Fiscal Federalism at the Ballot Box : The Relevance of Expressive Voting

This paper explores the impact of citizens' motivation to vote on the pattern of fiscal federalism. If the only concern of instrumental citizens was outcome they would have little incentive to vote because the probability that a single vote might change an electoral outcome is usually minuscule. If voters turn out in large numbers to derive intrinsic value from action, how will these voters choose when considering the role local jurisdictions should play? The first section of the paper assesses the weight that expressive voters attach to an instrumental evaluation of alternative outcomes. Predictions are tested with reference to case study analysis of the way Swiss voters assessed the role their local jurisdiction should play. The relevance of this analysis is also assessed with reference to the choice that voters express when considering other local issues. Textbook analysis of fiscal federalism is premised on the assumption that voters register choice just as 'consumers' reveal demand for services in a market, but how robust is this analogy.

Do resources, justice administration practices and federalism have an impact on registered and sentenced crime prevalence ?

This contribution, based on a statistical approach, undertakes to link data on resources (personnel and financial means) and the working of the administration of penal justice (prosecution, sentencing) taking into account the nationality of those prosecuted. In order to be able to distinguish prosecution and sentencing practices of judicial authorities and possible processes of discrimination, diverse sources have been used such as data from court administrations, public finances and police forces, collected by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office and the Swiss Federal administration of finances. The authors discuss discrimination in prosecution and sentencing between Swiss residents and foreigners taking into account localization and resources regarding personnel and public finances.

Federalism and Welfare to Work in Switzerland: The Development of Active Social Policies in a Fragmented Welfare State

This article is concerned with the impact that federal structures have on the development of welfare to work or activation policies. More precisely, it argues that the incentives and the risks associated with a division of responsibilities among different jurisdictions may constitute an obstacle to broad reforms that promote labor market participation of nonworking benefit recipients. This argument is illustrated with a case study discussing policy responses to a massive rise in caseloads among social assistance recipients in Switzerland. We conclude that the lack of a fundamental reform was the consequence of the incentives provided by the federal structure of the program. These incentives have both encouraged cost shifting among jurisdictions and discouraged involvement of federal level policy makers in a bigger reform.