Leniency programs, antitrust enforcement and multimarket contact : three essays in industrial organization

The Layout of My Thesis This thesis contains three chapters in Industrial Organization that build on the work outlined above. The first two chapters combine leniency programs with multimarket contact and provide a thorough analysis of the potential effects of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus. The third chapter puts the whole discussion on leniency programs into perspective by examining other enforcement tools available to an antitrust authority. The main argument in that last chapter is that a specific instrument can only be as effective as the policy in which it is embedded. It is therefore important for an antitrust authority to know how it best accompanies the introduction or modification of a policy instrument that helps deterrence. INTRODUCTION Chapter 1 examines the efféct of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus on the incentives of firms to report cartel activities. The main question is whether the inclusion of these policies in a leniency program undermine the effectiveness of the latter by discouraging the firms to apply for amnesty. The model is static and focus on the ex post incentives of firms to desist from collusion. The results suggest that, because Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus encourage the reporting of a second cartel after a first detection, a firm, anticipating this, may be reluctant to seek leniency and to report in the first place. However, the effect may also go in the opposite direction, and Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may encourage the simultaneous reporting of two cartels. Chapter 2 takes this idea further to the stage of cartel formation. This chapter provides a complete characterization of the potential anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of Amnesty Plus in a infinitely repeated game framework when the firms use their multimarket contact to harshen punishment. I suggest a clear-cut policy rule that prevents potential adverse effects and thereby show that, if policy makers follow this rule, a leniency program with Amnesty Plus performs better than one without. Chapter 3 characterizes the socially optimal enforcement effort of an antitrust authority and shows how this effort changes with the introduction or modification of specific policy instruments. The intuition is that the policy instrument may increase the marginal benefit of conducting investigations. If this effect is strong enough, a more rigorous detection policy becomes socially desirable.

Mise en place d'un programme de prévention et de prise en charge du diabète en Suisse: le point de vue des patients et des professionnels de la santé [Implementation of a diabetes disease management program in Switzerland: patients' and healthcare professionals' point of view].

BACKGROUND: A reorganization of healthcare systems is required to meet the challenge of the increasing prevalence of chronic diseases, e.g. diabetes. In North-America and Europe, several countries have thus developed national or regional chronic disease management programs. In Switzerland, such initiatives have only emerged recently. In 2010, the canton of Vaud set up the "Diabetes Cantonal Program", within the framework of which we conducted a study designed to ascertain the opinions of both diabetic patients and healthcare professionals on the elements that could be integrated into this program, the barriers and facilitators to its development, and the incentives that could motivate these actors to participate. METHODS: We organized eight focus-groups: one with diabetic patients and one with healthcare professionals in the four sanitary areas of the canton of Vaud. The discussions were recorded, transcribed and submitted to a thematic content analysis. RESULTS: Patients and healthcare professionals were rather in favour of the implementation of a cantonal program, although patients were more cautious concerning its necessity. All participants envisioned a set of elements that could be integrated to this program. They also considered that the program could be developed more easily if it were adapted to patients' and professionals' needs and if it used existing structures and professionals. The difficulty to motivate both patients and professionals to participate was mentioned as a barrier to the development of this program however. Quality or financial incentives could therefore be created to overcome this potential problem. CONCLUSION: The identification of the elements to consider, barriers, facilitators and incentives to participate to a chronic disease management program, obtained by exploring the opinions of patients and healthcare professionals, should favour its further development and implementation.

The Swiss regulatory framework for pædiatric health research

Medical research on minors entails both risks and benefits. Under Swiss law, clinical trials on children, including nontherapeutic drug trials, are permissible. However, ethics committees must systematically verify that all clinical studies have a favorable risk-benefit profile. Additional safeguards are designed to ensure that children are not unnecessarily involved in research and that proper consent is always obtained. Federal Swiss law is undergoing revision to extend these protections beyond clinical trials to a broad array of health research. The Swiss drug agency also seeks to improve the incentives for pharmaceutical firms to develop new paediatric drugs and relevant paediatric drug labels.

Housewife or working mum--each to her own? The relevance of societal factors in the association between social roles and alcohol use among mothers in 16 industrialized countries.

Aims To investigate whether differences in gender-income equity at country level explain national differences in the links between alcohol use, and the combination of motherhood and paid labour. Design Cross-sectional data in 16 established market economies participating in the Gender, Alcohol and Culture: An International Study (GenACIS) study. Setting Population surveys. Participants A total of 12 454 mothers (aged 25-49 years). Measurements Alcohol use was assessed as the quantity per drinking day. Paid labour, having a partner, gender-income ratio at country level and the interaction between individual and country characteristics were regressed on alcohol consumed per drinking day using multi-level modelling. Findings Mothers with a partner who were in paid labour reported consuming more alcohol on drinking days than partnered housewives. In countries with high gender-income equity, mothers with a partner who were in paid labour drank less alcohol per occasion, while alcohol use was higher among working partnered mothers living in countries with lower income equity. Conclusion In countries which facilitate working mothers, daily alcohol use decreases as female social roles increase; in contrast, in countries where there are fewer incentives for mothers to remain in work, the protective effect of being a working mother (with partner) on alcohol use is weaker. These data suggest that a country's investment in measures to improve the compatibility of motherhood and paid labour may reduce women's alcohol use.