Transforming personal experience and emotions through education to cultural diversity: an interplay between unicity and genericity

When subjects studied at school are close to societal discourses and to the students' social identities, when they have high emotional resonance, is it possible to enable the students to distance themselves from their emotions and personal experience, and to conceptualise them? Examining the relation between emotion and learning through the lens of socio-cultural psychology, the aim of our study was to shed light on "secondarisation" processes, that is, processes that transform personal experience and emotions into conceptualised forms of thinking. We analysed 85 video-recorded lessons in education for cultural diversity involving 12 teachers (of primary and secondary schools). Having identified episodes in which emotions were put into words or personal experience was reported, we analysed the use of pronouns (taken as indicators of secondarisation processes) and found a recurrent pattern: "the unicity-genericity routine". We illustrate the functioning of this routine with various excerpts taken from lessons in education for diversity taught in the classes of two teachers in primary school. The results show that the interplay between unicity and genericity works as a discursive resource for the development of secondarisation processes.

Le visage au-delà de l'apparence. Levinas et l'autre rive de l'éthique

In this article I look at the significance of Emmanuel Levinas' thought for an ethics of care. I argue that the meaning Levinas gives to the term « face » is a central aspect related to this issue. The face is in this French philosopher's view an ambiguous phenomenon, an enigma, that bears high ethical significance : beyond its physical appearance, the face of the other escapes every affort at representation, it indicates the way in which the representation of the other exceeds any idea of the other in me, and it is precisely this irreducibility of alterity that lights up its ethical meaning. In Levinas' view, to be oneself is to be for the other, and the otherness of the other manifests itself in the face-to-face encounter. Accordingly, responsibility is the response to the injunction, the interpellation, of the other's face, preceding the claim of justice, and humaneness is conceived as entangled in the other's face. Against this background, I suggest that Levinas' philosophical insight constitutes a turning point from a traditional to a new conception of responsibility that may bear great significance to a renewed understanding of an hermeneutics and an ethics of care.