Compensation for environmental damages under international law

ABSTRACT The purpose of this research is to clarify the contribution of international dispute adjudication mechanisms in regard to environmental protection. Most specifically, the study aims to identify and develop the criterion adopted by the international judge in relation to the compensation for environmental damages. In this perspective, the study identifies some gaps between international responsibility and environmental protection interests. The premise sustained all along the study is that compensation is determinant to conciliate environmental prerogatives with mechanisms of international adjudication, in particular the system of international responsibility. Supported by the analysis of treaties, international decisions and secondary sources, the thesis defends the idea that some elements of international law allow the adjudicator to adapt the compensation to attend certain environmental interests, creating a new approach which was entitled 'fair compensation'. The antithesis of this approach is the idea that compensation in international law is limited exclusively to the strict reparation of the material losses incurred by the victim. As a synthesis, the study defends the specificity of environmental damages in relation to other kind of damages that are subject to compensation under international law. The measure upon which compensation for environmental damages could be classified as a specific type of damage under international law remains to be determined. The main conclusion of the study is that the existing standard of compensation defined by the theory and practice of international law is impossible to be strictly respected in cases involving environmental damages. This limitation is mainly due to the complexity of the notion of environment, which is constantly conflicting with the anthropologic view of legal theory. The study supports the idea that the establishment of a 'fair compensation' which takes into account the political, legal and technical context of the environmental damage, is the best possible approach to conciliate internationally responsibility and environmental interests. This could be implemented by the observance of certain elements by the international judge/arbitrator through a case-by-case analysis.

War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust and Conflict

We construct a dynamic theory of civil conflict hinging on inter-ethnic trust and trade. The model economy is inhabitated by two ethnic groups. Inter-ethnic trade requires imperfectly observed bilateral investments and one group has to form beliefs on the average propensity to trade of the other group. Since conflict disrupts trade, the onset of a conflict signals that the aggressor has a low propensity to trade. Agents observe the history of conflicts and update their beliefs over time, transmitting them to the next generation. The theory bears a set of testable predictions. First, war is a stochastic process whose frequency depends on the state of endogenous beliefs. Second, the probability of future conflicts increases after each conflict episode. Third, "accidental" conflicts that do not reflect economic fundamentals can lead to a permanent breakdown of trust, plunging a society into a vicious cycle of recurrent conflicts (a war trap). The incidence of conflict can be reduced by policies abating cultural barriers, fostering inter-ethnic trade and human capital, and shifting beliefs. Coercive peace policies such as peacekeeping forces or externally imposed regime changes have instead no persistent effects.

Social evolution: war of the worms.

The discovery of a non-reproductive soldier caste in a clonally reproducing trematode greatly extends the taxonomic distribution of eusociality and reaffirms the importance of relatedness in the evolution of reproductive altruism.

War and the evolution of belligerence and bravery.

Tribal war occurs when a coalition of individuals use force to seize reproduction-enhancing resources, and it may have affected human evolution. Here, we develop a population-genetic model for the coevolution of costly male belligerence and bravery when war occurs between groups of individuals in a spatially subdivided population. Belligerence is assumed to increase an actor's group probability of trying to conquer another group. An actor's bravery is assumed to increase his group's ability to conquer an attacked group. We show that the selective pressure on these two traits can be substantial even in groups of large size, and that they may be driven by two independent reproduction-enhancing resources: additional mates for males and additional territory (or material resources) for females. This has consequences for our understanding of the evolution of intertribal interactions, as hunter-gatherer societies are well known to have frequently raided neighbouring groups from whom they appropriated territory, goods and women.