Screening primary-care patients forgoing health care for economic reasons.

BACKGROUND: Growing social inequities have made it important for general practitioners to verify if patients can afford treatment and procedures. Incorporating social conditions into clinical decision-making allows general practitioners to address mismatches between patients' health-care needs and financial resources. OBJECTIVES: Identify a screening question to, indirectly, rule out patients' social risk of forgoing health care for economic reasons, and estimate prevalence of forgoing health care and the influence of physicians' attitudes toward deprivation. DESIGN: Multicenter cross-sectional survey. PARTICIPANTS: Forty-seven general practitioners working in the French-speaking part of Switzerland enrolled a random sample of patients attending their private practices. MAIN MEASURES: Patients who had forgone health care were defined as those reporting a household member (including themselves) having forgone treatment for economic reasons during the previous 12 months, through a self-administered questionnaire. Patients were also asked about education and income levels, self-perceived social position, and deprivation levels. KEY RESULTS: Overall, 2,026 patients were included in the analysis; 10.7% (CI95% 9.4-12.1) reported a member of their household to have forgone health care during the 12 previous months. The question "Did you have difficulties paying your household bills during the last 12 months" performed better in identifying patients at risk of forgoing health care than a combination of four objective measures of socio-economic status (gender, age, education level, and income) (R(2) = 0.184 vs. 0.083). This question effectively ruled out that patients had forgone health care, with a negative predictive value of 96%. Furthermore, for physicians who felt powerless in the face of deprivation, we observed an increase in the odds of patients forgoing health care of 1.5 times. CONCLUSION: General practitioners should systematically evaluate the socio-economic status of their patients. Asking patients whether they experience any difficulties in paying their bills is an effective means of identifying patients who might forgo health care.

Pupal cocoons affect sanitary brood care and limit fungal infections in ant colonies.

BACKGROUND: The brood of ants and other social insects is highly susceptible to pathogens, particularly those that penetrate the soft larval and pupal cuticle. We here test whether the presence of a pupal cocoon, which occurs in some ant species but not in others, affects the sanitary brood care and fungal infection patterns after exposure to the entomopathogenic fungus Metarhizium brunneum. We use a) a comparative approach analysing four species with either naked or cocooned pupae and b) a within-species analysis of a single ant species, in which both pupal types co-exist in the same colony. RESULTS: We found that the presence of a cocoon did not compromise fungal pathogen detection by the ants and that species with cocooned pupae increased brood grooming after pathogen exposure. All tested ant species further removed brood from their nests, which was predominantly expressed towards larvae and naked pupae treated with the live fungal pathogen. In contrast, cocooned pupae exposed to live fungus were not removed at higher rates than cocooned pupae exposed to dead fungus or a sham control. Consistent with this, exposure to the live fungus caused high numbers of infections and fungal outgrowth in larvae and naked pupae, but not in cocooned pupae. Moreover, the ants consistently removed the brood prior to fungal outgrowth, ensuring a clean brood chamber. CONCLUSION: Our study suggests that the pupal cocoon has a protective effect against fungal infection, causing an adaptive change in sanitary behaviours by the ants. It further demonstrates that brood removal-originally described for honeybees as "hygienic behaviour"-is a widespread sanitary behaviour in ants, which likely has important implications on disease dynamics in social insect colonies.

Expertise et négociations fiscales à la Société des Nations (1923-1939)

À travers l'analyse du comité fiscal de la Société des Nations, cet article aborde la question de l'autonomie et de l'influence des organismes économiques multilatéraux instaurés après la Première Guerre mondiale. Il démontre ainsi comment ce comité abandonne progressivement son statut initial de négociations intergouvernementales pour se transformer en une réunion de praticiens fiscaux qui défendent des intérêts propres. Mais l'étude du cas suisse met également en évidence l'impact de plus en plus limité de ces discussions multilatérales sur les politiques nationales et les relations bilatérales. Dès le milieu des années 1920, les débats genevois ne font en effet plus contrepoids à la politique d'attraction fiscale de la Suisse. Expertise and fiscal negotiations at the League of Nations (1923-1939): This article considers the autonomy and the influence of multilateral economic organisations during the inter-war years through the study of the League of Nations' fiscal committee. It shows that this committee gradually discarded intergovernmental negotiations and became a tax practitioners' club that defended its own interest. But a look at the Swiss case also demonstrates that the impact of these multilateral discussions on national policies and bilateral relations quickly decreased. From the middle of the 1920s, the debates in Geneva no longer hampered the fiscal attractiveness of Switzerland as a tax haven.

Perinatal care at the limit of viability between 22 and 26 completed weeks of gestation in Switzerland.

Perinatal care of pregnant women at high risk for preterm delivery and of preterm infants born at the limit of viability (22-26 completed weeks of gestation) requires a multidisciplinary approach by an experienced perinatal team. Limited precision in the determination of both gestational age and foetal weight, as well as biological variability may significantly affect the course of action chosen in individual cases. The decisions that must be taken with the pregnant women and on behalf of the preterm infant in this context are complex and have far-reaching consequences. When counselling pregnant women and their partners, neonatologists and obstetricians should provide them with comprehensive information in a sensitive and supportive way to build a basis of trust. The decisions are developed in a continuing dialogue between all parties involved (physicians, midwives, nursing staff and parents) with the principal aim to find solutions that are in the infant's and pregnant woman's best interest. Knowledge of current gestational age-specific mortality and morbidity rates and how they are modified by prenatally known prognostic factors (estimated foetal weight, sex, exposure or nonexposure to antenatal corticosteroids, single or multiple births) as well as the application of accepted ethical principles form the basis for responsible decision-making. Communication between all parties involved plays a central role. The members of the interdisciplinary working group suggest that the care of preterm infants with a gestational age between 22 0/7 and 23 6/7 weeks should generally be limited to palliative care. Obstetric interventions for foetal indications such as Caesarean section delivery are usually not indicated. In selected cases, for example, after 23 weeks of pregnancy have been completed and several of the above mentioned prenatally known prognostic factors are favourable or well informed parents insist on the initiation of life-sustaining therapies, active obstetric interventions for foetal indications and provisional intensive care of the neonate may be reasonable. In preterm infants with a gestational age between 24 0/7 and 24 6/7 weeks, it can be difficult to determine whether the burden of obstetric interventions and neonatal intensive care is justified given the limited chances of success of such a therapy. In such cases, the individual constellation of prenatally known factors which impact on prognosis can be helpful in the decision making process with the parents. In preterm infants with a gestational age between 25 0/7 and 25 6/7 weeks, foetal surveillance, obstetric interventions for foetal indications and neonatal intensive care measures are generally indicated. However, if several prenatally known prognostic factors are unfavourable and the parents agree, primary non-intervention and neonatal palliative care can be considered. All pregnant women with threatening preterm delivery or premature rupture of membranes at the limit of viability must be transferred to a perinatal centre with a level III neonatal intensive care unit no later than 23 0/7 weeks of gestation, unless emergency delivery is indicated. An experienced neonatology team should be involved in all deliveries that take place after 23 0/7 weeks of gestation to help to decide together with the parents if the initiation of intensive care measures appears to be appropriate or if preference should be given to palliative care (i.e., primary non-intervention). In doubtful situations, it can be reasonable to initiate intensive care and to admit the preterm infant to a neonatal intensive care unit (i.e., provisional intensive care). The infant's clinical evolution and additional discussions with the parents will help to clarify whether the life-sustaining therapies should be continued or withdrawn. Life support is continued as long as there is reasonable hope for survival and the infant's burden of intensive care is acceptable. If, on the other hand, the health care team and the parents have to recognise that in the light of a very poor prognosis the burden of the currently used therapies has become disproportionate, intensive care measures are no longer justified and other aspects of care (e.g., relief of pain and suffering) are the new priorities (i.e., redirection of care). If a decision is made to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining therapies, the health care team should focus on comfort care for the dying infant and support for the parents.

Three Essays on the Formation and Impact of Economic Policy

Introduction In my thesis I argue that economic policy is all about economics and politics. Consequently, analysing and understanding economic policy ideally has at least two parts. The economics part, which is centered around the expected impact of a specific policy on the real economy both in terms of efficiency and equity. The insights of this part point into which direction the fine-tuning of economic policies should go. However, fine-tuning of economic policies will be most likely subject to political constraints. That is why, in the politics part, a much better understanding can be gained by taking into account how the incentives of politicians and special interest groups as well as the role played by different institutional features affect the formation of economic policies. The first part and chapter of my thesis concentrates on the efficiency-related impact of economic policies: how does corporate income taxation in general, and corporate income tax progressivity in specific, affect the creation of new firms? Reduced progressivity and flat-rate taxes are in vogue. By 2009, 22 countries are operating flat-rate income tax systems, as do 7 US states and 14 Swiss cantons (for corporate income only). Tax reform proposals in the spirit of the "flat tax" model typically aim to reduce three parameters: the average tax burden, the progressivity of the tax schedule, and the complexity of the tax code. In joint work, Marius Brülhart and I explore the implications of changes in these three parameters on entrepreneurial activity, measured by counts of firm births in a panel of Swiss municipalities. Our results show that lower average tax rates and reduced complexity of the tax code promote firm births. Controlling for these effects, reduced progressivity inhibits firm births. Our reading of these results is that tax progressivity has an insurance effect that facilitates entrepreneurial risk taking. The positive effects of lower tax levels and reduced complexity are estimated to be significantly stronger than the negative effect of reduced progressivity. To the extent that firm births reflect desirable entrepreneurial dynamism, it is not the flattening of tax schedules that is key to successful tax reforms, but the lowering of average tax burdens and the simplification of tax codes. Flatness per se is of secondary importance and even appears to be detrimental to firm births. The second part of my thesis, which corresponds to the second and third chapter, concentrates on how economic policies are formed. By the nature of the analysis, these two chapters draw on a broader literature than the first chapter. Both economists and political scientists have done extensive research on how economic policies are formed. Thereby, researchers in both disciplines have recognised the importance of special interest groups trying to influence policy-making through various channels. In general, economists base their analysis on a formal and microeconomically founded approach, while abstracting from institutional details. In contrast, political scientists' frameworks are generally richer in terms of institutional features but lack the theoretical rigour of economists' approaches. I start from the economist's point of view. However, I try to borrow as much as possible from the findings of political science to gain a better understanding of how economic policies are formed in reality. In the second chapter, I take a theoretical approach and focus on the institutional policy framework to explore how interactions between different political institutions affect the outcome of trade policy in presence of special interest groups' lobbying. Standard political economy theory treats the government as a single institutional actor which sets tariffs by trading off social welfare against contributions from special interest groups seeking industry-specific protection from imports. However, these models lack important (institutional) features of reality. That is why, in my model, I split up the government into a legislative and executive branch which can both be lobbied by special interest groups. Furthermore, the legislative has the option to delegate its trade policy authority to the executive. I allow the executive to compensate the legislative in exchange for delegation. Despite ample anecdotal evidence, bargaining over delegation of trade policy authority has not yet been formally modelled in the literature. I show that delegation has an impact on policy formation in that it leads to lower equilibrium tariffs compared to a standard model without delegation. I also show that delegation will only take place if the lobby is not strong enough to prevent it. Furthermore, the option to delegate increases the bargaining power of the legislative at the expense of the lobbies. Therefore, the findings of this model can shed a light on why the U.S. Congress often practices delegation to the executive. In the final chapter of my thesis, my coauthor, Antonio Fidalgo, and I take a narrower approach and focus on the individual politician level of policy-making to explore how connections to private firms and networks within parliament affect individual politicians' decision-making. Theories in the spirit of the model of the second chapter show how campaign contributions from lobbies to politicians can influence economic policies. There exists an abundant empirical literature that analyses ties between firms and politicians based on campaign contributions. However, the evidence on the impact of campaign contributions is mixed, at best. In our paper, we analyse an alternative channel of influence in the shape of personal connections between politicians and firms through board membership. We identify a direct effect of board membership on individual politicians' voting behaviour and an indirect leverage effect when politicians with board connections influence non-connected peers. We assess the importance of these two effects using a vote in the Swiss parliament on a government bailout of the national airline, Swissair, in 2001, which serves as a natural experiment. We find that both the direct effect of connections to firms and the indirect leverage effect had a strong and positive impact on the probability that a politician supported the government bailout.

Renoncement aux soins: comment appréhender cette réalité en médecine de premier recours [Patients forgoing health care for economic reasons: how to identify this in a primary care setting?].

Although the performance of the Swiss health system is high, one out of ten patients in general practitioner's (GP) office declares having foregone care in the previous twelve months for economic reasons. Reasons for foregoing care are several and include a lack of knowledge of existing social aids in getting health insurance, unavailability of GPs and long waiting lists for various types of care. Although long term knowledge of patients or a psychosocial history of deprivation or poverty may help identify individuals at risk of foregoing care, many may remain undetected. We propose then a few instruments to help GPs to identify, in a simple and structured approach, patients at risk of forgoing care for economic reasons; these patients are frequently deprived and sometimes poor.