The class basis of the cleavage between the New Left and the radical right: An analysis for Austria, Denmark, Norway and Switzerland

This chapter argues that the electoral competition between the New Left and the Radical Right is best understood as a cultural divide anchored in different class constituencies. Based on individual-level data from the European Social Survey, we analyze the links between voters' class position, their economic and cultural preferences and their party choice for four small and affluent European countries. We find a striking similarity in the class pattern across countries. Everywhere, the New Left attracts disproportionate support from socio-cultural professionals and presents a clear-cut middle-class profile, whereas the Radical Right is most successful among production and service workers and receives least support from professionals. In general, the Radical Right depends on the votes of lowereducated men and older citizens and has turned into a new type of working-class party. However, its success within the working-class is not due to economic, but to cultural issues. The voters of the Radical Right collide with those of the New Left over a cultural conflict of identity and community - and not over questions of redistribution. A full-grown cleavage has thus emerged in the four countries under study, separating a libertarian-universalistic pole from an authoritarian-communitarian pole and going along with a process of class realignment.

Le médecin face aux inégalités sociales de santé: quel pouvoir d'action [General practitioners facing social inequalities in health: which power to act?].

The link between social inequalities and health has been known for many years, as attested by Villermé's work on the "mental and physical status of the working class" (1840). We have more and more insight into the nature of this relationship, which embraces not only material deprivation, but also psychological mechanisms related to social and interpersonal problems. Defining our possible role as physicians to fight against these inequalities has become a public health priority. Instruments and leads, which are now available to help us in our daily practice, are presented here.

Entre culture du consensus et critique sociale : les intellectuels de gauche dans la Suisse de l'après-guerre (1945-1968)

Cette thèse étudie l'engagement des intellectuels de gauche dans la vie politique suisse, de 1945 à 1968. D'une part, il s'agit de retracer l'évolution du statut des intellectuels, que ce soit dans ou hors des partis. D'autre part, il est question d'analyser les débats politiques au sein desquels ces intellectuels furent impliqués, et la manière dont ces débats suscitèrent des clivages entre eux. De ce point de vue, nous mettons en lumière les différents courants et groupes formés par les intellectuels progressistes, souvent structurés autour de revues ; il s'agit aussi bien d'étudier l'engagement de personnalités sociales-démocrates que des communistes prosoviétiques, sans oublier les chrétiens pacifistes ou les intellectuels proches de la gauche radicale antistalinienne. S'agissant de l'évolution du statut des acteurs étudiés, ce travail souligne le déclin de la figure de l'intellectuel de gauche organiquement lié à son parti, souvent issu du milieu ouvrier, au profit d'intellectuels critiques, généralement au bénéfice d'une formation académique et revendiquant une certaine autonomie par rapport aux organisations politiques. Du point de vue des débats politiques, l'engagement des intellectuels de gauche est envisagé à la lumière de trois périodes. Tout d'abord, nous étudions la phase de l'immédiat après-guerre (1945-1949), marquée par une poussée de la gauche, y compris prosoviétique, qui met en cause le conservatisme politique issu des années de Mobilisation. Nous étudions ensuite les années les plus tendues de la guerre froide, entre 1950 et 1962, durant lesquelles la vie politique et intellectuelle en Suisse est dominée par un fort anticommunisme, auquel se rallient les dirigeants du Parti socialiste. Pourtant, l'engagement de certains intellectuels progressistes, en particulier dans le mouvement pacifiste, met en cause le consensus politique de guerre froide. Enfin, dans une troisième partie, nous montrons comment la critique intellectuelle de gauche se renforce après 1962, à la faveur de la détente Est-Ouest sur le plan international, et avec l'essor, en Suisse même, du mouvement des « non- conformistes ». Ce mouvement est animé par des intellectuels qui dénoncent le conservatisme helvétique, les excès de l'anticommunisme ou qui affirment leur solidarité avec les travailleurs immigrés en Suisse, aussi bien qu'avec les mouvements sociaux dans les pays du tiers-monde. Nous montrons en particulier comment l'engagement de ces intellectuels progressistes contribue à préparer le terrain pour les mobilisations de la jeunesse qui surviendront dans les « années 1968 ». -- This thesis adresses the political commitment of left-wing intellectuals in Switzerland between 1945 and 1968. It aims, on the one hand, to examine how the status of intellectuals developed within and outside of political parties. On the other hand, it endeavours to understand the political debates that involved and sometimes split these intellectuals. In this intent, we examine the various political orientations and formations that brought left-wing intellectuals together - often around dedicated periodicals - such as the Social-democratic, the Communist, the Christian Progressist or the anti-Stalinist Marxist movements. Regarding the evolving status of left-wing opinion leaders, we observe the decline of the organic, party-affiliated intellectuals - often from a working class background. By contrast, critical academics - left-wing oriented but.not directly linked to a political formation - became prevailing figures. Concerning left-wing intellectuals' involvement in the political debate, we differentiate three historical periods. Firstly, the immediate postwar years (1945-1949) were characterised by the strengthening of a left-wing faction, including pro-Soviet forces, which criticized the conservative political consensus built up during the War. Secondly, during the most tense years of the Cold War (1950-1962), the Swiss political and intellectual life became widely dominated by a strong anticommunism, supported by the Social-Democratic leaders. Still, the commitment of certain progressist intellectuals, particularly in the pacifist movement, called into question the political consensus resulting from the Cold War. This questioning strengthened after 1962, in the context of the Détente, corresponding to the rise of the "non-conformist" movement. This movement stemmed from progressist intellectuals, who criticized the Swiss conservatism, and the excesses of official anticommunism, while declaring their solidarity with immigrant workers or with the social movements in the Third World. We show in particular how these intellectuals paved the way for the youth mobilization due to occur in the "1968 years".

Lifecourse socioeconomic status and type 2 diabetes : the role of chronic inflammation in the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing.

We examined the association between lifecourse socioeconomic status (SES) and the risk of type 2 diabetes at older ages, ascertaining the extent to which adult lifestyle factors and systemic inflammation explain this relationship. Data were drawn from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) which, established in 2002, is a representative cohort study of ≥50-year olds individuals living in England. SES indicators were paternal social class, participants' education, participants' wealth, and a lifecourse socioeconomic index. Inflammatory markers (C-reactive protein and fibrinogen) and lifestyle factors were measured repeatedly; diabetes incidence (new cases) was monitored over 7.5 years of follow-up. Of the 6218 individuals free from diabetes at baseline (44% women, mean aged 66 years), 423 developed diabetes during follow-up. Relative to the most advantaged people, those in the lowest lifecourse SES group experienced more than double the risk of diabetes (hazard ratio 2.59; 95% Confidence Interval (CI) = 1.81-3.71). Lifestyle factors explained 52% (95%CI:30-85) and inflammatory markers 22% (95%CI:13-37) of this gradient. Similar results were apparent with the separate SES indicators. In a general population sample, socioeconomic inequalities in the risk of type 2 diabetes extend to older ages and appear to partially originate from socioeconomic variations in modifiable factors which include lifestyle and inflammation.