Interactive Epistemology and Reasoning: On the Foundations of Game Theory

Game theory describes and analyzes strategic interaction. It is usually distinguished between static games, which are strategic situations in which the players choose only once as well as simultaneously, and dynamic games, which are strategic situations involving sequential choices. In addition, dynamic games can be further classified according to perfect and imperfect information. Indeed, a dynamic game is said to exhibit perfect information, whenever at any point of the game every player has full informational access to all choices that have been conducted so far. However, in the case of imperfect information some players are not fully informed about some choices. Game-theoretic analysis proceeds in two steps. Firstly, games are modelled by so-called form structures which extract and formalize the significant parts of the underlying strategic interaction. The basic and most commonly used models of games are the normal form, which rather sparsely describes a game merely in terms of the players' strategy sets and utilities, and the extensive form, which models a game in a more detailed way as a tree. In fact, it is standard to formalize static games with the normal form and dynamic games with the extensive form. Secondly, solution concepts are developed to solve models of games in the sense of identifying the choices that should be taken by rational players. Indeed, the ultimate objective of the classical approach to game theory, which is of normative character, is the development of a solution concept that is capable of identifying a unique choice for every player in an arbitrary game. However, given the large variety of games, it is not at all certain whether it is possible to device a solution concept with such universal capability. Alternatively, interactive epistemology provides an epistemic approach to game theory of descriptive character. This rather recent discipline analyzes the relation between knowledge, belief and choice of game-playing agents in an epistemic framework. The description of the players' choices in a given game relative to various epistemic assumptions constitutes the fundamental problem addressed by an epistemic approach to game theory. In a general sense, the objective of interactive epistemology consists in characterizing existing game-theoretic solution concepts in terms of epistemic assumptions as well as in proposing novel solution concepts by studying the game-theoretic implications of refined or new epistemic hypotheses. Intuitively, an epistemic model of a game can be interpreted as representing the reasoning of the players. Indeed, before making a decision in a game, the players reason about the game and their respective opponents, given their knowledge and beliefs. Precisely these epistemic mental states on which players base their decisions are explicitly expressible in an epistemic framework. In this PhD thesis, we consider an epistemic approach to game theory from a foundational point of view. In Chapter 1, basic game-theoretic notions as well as Aumann's epistemic framework for games are expounded and illustrated. Also, Aumann's sufficient conditions for backward induction are presented and his conceptual views discussed. In Chapter 2, Aumann's interactive epistemology is conceptually analyzed. In Chapter 3, which is based on joint work with Conrad Heilmann, a three-stage account for dynamic games is introduced and a type-based epistemic model is extended with a notion of agent connectedness. Then, sufficient conditions for backward induction are derived. In Chapter 4, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa, a topological approach to interactive epistemology is initiated. In particular, the epistemic-topological operator limit knowledge is defined and some implications for games considered. In Chapter 5, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa and Andrés Perea, Aumann's impossibility theorem on agreeing to disagree is revisited and weakened in the sense that possible contexts are provided in which agents can indeed agree to disagree.

Theory of mind tasks and executive functions: A systematic review of group studies in neurology.

A growing number of studies have been addressing the relationship between theory of mind (TOM) and executive functions (EF) in patients with acquired neurological pathology. In order to provide a global overview on the main findings, we conducted a systematic review on group studies where we aimed to (1) evaluate the patterns of impaired and preserved abilities of both TOM and EF in groups of patients with acquired neurological pathology and (2) investigate the existence of particular relations between different EF domains and TOM tasks. The search was conducted in Pubmed/Medline. A total of 24 articles met the inclusion criteria. We considered for analysis classical clinically accepted TOM tasks (first- and second-order false belief stories, the Faux Pas test, Happe's stories, the Mind in the Eyes task, and Cartoon's tasks) and EF domains (updating, shifting, inhibition, and access). The review suggests that (1) EF and TOM appear tightly associated. However, the few dissociations observed suggest they cannot be reduced to a single function; (2) no executive subprocess could be specifically associated with TOM performances; (3) the first-order false belief task and the Happe's story task seem to be less sensitive to neurological pathologies and less associated to EF. Even though the analysis of the reviewed studies demonstrates a close relationship between TOM and EF in patients with acquired neurological pathology, the nature of this relationship must be further investigated. Studies investigating ecological consequences of TOM and EF deficits, and intervention researches may bring further contributions to this question.

The longitudinal association between social functioning and theory of mind in first episode psychosis

Introduction. There is some cross-sectional evidence that theory of mind ability is associated with social functioning in those with psychosis but the direction of this relationship is unknown. This study investigates the longitudinal association between both theory of mind and psychotic symptoms and social functioning outcome in first-episode psychosis. Methods. Fifty-four people with first-episode psychosis were followed up at 6 and 12 months. Random effects regression models were used to estimate the stability of theory of mind over time and the association between baseline theory of mind and psychotic symptoms and social functioning outcome. Results. Neither baseline theory of mind ability (regression coefficients: Hinting test 1.07 95% CI 0.74, 2.88; Visual Cartoon test 2.91 95% CI 7.32, 1.51) nor baseline symptoms (regression coefficients: positive symptoms 0.04 95% CI 1.24, 1.16; selected negative symptoms 0.15 95% CI 2.63, 2.32) were associated with social functioning outcome. There was evidence that theory of mind ability was stable over time, (regression coefficients: Hinting test 5.92 95% CI 6.66, 8.92; Visual Cartoon test score 0.13 95% CI 0.17, 0.44). Conclusions. Neither baseline theory of mind ability nor psychotic symptoms are associated with social functioning outcome. Further longitudinal work is needed to understand the origin of social functioning deficits in psychosis.

Recommandations de pratique clinique dans la schizophrénie: de la théorie à la mise en application = Clinical practice guidelines for the treatment of schizophrenia: from theory to practice

Dans le cadre d'une étude rétrospective au sein d'une unité de réhabilitation, nous avons cherché à examiner le degré de respect de recommandations de pratique clinique (RPC) abordant le traitement pharmacologique au long cours de la schizophrénie, par des médecins qui n'en ont qu'une connaissance indirecte. The Expert Consensus Guideline for the treatment of schizophrenia (ECGTS) a été retenu comme référence sur la base d'une comparaison avec cinq autres RPC principales. Sur un collectif de 20 patients, les recommandations de l'ECGTS sont totalement respectées dans 65 % des cas, partiellement respectées dans 10 % et non respectées dans 25 %, démontrant ainsi que la pratique clinique est clairement perfectible (principalement dans le traitement des symptômes psychotiques et dépressifs). Cependant, le respect des RPC ne garantit pas forcément la résolution de tous les problèmes cliniques rencontrés : 12 patients sur 20 présentent des effets secondaires à l'évaluation clinique et pour huit d'entre eux, les recommandations à ce niveau, sont respectées. Notre étude montre cependant que le choix et l'application d'une RPC ne sont pas simples. Les RPC actuelles donnent peu ou pas d'instruments de mesure, ni de critères précis pour évaluer les problèmes cliniques auxquels elles font référence. L'avenir appartient donc à des RPC qui proposent, outre les recommandations cliniques elles-mêmes, les moyens de leur vérification et de leur application sur le terrain.

Public sector rationing and private sector selection [paper accepted and forthcoming in Journal of Public Economic Theory]

We study the interaction between nonprice public rationing and prices in the private market. Under a limited budget, the public supplier uses a rationing policy. A private firm may supply the good to those consumers who are rationed by the public system. Consumers have different amounts of wealth, and costs of providing the good to them vary. We consider two regimes. First, the public supplier observes consumers' wealth information; second, the public supplier observes both wealth and cost information. The public supplier chooses a rationing policy, and, simultaneously, the private firm, observing only cost but not wealth information, chooses a pricing policy. In the first regime, there is a continuum of equilibria. The Pareto dominant equilibrium is a means-test equilibrium: poor consumers are supplied while rich consumers are rationed. Prices in the private market increase with the budget. In the second regime, there is a unique equilibrium. This exhibits a cost-effectiveness rationing rule; consumers are supplied if and only if their costbenefit ratios are low. Prices in the private market do not change with the budget. Equilibrium consumer utility is higher in the cost-effectiveness equilibrium than the means-test equilibrium [Authors]