IEF pattern classification-derived criteria for the identification of epoetin-delta in urine.

Epoetin-delta (Dynepo Shire Pharmaceuticals, Basing stoke, UK) is a synthetic form of erythropoietin (EPO) whose resemblance with endogenous EPO makes it hard to identify using the classical identification criteria. Urine samples collected from six healthy volunteers treated with epoetin-delta injections and from a control population were immuno-purified and analyzed with the usual IEF method. On the basis of the EPO profiles integration, a linear multivariate model was computed for discriminant analysis. For each sample, a pattern classification algorithm returned a bands distribution and intensity score (bands intensity score) saying how representative this sample is of one of the two classes, positive or negative. Effort profiles were also integrated in the model. The method yielded a good sensitivity versus specificity relation and was used to determine the detection window of the molecule following multiple injections. The bands intensity score, which can be generalized to epoetin-alpha and epoetin-beta, is proposed as an alternative criterion and a supplementary evidence for the identification of EPO abuse.

A regional Industrial Symbiosis methodology and its implementation in Geneva, Switzerland

The Agenda 21 for the Geneva region is the results from a broad consultation process including all local actors. The article 12 stipulates that « the State facilitates possible synergies between economic activities in order to minimize their environmental impacts » thus opening the way for Industrial Ecology (IE) and Industrial Symbiosis (IS). An Advisory Board for Industrial Ecology and Industrial Symbiosis implementation was established in 2002 involving relevant government agencies. Regulatory and technical conditions for IS are studied in the Swiss context. Results reveal that the Swiss law on waste does not hinder by-product exchanges. Methodology and technical factors including geographic, qualitative, quantitative and economical aspects are detailed. The competition with waste operators in a highly developed recycling system is also tackled.The IS project develops an empirical and systematic method for detecting and implementing by-products synergies between industrial actors disseminated throughout the Geneva region. Database management tool for the treatment of input-output analysis data and GIS tools for detecting potentials industrial partners are constantly improved. Potential symbioses for 17 flows (including energy, water and material flows) are currently studied for implementation.

The de facto independence of regulatory agencies and its consequences for policy making and regulatory outcomes

This dissertation focuses on the practice of regulatory governance, throughout the study of the functioning of formally independent regulatory agencies (IRAs), with special attention to their de facto independence. The research goals are grounded on a "neo-positivist" (or "reconstructed positivist") position (Hawkesworth 1992; Radaelli 2000b; Sabatier 2000). This perspective starts from the ontological assumption that even if subjective perceptions are constitutive elements of political phenomena, a real world exists beyond any social construction and can, however imperfectly, become the object of scientific inquiry. Epistemologically, it follows that hypothetical-deductive theories with explanatory aims can be tested by employing a proper methodology and set of analytical techniques. It is thus possible to make scientific inferences and general conclusions to a certain extent, according to a Bayesian conception of knowledge, in order to update the prior scientific beliefs in the truth of the related hypotheses (Howson 1998), while acknowledging the fact that the conditions of truth are at least partially subjective and historically determined (Foucault 1988; Kuhn 1970). At the same time, a sceptical position is adopted towards the supposed disjunction between facts and values and the possibility of discovering abstract universal laws in social science. It has been observed that the current version of capitalism corresponds to the golden age of regulation, and that since the 1980s no government activity in OECD countries has grown faster than regulatory functions (Jacobs 1999). Following an apparent paradox, the ongoing dynamics of liberalisation, privatisation, decartelisation, internationalisation, and regional integration hardly led to the crumbling of the state, but instead promoted a wave of regulatory growth in the face of new risks and new opportunities (Vogel 1996). Accordingly, a new order of regulatory capitalism is rising, implying a new division of labour between state and society and entailing the expansion and intensification of regulation (Levi-Faur 2005). The previous order, relying on public ownership and public intervention and/or on sectoral self-regulation by private actors, is being replaced by a more formalised, expert-based, open, and independently regulated model of governance. Independent regulation agencies (IRAs), that is, formally independent administrative agencies with regulatory powers that benefit from public authority delegated from political decision makers, represent the main institutional feature of regulatory governance (Gilardi 2008). IRAs constitute a relatively new technology of regulation in western Europe, at least for certain domains, but they are increasingly widespread across countries and sectors. For instance, independent regulators have been set up for regulating very diverse issues, such as general competition, banking and finance, telecommunications, civil aviation, railway services, food safety, the pharmaceutical industry, electricity, environmental protection, and personal data privacy. Two attributes of IRAs deserve a special mention. On the one hand, they are formally separated from democratic institutions and elected politicians, thus raising normative and empirical concerns about their accountability and legitimacy. On the other hand, some hard questions about their role as political actors are still unaddressed, though, together with regulatory competencies, IRAs often accumulate executive, (quasi-)legislative, and adjudicatory functions, as well as about their performance.

The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Capitalism: The Diffusion of Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe

This article studies the diffusion of the main institutional feature of regulatory capitalism, namely, independent regulatory agencies. While only a few such authorities existed in Europe in the early 1980s, by the end of the twentieth century they had spread impressively across countries and sectors. The analysis finds that three classes of factors (bottom-up, top-down, and horizontal) explain this trend. First, the establishment of independent regulatory agencies was an attempt to improve credible commitment capacity when liberalizing and privatizing utilities and to alleviate the political uncertainty problem, namely, the risk to a government that its policies will be changed when it loses power. Second, Europeanization favored the creation of independent regulators. Third, individual decisions were interdependent, as governments were influenced by the decisions of others in an emulation process where the symbolic properties of independent regulators mattered more than the functions they performed.

Policy Credibility and Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Comparative Empirical Analysis

Independent regulatory agencies are one of the main institutional features of the 'rising regulatory state' in Western Europe. Governments are increasingly willing to abandon their regulatory competencies and to delegate them to specialized institutions that are at least partially beyond their control. This article examines the empirical consistency of one particular explanation of this phenomenon, namely the credibility hypothesis, claiming that governments delegate powers so as to enhance the credibility of their policies. Three observable implications are derived from the general hypothesis, linking credibility and delegation to veto players, complexity and interdependence. An independence index is developed to measure agency independence, which is then used in a multivariate analysis where the impact of credibility concerns on delegation is tested. The analysis relies on an original data set comprising independence scores for thirty-three regulators. Results show that the credibility hypothesis can explain a good deal of the variation in delegation. The economic nature of regulation is a strong determinant of agency independence, but is mediated by national institutions in the form of veto players.

Street-Level Bureaucracy and E-Government

With the intensive use of information and communication technologies, governments are transforming into e-governments. While public management research has given increased attention to this subject lately, this article reviews the limited literature that deals with the impacts of e-government technologies on street-level bureaucracies. A twofold argument is being developed. First, what can be called the 'curtailment thesis', stressing the reduction or disappearance of frontline policy discretion, is addressed. Second, the 'enablement thesis' gets attention, highlighting how technologies provide frontline workers and citizens with additional action resources. The article concludes with propositions for a future research agenda on the topic.

Having Your Cake and Eating It, Too: Can Regulatory Agencies Be Both Independent and Accountable?

Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) were created in various sectors and on different governmental levels to implement liberalization policies. This paper investigates the link between IRAs' independence, which is said to promote regulatory credibility and the use of technical expertise, and their accountability, which is related to the need for controlling and legitimizing independent regulators. The literature on the regulatory state anticipates a positive relation between the independence and accountability of IRAs, but systematic empirical evidence is still lacking. To tackle this question, this paper measures and compares the independence and the accountability of IRAs in three differentially liberalized sectors in Switzerland (telecommunications, electricity and railways). With the application of Social Network Analysis, this piece of research shows that IRAs can be de facto independent and accountable at the same time, but the two features do not necessarily co-evolve in the same direction.