds that while the aspect of an oversight body's formal independence that has the greatest impact on its work is resource control and that although the powers granted by law set the framework for ensuring that the administration is properly complying with the policy, the commissioner's leadership style - a component of informal independence - has more influence than formal attributes of independence in setting out how resources are obtained and used as well as how staff set priorities and utilize the powers they are granted by law. The conclusion, therefore, is that an ATI oversight body's ability to contribute to the achievement of the policy's objectives is a function of three main factors: a. commissioner's leadership style; b. adequacy of resources and degree of control the organization has over them; c. powers and the exercise of discretion in using them. In effect, the thesis argues that it is difficult to pinpoint the value of the formal powers set out for the oversight body in the ATI law, and that their decisions on whether and how to use them are more important than the presumed strength of the powers. It also claims that the choices made by the commissioners and their staff regarding priorities and use of powers are determined to a large extent by the adequacy of resources and the degree of control the organization has over those resources. In turn, how the head of the organization leads and manages the oversight body is crucial to both the adequacy of the organization's resources and the decisions made about the use of powers. Together, these three factors have a significant impact on the body's effectiveness in contributing to ATI objectives.

An assurance-based model to holistically assess the information security posture

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY : Evaluating Information Security Posture within an organization is becoming a very complex task. Currently, the evaluation and assessment of Information Security are commonly performed using frameworks, methodologies and standards which often consider the various aspects of security independently. Unfortunately this is ineffective because it does not take into consideration the necessity of having a global and systemic multidimensional approach to Information Security evaluation. At the same time the overall security level is globally considered to be only as strong as its weakest link. This thesis proposes a model aiming to holistically assess all dimensions of security in order to minimize the likelihood that a given threat will exploit the weakest link. A formalized structure taking into account all security elements is presented; this is based on a methodological evaluation framework in which Information Security is evaluated from a global perspective. This dissertation is divided into three parts. Part One: Information Security Evaluation issues consists of four chapters. Chapter 1 is an introduction to the purpose of this research purpose and the Model that will be proposed. In this chapter we raise some questions with respect to "traditional evaluation methods" as well as identifying the principal elements to be addressed in this direction. Then we introduce the baseline attributes of our model and set out the expected result of evaluations according to our model. Chapter 2 is focused on the definition of Information Security to be used as a reference point for our evaluation model. The inherent concepts of the contents of a holistic and baseline Information Security Program are defined. Based on this, the most common roots-of-trust in Information Security are identified. Chapter 3 focuses on an analysis of the difference and the relationship between the concepts of Information Risk and Security Management. Comparing these two concepts allows us to identify the most relevant elements to be included within our evaluation model, while clearing situating these two notions within a defined framework is of the utmost importance for the results that will be obtained from the evaluation process. Chapter 4 sets out our evaluation model and the way it addresses issues relating to the evaluation of Information Security. Within this Chapter the underlying concepts of assurance and trust are discussed. Based on these two concepts, the structure of the model is developed in order to provide an assurance related platform as well as three evaluation attributes: "assurance structure", "quality issues", and "requirements achievement". Issues relating to each of these evaluation attributes are analysed with reference to sources such as methodologies, standards and published research papers. Then the operation of the model is discussed. Assurance levels, quality levels and maturity levels are defined in order to perform the evaluation according to the model. Part Two: Implementation of the Information Security Assurance Assessment Model (ISAAM) according to the Information Security Domains consists of four chapters. This is the section where our evaluation model is put into a welldefined context with respect to the four pre-defined Information Security dimensions: the Organizational dimension, Functional dimension, Human dimension, and Legal dimension. Each Information Security dimension is discussed in a separate chapter. For each dimension, the following two-phase evaluation path is followed. The first phase concerns the identification of the elements which will constitute the basis of the evaluation: ? Identification of the key elements within the dimension; ? Identification of the Focus Areas for each dimension, consisting of the security issues identified for each dimension; ? Identification of the Specific Factors for each dimension, consisting of the security measures or control addressing the security issues identified for each dimension. The second phase concerns the evaluation of each Information Security dimension by: ? The implementation of the evaluation model, based on the elements identified for each dimension within the first phase, by identifying the security tasks, processes, procedures, and actions that should have been performed by the organization to reach the desired level of protection; ? The maturity model for each dimension as a basis for reliance on security. For each dimension we propose a generic maturity model that could be used by every organization in order to define its own security requirements. Part three of this dissertation contains the Final Remarks, Supporting Resources and Annexes. With reference to the objectives of our thesis, the Final Remarks briefly analyse whether these objectives were achieved and suggest directions for future related research. Supporting resources comprise the bibliographic resources that were used to elaborate and justify our approach. Annexes include all the relevant topics identified within the literature to illustrate certain aspects of our approach. Our Information Security evaluation model is based on and integrates different Information Security best practices, standards, methodologies and research expertise which can be combined in order to define an reliable categorization of Information Security. After the definition of terms and requirements, an evaluation process should be performed in order to obtain evidence that the Information Security within the organization in question is adequately managed. We have specifically integrated into our model the most useful elements of these sources of information in order to provide a generic model able to be implemented in all kinds of organizations. The value added by our evaluation model is that it is easy to implement and operate and answers concrete needs in terms of reliance upon an efficient and dynamic evaluation tool through a coherent evaluation system. On that basis, our model could be implemented internally within organizations, allowing them to govern better their Information Security. RÉSUMÉ : Contexte général de la thèse L'évaluation de la sécurité en général, et plus particulièrement, celle de la sécurité de l'information, est devenue pour les organisations non seulement une mission cruciale à réaliser, mais aussi de plus en plus complexe. A l'heure actuelle, cette évaluation se base principalement sur des méthodologies, des bonnes pratiques, des normes ou des standards qui appréhendent séparément les différents aspects qui composent la sécurité de l'information. Nous pensons que cette manière d'évaluer la sécurité est inefficiente, car elle ne tient pas compte de l'interaction des différentes dimensions et composantes de la sécurité entre elles, bien qu'il soit admis depuis longtemps que le niveau de sécurité globale d'une organisation est toujours celui du maillon le plus faible de la chaîne sécuritaire. Nous avons identifié le besoin d'une approche globale, intégrée, systémique et multidimensionnelle de l'évaluation de la sécurité de l'information. En effet, et c'est le point de départ de notre thèse, nous démontrons que seule une prise en compte globale de la sécurité permettra de répondre aux exigences de sécurité optimale ainsi qu'aux besoins de protection spécifiques d'une organisation. Ainsi, notre thèse propose un nouveau paradigme d'évaluation de la sécurité afin de satisfaire aux besoins d'efficacité et d'efficience d'une organisation donnée. Nous proposons alors un modèle qui vise à évaluer d'une manière holistique toutes les dimensions de la sécurité, afin de minimiser la probabilité qu'une menace potentielle puisse exploiter des vulnérabilités et engendrer des dommages directs ou indirects. Ce modèle se base sur une structure formalisée qui prend en compte tous les éléments d'un système ou programme de sécurité. Ainsi, nous proposons un cadre méthodologique d'évaluation qui considère la sécurité de l'information à partir d'une perspective globale. Structure de la thèse et thèmes abordés Notre document est structuré en trois parties. La première intitulée : « La problématique de l'évaluation de la sécurité de l'information » est composée de quatre chapitres. Le chapitre 1 introduit l'objet de la recherche ainsi que les concepts de base du modèle d'évaluation proposé. La maniéré traditionnelle de l'évaluation de la sécurité fait l'objet d'une analyse critique pour identifier les éléments principaux et invariants à prendre en compte dans notre approche holistique. Les éléments de base de notre modèle d'évaluation ainsi que son fonctionnement attendu sont ensuite présentés pour pouvoir tracer les résultats attendus de ce modèle. Le chapitre 2 se focalise sur la définition de la notion de Sécurité de l'Information. Il ne s'agit pas d'une redéfinition de la notion de la sécurité, mais d'une mise en perspectives des dimensions, critères, indicateurs à utiliser comme base de référence, afin de déterminer l'objet de l'évaluation qui sera utilisé tout au long de notre travail. Les concepts inhérents de ce qui constitue le caractère holistique de la sécurité ainsi que les éléments constitutifs d'un niveau de référence de sécurité sont définis en conséquence. Ceci permet d'identifier ceux que nous avons dénommés « les racines de confiance ». Le chapitre 3 présente et analyse la différence et les relations qui existent entre les processus de la Gestion des Risques et de la Gestion de la Sécurité, afin d'identifier les éléments constitutifs du cadre de protection à inclure dans notre modèle d'évaluation. Le chapitre 4 est consacré à la présentation de notre modèle d'évaluation Information Security Assurance Assessment Model (ISAAM) et la manière dont il répond aux exigences de l'évaluation telle que nous les avons préalablement présentées. Dans ce chapitre les concepts sous-jacents relatifs aux notions d'assurance et de confiance sont analysés. En se basant sur ces deux concepts, la structure du modèle d'évaluation est développée pour obtenir une plateforme qui offre un certain niveau de garantie en s'appuyant sur trois attributs d'évaluation, à savoir : « la structure de confiance », « la qualité du processus », et « la réalisation des exigences et des objectifs ». Les problématiques liées à chacun de ces attributs d'évaluation sont analysées en se basant sur l'état de l'art de la recherche et de la littérature, sur les différentes méthodes existantes ainsi que sur les normes et les standards les plus courants dans le domaine de la sécurité. Sur cette base, trois différents niveaux d'évaluation sont construits, à savoir : le niveau d'assurance, le niveau de qualité et le niveau de maturité qui constituent la base de l'évaluation de l'état global de la sécurité d'une organisation. La deuxième partie: « L'application du Modèle d'évaluation de l'assurance de la sécurité de l'information par domaine de sécurité » est elle aussi composée de quatre chapitres. Le modèle d'évaluation déjà construit et analysé est, dans cette partie, mis dans un contexte spécifique selon les quatre dimensions prédéfinies de sécurité qui sont: la dimension Organisationnelle, la dimension Fonctionnelle, la dimension Humaine, et la dimension Légale. Chacune de ces dimensions et son évaluation spécifique fait l'objet d'un chapitre distinct. Pour chacune des dimensions, une évaluation en deux phases est construite comme suit. La première phase concerne l'identification des éléments qui constituent la base de l'évaluation: ? Identification des éléments clés de l'évaluation ; ? Identification des « Focus Area » pour chaque dimension qui représentent les problématiques se trouvant dans la dimension ; ? Identification des « Specific Factors » pour chaque Focus Area qui représentent les mesures de sécurité et de contrôle qui contribuent à résoudre ou à diminuer les impacts des risques. La deuxième phase concerne l'évaluation de chaque dimension précédemment présentées. Elle est constituée d'une part, de l'implémentation du modèle général d'évaluation à la dimension concernée en : ? Se basant sur les éléments spécifiés lors de la première phase ; ? Identifiant les taches sécuritaires spécifiques, les processus, les procédures qui auraient dû être effectués pour atteindre le niveau de protection souhaité. D'autre part, l'évaluation de chaque dimension est complétée par la proposition d'un modèle de maturité spécifique à chaque dimension, qui est à considérer comme une base de référence pour le niveau global de sécurité. Pour chaque dimension nous proposons un modèle de maturité générique qui peut être utilisé par chaque organisation, afin de spécifier ses propres exigences en matière de sécurité. Cela constitue une innovation dans le domaine de l'évaluation, que nous justifions pour chaque dimension et dont nous mettons systématiquement en avant la plus value apportée. La troisième partie de notre document est relative à la validation globale de notre proposition et contient en guise de conclusion, une mise en perspective critique de notre travail et des remarques finales. Cette dernière partie est complétée par une bibliographie et des annexes. Notre modèle d'évaluation de la sécurité intègre et se base sur de nombreuses sources d'expertise, telles que les bonnes pratiques, les normes, les standards, les méthodes et l'expertise de la recherche scientifique du domaine. Notre proposition constructive répond à un véritable problème non encore résolu, auquel doivent faire face toutes les organisations, indépendamment de la taille et du profil. Cela permettrait à ces dernières de spécifier leurs exigences particulières en matière du niveau de sécurité à satisfaire, d'instancier un processus d'évaluation spécifique à leurs besoins afin qu'elles puissent s'assurer que leur sécurité de l'information soit gérée d'une manière appropriée, offrant ainsi un certain niveau de confiance dans le degré de protection fourni. Nous avons intégré dans notre modèle le meilleur du savoir faire, de l'expérience et de l'expertise disponible actuellement au niveau international, dans le but de fournir un modèle d'évaluation simple, générique et applicable à un grand nombre d'organisations publiques ou privées. La valeur ajoutée de notre modèle d'évaluation réside précisément dans le fait qu'il est suffisamment générique et facile à implémenter tout en apportant des réponses sur les besoins concrets des organisations. Ainsi notre proposition constitue un outil d'évaluation fiable, efficient et dynamique découlant d'une approche d'évaluation cohérente. De ce fait, notre système d'évaluation peut être implémenté à l'interne par l'entreprise elle-même, sans recourir à des ressources supplémentaires et lui donne également ainsi la possibilité de mieux gouverner sa sécurité de l'information.

Governance by Contract? The impact of the International Finance Corporation's Social Conditionality on Worker Organization and Social Dialogue

This study considers the question of the relationship between private labour regulation and workers' capacity to take collective action through the lens of an empirical study of the International Finance Corporation's (IFC) 'performance standards' system of social and environmental conditionality. The study covered some 150 IFC client businesses in four world regions, drawing on data made public by the IFC as well as the results of a dedicated field survey that gathered information directly from workers, managers and union representatives. The study found that the application of the performance standards system has had remarkably little impact on union membership and social dialogue. In those few cases where change could be causally linked to the standards, the effect depended on the presence of workers' organizations that already had the capacity to take effective action on behalf of their members. The study also uncovered some prima facie evidence of breaches of freedom of association rights occurring with no reaction from IFC. The study concludes that the lack of impact is largely due to the private contractual structure that supposedly guarantees standards compliance.