Five essays on bankruptcy

Chapter 2 Bankruptcy Initiation In The New Era of Chapter 11 2.1 Abstract The bankruptcy act of 1978 placed corporate managers (as debtor in possession) in control of the bankruptcy process. Between 2000 and 2001 managers apparently lost this control to secured creditors. This study examines financial ratios of firms filing for bankruptcy between 1993 and 2004 and tests the hypothesis that the change from manager to creditor control created or exacerbated the managerial (and dominant creditor) incentive to delay bankruptcy filing. We find a clear deterioration in the financial conditions of firms filing after 2001. This is consistent with managers (or creditors who control them) delaying filing for bankruptcy. We also observe patterns of operating losses and liquidations that suggest adverse economic consequences from such delay. Chapter 3 Bankruptcy Resolution: Priority of Claims with the Secured Creditor in Control 3.1 Abstract We present new evidence on the violation of priority of claims in bankruptcy using a sample of 222 firms that tiled for Chapter 11 bankruptcy over the 1993-2004 period. Our study reveals a dramatic reduction in the violations of priority of claims compared to research on prior periods. These results are consistent with changes in both court practices and laws transferring power to the secured creditors over our sample period. We also find an increase in the time from the date of a bankruptcy filing to reaching plan confirmation where priority is not violated. Chapter 4 Bankruptcy Resolution: Speed, APR Violations and Delaware 4.1 Abstract We analyze speed of bankruptcy resolution on a sample of 294 US firms filing for bankruptcy in the 1993-2004 period. We find strong association between type of Chapter II filing and speed of bankruptcy resolution. We also find that violations to the absolute priority rule reduce the time from bankruptcy filing to plan confirmation. This is consistent with the hypothesis that creditors are willing to grant concessions in exchange for faster bankruptcy resolution. Furthermore, after controlling for the type of filing and violations to the absolute priority rule, we do not find any difference in the duration of the bankruptcy process for firms filing in Delaware, New York, or other bankruptcy districts. Chapter 5 Financial Distress and Corporate Control 5.1 Abstract We examine the replacement rates of directors and executives in 63 firms filing for bank ruptcy during the 1995-2002 period. We find that over 76% of directors and executives are replaced in the four year period from the year prior to the bankruptcy filing through three years after. These rates are higher than those found in prior research and is consistent with changes in bankruptcy procedures and practice (i.e. the increased secured creditors control over the process due to both DIP financing and changes in the Uniform Commercial Code) having a significant impact on the corporate governance of firms in financial distress. Chapter 6 Financial Statement Restatements: Decision to File for Bankruptcy 6.1 Abstract On a sample of 201 firms that restated their financial statements we analyze the process of regaining investor trust in a two year period after the restatement. We find that 20% of firms that restate their financial statements tile for bankruptcy or restructure out of court. Our results also indicate that the decisions to change auditor or management is correlated with a higher probability of failure. Increased media attention appears to partly explain the decision of firms to restructure their debt or tile for bankruptcy.

Palaeotectonic and palaeogeographic evolution of the western Tethys and PeriTethyan domain (IGCP Project 369)

Project No. 369 (''Comparative Evolution of PeriTethyan Rift Basins'') of the International Geological Correlation Program produced a new palaeotectonic-palaeo-geographic atlas of the western PeriTethyan domain. The atlas contains more than two hundred new maps and documents grouped in nine regional sets (Iberia, Polish Trough, Eastern European and Scythian Platforms, Moesian Platform, Levant, Arabian Platform,, Northern Africa, NE Africa-NW Arabia, Libya-Pelagian Shelf plus a set of reconstructions for the whole western Tethys. The area, considered in the atlas stretches. from west to east, from the eastern Atlantic shores to the Urals and, from north to south, from the Baltic shield to equatorial Africa; the time span covered extends from the Late. Carboniferous to the Present. The dataset, resulting from an extensive cooperation between industrial and academic sources, is accessible interactively on a CD-ROM (Stampfli et al., 2001a) and includes legend, timetable, short explanatory notes, full references and additional supporting data. This dataset provides information on the development of the Tethyan realm in space and time. In particular, the relation between the Variscan and Cimmerian cycles in the Mediterranean realm is illustrated by numerous palaeogeographic and palaeotectonic maps.

Three essays in dynamic corporate finance

The three essays constituting this thesis focus on financing and cash management policy. The first essay aims to shed light on why firms issue debt so conservatively. In particular, it examines the effects of shareholder and creditor protection on capital structure choices. It starts by building a contingent claims model where financing policy results from a trade-off between tax benefits, contracting costs and agency costs. In this setup, controlling shareholders can divert part of the firms' cash ows as private benefits at the expense of minority share- holders. In addition, shareholders as a class can behave strategically at the time of default leading to deviations from the absolute priority rule. The analysis demonstrates that investor protection is a first order determinant of firms' financing choices and that conflicts of interests between firm claimholders may help explain the level and cross-sectional variation of observed leverage ratios. The second essay focuses on the practical relevance of agency conflicts. De- spite the theoretical development of the literature on agency conflicts and firm policy choices, the magnitude of manager-shareholder conflicts is still an open question. This essay proposes a methodology for quantifying these agency conflicts. To do so, it examines the impact of managerial entrenchment on corporate financing decisions. It builds a dynamic contingent claims model in which managers do not act in the best interest of shareholders, but rather pursue private benefits at the expense of shareholders. Managers have discretion over financing and dividend policies. However, shareholders can remove the manager at a cost. The analysis demonstrates that entrenched managers restructure less frequently and issue less debt than optimal for shareholders. I take the model to the data and use observed financing choices to provide firm-specific estimates of the degree of managerial entrenchment. Using structural econometrics, I find costs of control challenges of 2-7% on average (.8-5% at median). The estimates of the agency costs vary with variables that one expects to determine managerial incentives. In addition, these costs are sufficient to resolve the low- and zero-leverage puzzles and explain the time series of observed leverage ratios. Finally, the analysis shows that governance mechanisms significantly affect the value of control and firms' financing decisions. The third essay is concerned with the documented time trend in corporate cash holdings by Bates, Kahle and Stulz (BKS,2003). BKS find that firms' cash holdings double from 10% to 20% over the 1980 to 2005 period. This essay provides an explanation of this phenomenon by examining the effects of product market competition on firms' cash holdings in the presence of financial constraints. It develops a real options model in which cash holdings may be used to cover unexpected operating losses and avoid inefficient closure. The model generates new predictions relating cash holdings to firm and industry characteristics such as the intensity of competition, cash flow volatility, or financing constraints. The empirical examination of the model shows strong support of model's predictions. In addition, it shows that the time trend in cash holdings documented by BKS can be at least partly attributed to a competition effect.