Taking "Galton's problem" Seriously : Towards a Theory of Policy Diffusion

This article builds on the recent policy diffusion literature and attempts to overcome one of its major problems, namely the lack of a coherent theoretical framework. The literature defines policy diffusion as a process where policy choices are interdependent, and identifies several diffusion mechanisms that specify the link between the policy choices of the various actors. As these mechanisms are grounded in different theories, theoretical accounts of diffusion currently have little internal coherence. In this article we put forward an expected-utility model of policy change that is able to subsume all the diffusion mechanisms. We argue that the expected utility of a policy depends on both its effectiveness and the payoffs it yields, and we show that the various diffusion mechanisms operate by altering these two parameters. Each mechanism affects one of the two parameters, and does so in distinct ways. To account for aggregate patterns of diffusion, we embed our model in a simple threshold model of diffusion. Given the high complexity of the process that results, strong analytical conclusions on aggregate patterns cannot be drawn without more extensive analysis which is beyond the scope of this article. However, preliminary considerations indicate that a wide range of diffusion processes may exist and that convergence is only one possible outcome.

Co-evolution of Policy Sectors: Health Care and Public Health in five Countries

Cette thèse analyse la co-évolution de deux secteurs dans la politique de la santé: santé publique (public health) et soins aux malades (health care). En d'autres termes, la relation entre les dimensions curative et préventive de la politique de la santé et leur développement dans la durée. Une telle recherche est nécessaire car les problèmes de la santé sont complexes et ont besoin de solutions coordonnées. De plus, les dépenses de la santé ont augmenté sans arrt durant les dernières décennies. Un moyen de réduire une future augmentation des dépenses pourrait consister en davantage d'investissement dans des mesures préventives. En relation avec cette idée, ma recherche analyse les politiques de la santé publique et les soins aux malades de cinq pays: Allemagne, Angleterre, Australie, Etats-Unis et Suisse. En m'appuyant sur la littérature secondaire, des statistiques descriptives et des entretiens avec des experts et des politiciens, j'analyse la relation entre les deux secteurs depuis la fin du dix-neuvième siècle. En particulier, je me focalise sur la relation des deux champs sur trois niveaux: institutions, acteurs et politiques. Mes résultats montrent les similitudes et les différences d'évolution entre les cinq pays. D'un c^oté, lorsque la profession médicale est politiquement active et que le pays consiste en une fédération centralisée ou en un gouvernement unitaire, les deux secteurs sont intégrés au niveau institutionnel, ralliant les professions et groupes d'intérêt des deux secteurs la cause commune dans une activité politique. Par contre, dans tous les pays, les deux secteurs ont co-évolué vers une complémentarité malgré de la politisation des professions et la centralisation du gouvernement. Ces résultats sont intéressants pour la science politique en général car ils soulignent l'importance des professions pour le développement institutionnel et proposent un cadre pour l'analyse de la co-évolution des politiques publiques en général. -- This Ph.D. thesis analyzes the co-evolution of the health care and the public health sectors. In other words, the relation between preventive and curative health policy and its evolution over time. Such research is necessary, because current health problems are complex and might need coordinated solutions. What is more, health expenditures have increased continuously in the last decades. One way to slow down further increase in health spending could be to invest more in preventative health policies. Therefore, I am connecting individual health care and public health into a common analysis, taking Australia, Germany, Switzerland, the UK and the U.S. as examples. Based on secondary literature, descriptive statistics and interviews with experts and policymakers, I am analyzing how the two sectors' relations co-evolved between the late nineteenth and the early twenty-first century. Specifically, I am researching how health care and public health were related on the levels of institutions, actors and policies. My results show that there are differences and similarities in the co-evolution of policy sectors between these countries. On the one hand, when the medical profession was politically active and the country a centralized federation or a unitary state, there was institutional integration and common political advocacy of the sectors' interest groups and professions. On the other hand, in all countries, both sectors co-evolved towards complementarity, irrespectively of the politicization of professions and centralization of government. These findings are interesting for the political science literature at large, because they underline the importance of professions for institutional development and propose an analytical framework for analyzing the co-evolution of policy sectors in general.

Literature report : a review of policy learning in five strands of political science research

This paper reviews the policy learning literature in political science. In recent years, the number of publications on learning in the political realm increased dramatically. Researchers have focused on how policymakers and administrators adapt policies based on learning processes or experiences. Thereby, learning has been discussed in very different ways. Authors have referred to learning in the context of ideas, understood as deeply held beliefs, and, as change and adaptation of policy instruments. Two other strands of literature have taken into consideration learning, namely the diffusion literature and research on transfer, which put forward learning to understand who learns from whom and what. Opposed to these views, political learning emphasizes the adaptation of new strategies by policymakers over the transfer of knowledge or broad ideas. In this approach, learning occurs due to the failure of existing policies, increasing problem pressure, scientific innovations, or a combination of these elements.

Three Essays on the Formation and Impact of Economic Policy

Introduction In my thesis I argue that economic policy is all about economics and politics. Consequently, analysing and understanding economic policy ideally has at least two parts. The economics part, which is centered around the expected impact of a specific policy on the real economy both in terms of efficiency and equity. The insights of this part point into which direction the fine-tuning of economic policies should go. However, fine-tuning of economic policies will be most likely subject to political constraints. That is why, in the politics part, a much better understanding can be gained by taking into account how the incentives of politicians and special interest groups as well as the role played by different institutional features affect the formation of economic policies. The first part and chapter of my thesis concentrates on the efficiency-related impact of economic policies: how does corporate income taxation in general, and corporate income tax progressivity in specific, affect the creation of new firms? Reduced progressivity and flat-rate taxes are in vogue. By 2009, 22 countries are operating flat-rate income tax systems, as do 7 US states and 14 Swiss cantons (for corporate income only). Tax reform proposals in the spirit of the "flat tax" model typically aim to reduce three parameters: the average tax burden, the progressivity of the tax schedule, and the complexity of the tax code. In joint work, Marius Brülhart and I explore the implications of changes in these three parameters on entrepreneurial activity, measured by counts of firm births in a panel of Swiss municipalities. Our results show that lower average tax rates and reduced complexity of the tax code promote firm births. Controlling for these effects, reduced progressivity inhibits firm births. Our reading of these results is that tax progressivity has an insurance effect that facilitates entrepreneurial risk taking. The positive effects of lower tax levels and reduced complexity are estimated to be significantly stronger than the negative effect of reduced progressivity. To the extent that firm births reflect desirable entrepreneurial dynamism, it is not the flattening of tax schedules that is key to successful tax reforms, but the lowering of average tax burdens and the simplification of tax codes. Flatness per se is of secondary importance and even appears to be detrimental to firm births. The second part of my thesis, which corresponds to the second and third chapter, concentrates on how economic policies are formed. By the nature of the analysis, these two chapters draw on a broader literature than the first chapter. Both economists and political scientists have done extensive research on how economic policies are formed. Thereby, researchers in both disciplines have recognised the importance of special interest groups trying to influence policy-making through various channels. In general, economists base their analysis on a formal and microeconomically founded approach, while abstracting from institutional details. In contrast, political scientists' frameworks are generally richer in terms of institutional features but lack the theoretical rigour of economists' approaches. I start from the economist's point of view. However, I try to borrow as much as possible from the findings of political science to gain a better understanding of how economic policies are formed in reality. In the second chapter, I take a theoretical approach and focus on the institutional policy framework to explore how interactions between different political institutions affect the outcome of trade policy in presence of special interest groups' lobbying. Standard political economy theory treats the government as a single institutional actor which sets tariffs by trading off social welfare against contributions from special interest groups seeking industry-specific protection from imports. However, these models lack important (institutional) features of reality. That is why, in my model, I split up the government into a legislative and executive branch which can both be lobbied by special interest groups. Furthermore, the legislative has the option to delegate its trade policy authority to the executive. I allow the executive to compensate the legislative in exchange for delegation. Despite ample anecdotal evidence, bargaining over delegation of trade policy authority has not yet been formally modelled in the literature. I show that delegation has an impact on policy formation in that it leads to lower equilibrium tariffs compared to a standard model without delegation. I also show that delegation will only take place if the lobby is not strong enough to prevent it. Furthermore, the option to delegate increases the bargaining power of the legislative at the expense of the lobbies. Therefore, the findings of this model can shed a light on why the U.S. Congress often practices delegation to the executive. In the final chapter of my thesis, my coauthor, Antonio Fidalgo, and I take a narrower approach and focus on the individual politician level of policy-making to explore how connections to private firms and networks within parliament affect individual politicians' decision-making. Theories in the spirit of the model of the second chapter show how campaign contributions from lobbies to politicians can influence economic policies. There exists an abundant empirical literature that analyses ties between firms and politicians based on campaign contributions. However, the evidence on the impact of campaign contributions is mixed, at best. In our paper, we analyse an alternative channel of influence in the shape of personal connections between politicians and firms through board membership. We identify a direct effect of board membership on individual politicians' voting behaviour and an indirect leverage effect when politicians with board connections influence non-connected peers. We assess the importance of these two effects using a vote in the Swiss parliament on a government bailout of the national airline, Swissair, in 2001, which serves as a natural experiment. We find that both the direct effect of connections to firms and the indirect leverage effect had a strong and positive impact on the probability that a politician supported the government bailout.

The Outlaw Pirate Heroine, An Analysis of a Durgā Figure in a 1935 Prabhat Film

(Résumé de l'ouvrage) She kills and destroys. She causes illness and disaster. The wild goddess evokes fear and terror. People worship her with blood-sacrifices and alcohol in order to appease her rage, but also in order to participate in her power for she is at once a force of destruction and a force of regeneration, of life, and of sexuality. Her creative violence reflects the ambivalent power of nature. The idea of frightening goddesses is preserved in regionally different forms throughout South Asia. The Institute for the Science of Religions, University of Berne, and the Museum of Anthropology of the University of Zurich, coordinated a symposium on wild goddesses in India and Nepal. The papers and reports on ongoing research presented at this symposium are published in this volume.